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The Wise Prince in the Defiant Sayyed 
A comparative study between The Prince of Niccolo Machiavelli and Hassan 
Nasrallah’s Behavior 
 
MANAL N. SARROUF 
 
Abstract 
Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah has proved to be one of Lebanon’s 
most influential political and religious figures in the country’s modern history. His 
influence has even surpassed Lebanese territories as people rallied in the streets of Egypt, 
Syria, Iran and other countries glorifying him for the 2006 “Divine Victory” over Israel. 
While he is adored by many, and even worshiped by some; his political rivals remain 
skeptical of him, detest him, fear him or at least fear his ideology and his party’s rising 
power in a weak state like Lebanon. 
Nasrallah has closely watched the development of Hezbollah since its formation and has 
contributed to its progress and disputed successes. Given the party’s ascending power and 
emergence as a major regional military player facing Israel, Nasrallah has become a leader 
with domestic, regional and international influence since he succeeded assassinated 
Secretary General Abbas al-Moussawi in 1992. 
This study delves into all the details of Nasrallah’s biography as well as his religious, 
ideological and political beliefs and practices. It aims to examine to what extent Nasrallah’s 
leadership traits resemble those of one of the well-known leadership models, The Princeof 
Niccolo Machiavelli.  
The comparison is made between Nasrallah as a person and the fictitious Prince in 
Machiavelli’s book. The study is aware of the limitations to this comparison such as the 
difference in time when The Prince was written, back in the 1500s, and modern times. It is 
also aware of another limitation which is the difference in the type of rule between 
Machiavelli’s principalities and Lebanon’s republic and as such between the position of 
Machiavelli’sPrince –as a country ruler- and that of Nasrallah- as a party leader. The study 
moves from the premise that Hezbollah is the principality ruled by Nasrallah.  
The study encompasses the following main sections: the acquisition of power, the qualities, 
the actions and achievements, and the military aspect. It concludes with the limitations to 
Nasrallah’s leadership which renders it impossible for him to have absolute power without 
any constraints.  
 
Keywords: Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah, Lebanon, The Prince, Niccolo Machiavelli, 
Machiavellian, Leader, Ideology, Wilayat al-Faqih, Jurisdiction Of The Jurist-Theologian, 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
“We are nobler, higher, grander, purer, more sincere, more virtuous, more faithful 
and more eminent than that one would dare issue accusations against our patriotic 
background,” says1 the leader of the Lebanese Shiite militant-political group Hezbollah 
Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in one of his 2005 speeches, conveying a clear notion of 
superiority vis-à-vis his Lebanese counterparts. Nasrallah even goes further in the same 
speech and challenges the other Lebanese groups inquiring of them about their identity, 
their past, previous positions, and alliances.  
Similar rhetoric has been reiterated by the Hezbollah chief on several occasions. This 
holier-than-attitude has incited abundant responses from various Lebanese political leaders 
who felt offended by Nasrallah’s words and considered his recurrent statements insulting to 
their leadership and their masses.  
When a Shiite leader like Nasrallah addresses his majorly Shiite audience with such words, 
he is clearly denoting that the times have changed and that his historically marginalized 
community is no longer the same.  It has rather accumulated some sort of power, basically 
military and political, which Nasrallah relies on in attributing grandeur to his people and in 
motivating them with such arrogance. One could easily deduce that Nasrallah is bluntly 
warning everybody that his previously dispossessed community should be dealt with 
differently, always citing its “honorable” past and hence its uprising power. In an attempt to 
                                                            
1 Retrieved from: http://www.10452lccc.com/hizbollah/nasrallah25.11.05.htm 
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prove this abovementioned “honor”, Nasrallah is always keen on emphasizing the role of 
the party, which he intentionally refers to as the Resistance, in preserving Lebanon.  
As it is known, the Shiite community has not played any significant political role in 
Lebanon’s history before the emergence of Imam Moussa al-Sadr in the 1970s. Neither in 
the formation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 nor in the establishment of the Maronite-Sunni 
National Pact of 1943 did the Shia have a say in determining the distribution of power in 
the sectarian country Lebanon although they were only given the position of the Speaker of 
Parliament which was insignificant at the time. Amidst the Maronite-Sunni dominance, the 
Shiite community in Lebanon ranked last among others in terms of education, social, 
political and economic standards which led to Sadr’s formation of the Movement of the 
Deprived [Harakat al-Mahroumin]. Today,Nasrallah takes pride that his people have 
liberated south Lebanon from the Israeli occupation in May 2000 and thus claims that no 
one is more devoted to safeguard the country’s sovereignty and freedom than his own 
people. 
One cannot but ask: what factors make Nasrallah adopt such a tone and why does he allow 
himself to consider his people superior to others? What changes have occurred in Lebanese 
politics to make him gain such confidence? Or, do these words only intend to keep his 
supporters’ morale high while matters differ when it comes to actions? 
Lebanon is a weak state which is not in full control of all its territory. Given the case, the 
“Party of God” [literal translation of the Arabic word “Hezbollah”] imposes itself as a 
predominant non-state actor which has established its own military power and welfare 
3 
 
system and has become a state-within-the-state. For instance, the Lebanese army cannot 
practice its full authority in the Beirut suburbs known as Dahiyeh and certain regions in the 
Bekaa and the South where Hezbollah has established its own strongholds.  
It is true that Nasrallah has proved to be one of Lebanon’s most influential public and 
religious figures in the country’s modern history; however, one should not mistakenly 
assume that Nasrallah would have achieved such success had Hezbollah not been a highly 
ideological, well structured, well organized and well funded party. Nasrallah’s influence 
has arguably surpassed Lebanese territories as people rallied in the streets of Egypt, Syria, 
Iran and other countries glorifying him for the 2006 “Divine Victory” over Israel. 
While he is adored by many, and even worshiped by some, his political rivals remain 
skeptical of him, dislike him, fear him or at least fear his ideology and his party’s rising 
power. At the time when some people say that they are ready to offer their lands, homes, 
and even their children or their own lives for the sake of Nasrallah and the Resistance, 
others have their hearts full of hatred toward the Sayyed2 who allowed his men on May 7, 
2008 to invade their homes in Beirut and other areas. 
Nasrallah has closely watched the development of Hezbollah since its formation following 
the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and has contributed to its progress and disputed 
successes. With the party’s rising power and emergence as a significant regional military 
player gaining its legitimacy from Wilayat al-Faqih-- the Jurisdiction of the Jurist-
                                                            
2 The title Sayyed in Shiite Islam is given to those who are considered descendents of Prophet Mohammad 
either through their mothers or fathers.   
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Theologian-- to face Israel, Nasrallah’s leadership has gained a regional dimension since he 
succeeded assassinated Hezbollah Secretary General Abbas al-Moussawi in 1992. 
Nasrallah has also gained to some extent an international importance whereby the United 
States has the party on its list of terrorist organizations. In his speeches, Nasrallah always 
addresses world leaders, attacks them and sometimes offends them, especially when it 
comes to the US. Such an attitude poses the question regarding to what extent Nasrallah 
really understands the West, and again whether his words are not mere demagogic slogans 
and could ever have any concrete impact in terms of politics beyond Lebanon. 
Who is Hassan Nasrallah, and by whom was he influenced? What are his leadership 
characteristics, and do they match with any of the well-known leadership styles? 
This study intends to delve into the details of Nasrallah’s biography as well as his religious, 
ideological and political beliefs and practices. It intends to scrutinize to what extent 
Nasrallah’s leadership traits resemble those of one of the well-known leadership models, 
The Prince of Niccolo Machiavelli.  
However, it is noteworthy to mention that the study is aware of the limitations to this 
comparison. Such limitations include the difference in the time when The Prince was 
written, during the latter part of 1513 early 1514, and our days. It is also aware of another 
limitation which is the difference in the type of rule between Machiavelli’s principalities 
and Lebanon’s republic and as such between the position of The Prince –as a country ruler- 
and that of Nasrallah- as a party leader. The aim is therefore to focus on the description of 
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the wise Prince, as suggested by Machiavelli, and to examine whether it applies to 
Nasrallah as one of Lebanon’s most prominent party leaders. 
This study moves from the premises that although Machiavelli’s Princehas been criticized 
and misinterpreted by many who only focus on the evil side of The Prince, a positive side 
cannot be dropped. Indeed, Machiavelli has offered valuable means for a Princeto ensure 
not only his own security but also that of the state. Machiavelli is also concerned with the 
power and the security of the state and with the need that the ruler achieve the best interest 
of his country. Thus, this study tries to discover to what extent Nasrallah cares about 
Lebanon’s security and national interest, and whether at any point he favors his party’s 
well-being and ideological extension at the expense of Lebanon. 
When setting the comparison between The Prince and Nasrallah, this study will encompass 
four main sections: the acquisition of power, the qualities, the actions and achievements, 
and the military aspect.  
Under each section, the study will discuss the description of the Prince mentioned by 
Machiavelli and will try to relate it to concrete examples from Nasrallah’s leadership. These 
examples encompass particular events, opinions on Nasrallah given by his adversaries and 
his supporters, as well as direct quotes taken from the speeches of the Hezbollah chief. 
This study is aware of the limitations to such a comparison between Nasrallah and the 
fictitious Prince in Machiavelli’s book as well as the limitations to Nasrallah’s leadership. 
The latter limitations will be thoroughly discussed in the conclusion of this research paper.  
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The literature on Lebanese leaders has mostly focused on their biographies and 
autobiographies rather than offering an assessment or analysis of their behavior and 
leadership styles. Several books and studies have so far been written about Hezbollah: its 
formation, history, ideology, and functioning. Some studies have included Nasrallah’s 
biography based on his own narration of the various stages of his life while other books 
compiled his various speeches in both Arabic and English. Therefore, the importance of this 
study is that it goes beyond narrating Nasrallah’s biography or compiling his speeches and 
tries to shed the light on his behavior within the context of his background and ideology. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A Strong Hezbollah in a Weak Lebanon 
Hassan Nasrallah is neither the President of Lebanon nor its Prime Minister nor its Speaker 
of Parliament, but only a party leader. Even his religious title and he being the Secretary 
General of the “Party of God” does not entitle him to be the leader of the entire Shiite 
community in Lebanon. Nevertheless, some of Nasrallah’s decisions have resulted in 
serious repercussions at the level of the whole country. Despite some Lebanese parties’ 
strong opposition to Hezbollah, its policies and strategies, Nasrallah chooses to speak on 
behalf of all the Lebanese and gives himself the right to manipulate Lebanon’s domestic 
and foreign policies.  
For instance, in July 2006, Nasrallah engaged the whole country in a 33-day war with Israel 
through abducting two Israeli soldiers as a means to liberate a Lebanese detainee, Samir al-
Quntar, and others from the Israeli prisons. He neither consulted the Lebanese government 
nor any other party leader with whom he was sitting at the National Dialogue Table only 
few days before. Even when peaceful methods were adopted by Nasrallah for the prisoners’ 
swaps with Israel, the Lebanese government was out of the game. The Hezbollah chief 
chose the mediator, set the negotiation conditions, and in the end called on the Lebanese 
authorities to come and welcome the liberated Lebanese prisoners.  
On February 26, 2010 Syrian President Bashar al-Assad hosted his Iranian counterpart 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Nasrallah in Damascus in a significant meeting, only 
few days after the US called on Syria to distance itself from Iran and stop arming 
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Hezbollah. Having the Syrian-Iranian axis represented by its presidents, Nasrallah again 
chose to represent Lebanon in a meeting that intended to send a clear message of 
resentment to the US and support to “resistance” movements.  
Such unilateral actions by Nasrallah represent a clear contradiction to Lebanon’s 
democratic system and reflect an image of autocratic rule detested by most Lebanese in a 
country of minorities. It is therefore very important to understand the role of Hezbollah, its 
position, its capabilities, and its advantages vis-à-vis the Lebanese state as well as the other 
parties. So before focusing on Nasrallah’s leadership traits and matching his characteristics 
with any already established model, we should put his leadership within its right context 
and his party’s presence in Lebanon and the region within the correct framework.  
In order to understand the favorable conditions that allowed Hezbollah’s strong emergence, 
Lebanon’s position and status in the Middle East should be taken into consideration. For 
this purpose, we will move from the premises that Lebanon is a weak state unable solely to 
determine its foreign policy and control all its territory. 
Talking about the geopolitics of Lebanon, the country’s strategic position in the Middle 
East further complicated its situation, especially that it has failed to maintain a policy of 
neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1948. Lebanon has also been used as a proxy by 
its militarily powerful neighbors Syria and Israel to fight the battles of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict which only resulted in massive losses and deeper internal divisions.  
“Lebanon has been a victim not only of internal divisiveness, but also of its geographical 
location and regional environment,” argues Walid E. Moubarak in his article on “The 
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Position of a Weak State in an Unstable Region: The Case of Lebanon” (2003, p.2). He 
adds that Lebanon was transformed into a hostage of outside interests and was used as a 
battleground for other countries’ rivalries (2003, p.4).  He also points out that Lebanon was 
unable to determine its own policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict due to the structural 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the Lebanese political system (2003, p.4). 
The weakness of the Lebanese state and its successive failures to act as a sovereign entity 
has dragged the country into getting involved in external conflicts. This weakness has 
paved the way for transnational guerillas and domestic paramilitary groups to operate freely 
on Lebanese soil thus highlighting the link between the state’s failure and external conflict. 
In view of that, Lebanon’s stability depends on external factors and balances of power and 
not only on the decisions and actions of the Lebanese players. These factors and balances of 
power have even put Lebanon’s sovereignty at stake furthering its weakness.  
The first major blow to Lebanon’s sovereignty was the Cairo Agreement of 1969 which 
allowed the Palestinian factions to use the South to launch guerrilla attacks against Israel. 
This agreement legitimized the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon and transformed the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) into a state-within-a-state in Lebanon, a de-facto 
situation that the Maronites in particular could not tolerate. Consequently, war broke out in 
1975 as the Palestinians aligned themselves with the Lebanese National Movement led by 
Kamal Jumblatt against the Lebanese Front,3 which was the coalition of Christian parties 
and intellectuals-like Charles Malik, Fouad Frem al-Boustany, and Said Akl. The several 
                                                            
3 Among the founders of the Lebanese Front were Camille Chamoun, Pierre Gemayel, Sleiman Franjieh who 
halted his participation in 1978, Charles Malik, Fouad Frem al-Boustany, Father Sharbel Qassis, Said Akl   
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years of the Civil War then rolled on until they came to a halt with the Taif Agreement in 
1989. Even that accord, which brought the Civil War to an end, compromised Lebanese 
sovereignty as it allowed the deployment of Syrian military units within Lebanon. 
Consequently, a Syrian political, security and military hegemony prevailed in Lebanon up 
until April 26, 2005 which marked the withdrawal of the last Syrian troops from Lebanon. 
This withdrawal followed the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and the 
emergence of Lebanon’s Second Independence Intifada4 [revolution].   
Throughout its 15 years of civil war, Lebanon had been the hotbed for various paramilitary 
groups that were used by foreign powers to achieve their interests. When the war came to 
an end, some of those groups implemented the Taif Accord and gave up their weapons to 
the state while others did not.5 Among the latter, the Palestinian factions still retain their 
weapons in a clear violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty. Although the Lebanese leaders 
agreed during the early 2006 rounds of national dialogue to disarm the Palestinian groups 
outside the 12 refugee camps and to organize the possession of arms inside the camps, this 
decision has not yet come into practice. The Lebanese Army is still not allowed to enter the 
refugee camps and is only deployed at their outskirts. These camps are thus off limits for 
the army which cannot even raid houses in search of wanted people except for the 2007 
battles against Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp. The Palestinian factions 
in Lebanon have various affiliations with foreign countries as well. Armed factions such as 
                                                            
4 Also known as the Cedar Revolution. An estimation of one million and a half Lebanese rallied to the streets 
of downtown Beirut on March 14, 2005 calling for Lebanon’s freedom, sovereignty, and independence.  The 
political coalition of Christian and Sunni parties that took part in that demonstration became known as the 
March 14 coalition. Prior to that demonstration around one million Lebanese gathered in Riad al-Soleh Square 
in a “Thank you Syria” demonstration which was primarily led by Hezbollah. 
5 The Christian Lebanese Forces militia was the first to hand over its weapons to the state.  
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the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC) located in 
the Bekaa and the “Jund Al Sham” located in the Ain Al-Hilweh refugee camp are affiliated 
to Syria. Consequently, an external factor is integral to any solution to this issue. There 
have also been attempts by Palestinian factions to connect the issue of their weapons to the 
refugees’ social situation inside the camps and to their civil rights.  
The armed Palestinian presence is not the only factor imposing a danger on Lebanon’s 
sovereignty, security and stability, and making the state incapable of practicing its authority 
throughout its territories. Hezbollah is a Lebanese paramilitary group existing in parallel 
with the Lebanese state and contributing to its weakness as well. 
The ascendancy of Shiite militarism in Lebanon, backed by Iran, came as the result of the 
various low-level wars that took place in Lebanon and which contributed, among other 
things, to the breakdown of the Lebanese state, the weakening of the PLO, and the coercive 
or conciliatory deployment of foreign military forces (Moubarak, 2003, p.6). This 
ascending Shiite militarism is still on the rise and the “Party of God” loudly announces that 
it will not give up its weapons as long as the Israeli threat exists. Chapter 3 will touch on 
the formation of Hezbollah while this chapter will define the party’s role at the domestic, 
regional and international levels. 
When addressing Hezbollah’s role at the domestic level, one should note that the party has 
political, military, socio-economic, cultural and media functions which will all be discussed 
in details throughout this study. These various functions enabled Hezbollah to gain a strong 
popular support, especially among the Shia. The party has known how to preserve its 
12 
 
popularity and the loyalty of its supporters, always backing up its various actions by 
emphasizing its resistance, religion and ideology duties. However, this does not suggest that 
Hezbollah is only a dogmatic party because the course of events since its formation after 
the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon shows that the party has managed to be successfully 
pragmatic at the various political, social and military levels. Hezbollah has indeed known 
how to play the role of the armed resistance in the South and how to act as a political party 
inside the parliament and the cabinet. Despite its ideology, Hezbollah has shown flexibility 
in dealing with various developments on the domestic level. Nasrallah reflects this 
flexibility in his variant tone when addressing different political and security developments 
that take place. Sometimes he gives reassuring and calm speeches and some other times he 
resorts to fiery and threatening ones. 
Hezbollah’s direct involvement in Lebanese domestic politics and governance began in 
1992 when the party decided to take part in the first parliamentary elections following the 
15-year Civil War. A 12-member delegation including prominent Hezbollah officials and 
members of the party’s Shura Majlis or Council was tasked with studying the advantages 
and disadvantages of Hezbollah’s participation in the parliamentary elections (Qassem, 
2010, pp. 313-314). A-ten-out-of twelve vote favored the party’s participation; however, 
such a step needed the approval of the Jurist-Theologian Imam Khomeini (Qassem, 2010, 
pp. 319-320).  Upon the latter’s blessing, Nasrallah held a press conference announcing the 
party’s decision to run in the elections. Since then, the party has participated in all the 
parliamentary elections that followed and won parliamentary seats which it allocated to 
Shia, Sunni and Christian Members of Parliament (MPs).  
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“Hezbollah’s parliamentarians have blended with the Lebanese fabric, which enabled them 
to reach out to the various groups in record time. They have entered the political reality 
from within, and revealed the party’s other face,” says Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General 
Skeikh Naim Qassem (2010, p. 322). He adds that Hezbollah’s MPs played a legislative 
role and the party gained official recognition of its proper representation of the public 
highlighting that this infuriated the US Administration and Israel (2010, p. 322). 
Hezbollah’s integration into the state institutions came despite its criticism of Lebanon’s 
sectarian and corrupt system. Although it disapproved the system, Hezbollah favored 
pragmatism to its ideology and seemingly adopted a non-religious electoral campaign 
which set resistance and abolishing political sectarianism as its primary goals. Also, 
Hezbollah’s representation in the parliament has allowed the party to further strengthen its 
legitimacy. In other words, Hezbollah officials easily denounce claims pertaining to the 
party’s unpopularity or illegitimacy of its resistance duties by relying on the ballots to 
advocate that people support their cause and to assure that their presence inside the state 
institutions is democratic and based on the people’s free choice.  
Up until April 2005, Hezbollah refused to take part in the successive governments. In 2005, 
the political situation in Lebanon changed drastically, a fact which Hezbollah was clearly 
aware of. Thus, the party decided to enter the transitional cabinet of Prime Minister Najib 
Mikati tasked with preparing that year’s parliamentary elections, which were the first to 
take place after the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.  Hezbollah realized the need for it to 
be inside the cabinet in order to maintain the balance of power in favor of its resistance 
wing which was facing increasing domestic and international pressure to disarm.  
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Hezbollah also knew how to impose its recognition on the government especially in the 
Ministerial Statement of the Western-backed cabinet of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora 
which offered explicit support to the resistance and legitimized its role in defending 
Lebanon against Israel.6 Despite internal objections, Hezbollah has succeeded in gaining 
legitimacy in all the following cabinets’ ministerial statements. The state’s weakness is also 
evident in the internal debates that emerged upon introducing a clause-which states that 
Lebanon has the right to defend itself against any Israeli aggression with its people, army 
and Resistance- to the Ministerial Statement of Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s 2009 cabinet.  
The Christian parties in the March 14 alliance ended up voicing their objection to the 
inclusion of this clause which was not omitted.  
Since 2005, Hezbollah has refused the appointment of any foreign minister who is not 
Shiite and affiliated to the Amal Movement and thus to it.7 Hezbollah is therefore 
determined to be at the core of Lebanon’s diplomacy and foreign policy making. The “Party 
of God” is keen on having a pro- Resistance minister and at the same time imposing his 
recognition on the other countries which it believes are targeting its weapons. 
Hezbollah has managed to impede the government’s internal decision-making process 
through halting its ministers’ participation, alongside those of the Shiite Amal Movement, 
on several turning points such as in December 2005. Then, the cabinet wanted to extend the 
mandate of the International Independent Investigative Commission (IIIC) probing into the 
                                                            
6  Fouad Siniora’s cabinet was formed after the March 14 alliance won the majority in the parliamentary 
elections. Only the Free Partriotic Movement was not allocated any ministerial seats in it.  
7 The Foreign Ministry portfolio had been conventionally allocated to the Greek Orthodox and later to the 
Maronite denominations. 
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Hariri assassination and the following assassinations8 and to request the UN Security 
Council to establish an International Tribunal. The Hezbollah and Amal ministers resigned 
from the cabinet in November 2006 when it was studying the draft of the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon. The ministers’ resignation obstructed the work of the cabinet which Hezbollah 
labeled as illegitimate since the Shia sect was no longer represented in it.9 
Hezbollah’s political decisions are not only backed by people’s votes but also by a huge 
arsenal. Since 1982, Hezbollah has built up its own military power which it operates 
independently from the Lebanese state, but in coordination with Syria and Iran without 
which it cannot possess these weapons. Hezbollah’s military preponderance over the state 
became debatable following the Israeli unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000. 
Before that, there was consensus that resistance against Israel was the Lebanese legitimate 
right amidst occupation. That consensus was highly reinforced, if not imposed, by Syria 
which was enjoying a complete political and security hegemony in Lebanon. The Israeli 
withdrawal followed the failure of Syrian-Israeli peace talks in March 2000 and was met 
with skepticism by the Lebanese and Syrian leaders. It was in Syria’s interest to protect 
Hezbollah’s armed presence in Lebanon as both a domestic and regional card to preserve 
the internal and external balances of power. After the liberation of the South, the state failed 
to fill the power vacuum in that region where it had already been absent for years. It was 
rather Hezbollah that took the lead and acted as an independent and sovereign entity 
imposing its authority amid the state’s full absence.  
                                                            
8 Several public Lebanese anti-Syrian figures including MPs, ministers and journalists were also assassinated 
in addition to various bombings that targeted Christian areas.  
9 Prime Minister Fouad Siniora rejected the ministers’ resignation to avoid re-appointing other Shia figures in 
their posts. 
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The Lebanese state’s decision not to deploy the Lebanese army in the South following the 
Israeli withdrawal revealed its political and military weakness. This decision showed that 
the state lacked both the military capabilities and the national political consensus especially 
that Damascus predetermined Lebanon’s decisions. 
Hezbollah’s militarism continues to pose a direct threat to the state’s sovereignty and 
despite all efforts to engage the party in a dialogue over a national defense strategy, it has 
not represented yet its own vision in this regard and strictly refuses its disarmament 
declaring that the occupied Shebaa Farms are still to be liberated. Israel occupied the 
Shebaa Farms during the 1967 Six-Day War with Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Upon its 
withdrawal from Lebanon, Israel and the United Nations declared that the UN Security 
Council Resolution 425 was fully implemented as they consider these lands to be Syrian. 
Lebanon and Syria claim that these farms are Lebanese; however, Damascus has not 
presented yet any official documents, ratified by Lebanon and Syria, which prove the 
farms’ identity to the United Nations. Meanwhile, Hezbollah exploits the issue to justify the 
retention of its weapons.   
Politics and military power aside, Hezbollah plays a major role at the socio-economic level 
where the state is also weak given Lebanon’s highly patrimonial system of prevailing 
“clientelism.” People rely on the Zou’ama [leaders] rather than the state institutions for the 
provision of services, especially that the state fails to meet their demands. The government 
remains incapable, following the long years of war, to supply electricity and water to all the 
Lebanese areas. Unequal development also remains a challenge for the state amidst its 
ongoing reconstruction processes. Hezbollah has known how to benefit well from the 
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situation to gain the people’s support and loyalty through offering public goods which are 
supposedly the state’s responsibility.  Hospitalization, education, electricity, water, garbage 
collection, agricultural aid, and reconstruction are no longer a problem for the residents of 
Hezbollah’s strongholds including the South, Dahiyeh and some Bekaa areas. Hezbollah 
has also established its own institutions to take care of the party’s injured and of the 
martyrs’ families.  
Through offering these services to the Shiite community in particular, the “Party of God” is 
taking the role of the government and transforming those people’s loyalty to it as opposed 
to the state’s negligence. Qassem refuses the Western assumption that these services are 
intended for recruitment advocating that social work aims at strengthening the supporters’ 
belief in the viability of the party’s cause and course (2010, p. 165). He adds that the party 
joins forces with its supporters to remain powerful and dogged in its political and resistance 
roles (2010, p. 165). Hezbollah’s welfare system and public services will be discussed in 
details throughout this research paper and the role of each of the party’s institutions will be 
addressed. 
The populations of weak states are much more likely to identify with non-state actors who 
are acting either against the state or at least in defiance of the state’s authority (Atzili, 2007, 
p. 17). Weak states lack the ability to control violence and govern efficiently and they are 
also incapable of gaining enough legitimacy and identification on the part of the people 
(Atzili, 2007, p. 17). This partly explains Hezbollah’s supporters’ strong identification and 
full commitment to their party.  For instance, during a protest against the Lebanese cabinet 
on December 1st 2006 in downtown Beirut, a Hezbollah supporter brought down the 
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Lebanese flag and replaced it with his party’s flag with the encouragement of the crowds 
cheering for Imam Ali (frombeirut, 2006). 
Moving on to the cultural influence of Hezbollah, perhaps the most recent example could 
be the establishment of a war museum in the southern village of Mlita. On its tenth 
anniversary of the liberation of the south, the party introduced a Jihadi tourism model 
where it displays confiscated Israeli weaponry, equipment and destroyed tanks.  Media 
reports said the museum cost more than 3 million dollars which according to Hezbollah 
were supplied from private donations (Antelava, 2010). This comes after Israel had 
completely destroyed in 2006 the Israeli prison in the Lebanese southern village of Khiam 
which Hezbollah had transformed into a touristic site after the liberation. 
Hezbollah established its own television station, Al-Manar, in 1991 and its own radio 
station, An-Nour, in 1988. The party has extensively used its media outlets as a tool in its 
psychological war against Israel, a factor which will also be further discussed later on. 
Moving on to the regional level and as it was mentioned before; Lebanon’s domestic 
politics is highly affected by the external balances of power. Most of the domestic players 
in Lebanon have ties with foreign powers, be it regional or international. In the case of 
Hezbollah, the party’s alliance with Syria and ideological commitment to Iran is announced 
the same way its enmity to Israel and the US is emphasized by all its leaders, officials and 
supporters. After its recurrent confrontations with Israel since 1982 and most notably in 
1993, 1996 and 2006, Hezbollah has succeeded in imposing itself as a regional player 
backed by regional powers.  
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Hezbollah plays a role in serving the interests of the Syrian-Iranian axis with respect to 
Israel; nonetheless, it cannot be considered a mere proxy for these two powers. One should 
keep in mind that the party does exist as a sovereign entity in Lebanon and still possesses a 
capability of decision-making although minor and restricted to internal issues. Hezbollah 
relies on Iran for its armament, financial, religious and ideological support while Syria 
offers the party its political backing and facilitates the shipment of weapons into Lebanon. 
When talking about the relationship with Iran, Qassem describes the points in common 
between the Islamic Republic and the Party of God (2010, pp. 388-389). First, He mentions 
that both believe in the Jurisdiction of the Jurist-Theologian and thus meet within the same 
framework of international leadership legitimacy. He talks second about the harmony 
between Hezbollah and Iran in the general guidelines or theoretical level in terms of Islamic 
principles. Third, Qassem points to the political concord between Hezbollah and Iran with 
respect to the rejection of superpower hegemony, preservation of independence and support 
of liberation movements particularly those aimed against Israel. 
As for the relationship with Syria, Qassem believes that it rests on Hezbollah’s strong 
ideological and political principles (2010, p. 399). He explains that Hezbollah does not 
view this relationship as mandatory or accidental but rather the cornerstone for facing major 
regional obligations. He adds that this relationship encompasses a lengthy experience of 
grave and complicated circumstances and it does not stand at the limits of concept or 
interest. He also advocates such a relationship’s utility and necessity.  
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Hezbollah’s regional ties weaken Lebanon on two levels: from within and from the outside. 
First, these ties do not necessarily meet the expectations of all the Lebanese and as such 
they intensify internal divisions and conflicts, and consequently weaken the state from 
within. Second, these ties do not necessarily serve the best national interest of Lebanon as 
they may sometimes use it as a battlefield in a tough regional confrontation. In other words, 
whether the Lebanese government approves it or not, Hezbollah, backed by Syria and Iran, 
takes decisions pertaining to regional confrontations with Israel. For a long time, Syria and 
Iran have been playing the Hezbollah card and conducting the battle with Israel on the 
Lebanese territories. The Hezbollah card is efficient in times of peace just like in times of 
war. Syria has always used this card to level up its bargaining position in peace talks with 
Israel.  On the other hand, Iran also uses this card in its ongoing nuclear conflict with the 
international community. 
Moving on to the international level, Lebanon has been under increasing pressure to disarm 
Hezbollah since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 in September 2004. 
The resolution stipulated, among other things, the disbanding and disarmament of all 
Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. This international pressure significantly increased 
after the 2005 Independence Revolution, following which the parliamentary elections 
brought an anti-Syrian majority to power for the first time in 30 years.   
While all the pressure aimed at cornering Hezbollah, it did not stand still and fiercely 
retaliated. The “Party of God” strongly opposed any attempts to disarm it, no matter from 
where they came, advocating that such a demand is an Israeli one and crying out loud that 
UN resolution 1559 is a “project of internal strife” in Lebanon. As a matter of fact, the 
21 
 
Lebanese state stood as a weak player incapable of balancing between external demands 
and internal challenges. The government stood confused amidst international pressure led 
by the United States, and an internal threat of civil war if Hezbollah’s weapons are targeted. 
The Lebanese government and its officials insisted in all international meetings, 
declarations and the cabinets’ Ministerial Statements that Hezbollah is not a militia but a 
Resistance against Lebanon’s enemy, Israel. The government refused any Western labeling 
of Hezbollah as a terrorist group insisting that it is part of the Lebanese society and its arms 
are a domestic affair to be resolved only through dialogue.  
Hezbollah’s confrontation with Israel has given it in addition to its regional dimension an 
international dimension as well, given the US strong alliance with Israel. During and after 
the 2006 July War, Hezbollah has been more than ever at the core of the Middle East 
conflict which gave the party some importance on the international level. The party faced 
increasing calls to disarm this time coming from Arab states as well such as Egypt, Jordan 
and Kuwait. Today, Hezbollah is at the heart of any peace talks in the region since it is a 
bargaining tool for Syria and Iran. It is also at the core of any possible military conflict in 
the region as it would expectedly not be idle if Syria or Iran is attacked. 
Hezbollah consistently tries to give itself a role beyond Lebanon. The party has repeatedly 
announced its enmity to the United States starting with its 1985 Open Letter which 
constituted the party’s first political platform in which it announced its public political 
work. Even before that, Hezbollah is allegedly responsible for the 1983 Beirut Barracks 
bombing which separately targeted the US Marines and the French military which were part 
of the international forces resulting in the death of 241 Americans and 56 French military 
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personnel. Hezbollah is also believed to be behind the 1984 blast that targeted the US 
Embassy annex which resulted in the death of 24 people including 2 Americans. The party 
is also allegedly responsible for the hijacking of the TWA flight 847 in 1985 during which a 
US Navy diver was killed.  
While Hezbollah is on the US State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations, the 
Europeans do not share this view. For instance, the US’s European ally Britain 
distinguishes between the party’s political and military wings. In March 2009, the British 
Foreign Office Minister Bill Rammel announced that his country is open to talks with 
Hezbollah’s political wing “in light of more positive developments in Lebanon” in 
reference to the formation of a national unity cabinet (Boyle, 2010, para.2). "We will look 
to have further discussions and our overriding objective within that is to press Hezbollah to 
play a more constructive role, particularly to move away from violence," Rammell said. 
This is not to assume that the European countries are not aware that Hezbollah can play a 
role in impeding peace talks in the region and destabilizing it. The nuance is rooted in the 
different approach between US and European foreign policy which favors engagement to 
former US President George W. Bush’s confrontational policy. 
Given Hezbollah’s abovementioned importance on the three intertwined domestic, regional 
and international levels, Nasrallah, the party’s Secretary General who heads its Shura 
Council, becomes an important figure on the three levels. Thus, delving into his leadership 
traits and characteristics might help us understand how this man leads his party, by whom 
and what he is influenced, and what are the limitations to his leadership given his party’s 
structure and ideology.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
Who is Hassan Nasrallah, why Hezbollah? 
Born on August 31, 1960, in the southern village of al-Bazourieh Hassan Abdelkarim 
Nasrallah was the eldest of nine children of a very modest non-political family unknown for 
any extremist religious dedication. Due to poverty and unemployment reasons, the family 
relocated to a very poor area in East Beirut known as “Camp Sharshabouk” Quarter near al-
Karantina. Nasrallah grew up in that area- where Shiites, Maslakh Arabs, Armenians and 
Kurds lived- until 1974 and completed his elementary education at al-Najah School. He 
then had to move with his family to Sin-al-Fil to complete his secondary education. To earn 
a living, Nasrallah’s father owned a small fruits and vegetables shop in “Camp 
Sharshabouk,” where he continued to go even when the family moved to Sin-al-Fil. When 
narrating his own biography, Nasrallah explains that he had been religious since his early 
childhood although he had no political leanings at that time, adding that by the age of nine 
he had already become an observant Muslim (Noe, 2007, p. 117).  Nasrallah recounts how 
at the age of 10 or 11 he used to get his grandmother’s long black scarf, wrap it around his 
head acting as a cleric and calling on the others to pray behind him (Wright, 2006, p. B01). 
"Ever since I was 9 years old, I had plans for the day when I would start doing this," reflects 
Nasrallah on his leadership in an interview with Robin Wright (Wright, 2006, p. B01). 
While the children of his age were attracted to playing games and having fun, Nasrallah had 
other concerns and interests. He used to go pray at nearby mosques outside Al-Karantina 
including one in al-Nabaa, where Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah prayed. Nasrallah 
believes that he became particularly religious due to the milieu he lived in noting that his 
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home was observant in a traditional way (Noe, 2007, p. 117).  When as a kid Nasrallah 
went to help his dad at work, he used to spend hours contemplating the picture of Imam 
Moussa al-Sadr hung on one of the walls of his father’s small shop, slipping into the realm 
of endless dreams (As-Sayyed Ahmad, 2009, p. 20). Nasrallah was fascinated with Sadr 
and dreamed to become like him (As-Sayyed Ahmad, 2009, p. 20). Unlike many of his age, 
Nasrallah was a very pious child who had his own life and read so many Islamic books 
which he used to buy from peddlers at the Martyrs’ square (As-Sayyed Ahmad, 2009, p. 
20). Whenever he found a difficulty in understanding any of those books he used to keep it 
aside to read it later on, as he grew older (As-Sayyed Ahmad, 2009, p. 21).  
When the Civil War broke out in 1975, Nasrallah’s father took his family back to their 
hometown and Nasrallah completed his secondary education at the public school in Tyre. 
At that time, his village was controlled by leftist and nationalist parties like the Communist 
Party and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, a factor which prompted Nasrallah to form a 
group of religious youths. Nasrallah narrates how he worked with the town’s sheikh, Ali 
Shamseddin, and established a library at the Islamic Center which attracted a significant 
number of young men and women whom he (Nasrallah) gave Islamic lessons (Noe, 2007, 
p.117). 
Only 15 years old, Nasrallah began his political career by joining the Amal Movement and 
becoming its representative in his hometown. Amal was the military wing of the back then 
known “Movement of the Deprived” founded and led by Sadr. Nasrallah’s choice of joining 
Amal was very natural given his fascination with Sadr and his affection toward him as a 
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great leader; although it was odd with respect to his village’s environment. Nasrallah’s 
brother, Hussein, also joined the movement and remains a party official until today.  
Despite his involvement in political activities, Nasrallah maintained his enthusiasm for 
carrying out religious studies. He had always longed to travel to the Iraqi city of Najaf to 
study at the religious seminary [or hawza in Arabic]. During his stays at the mosque in 
Tyre, Nasrallah became friends with Sayyed Mohammad al-Gharawi who wanted to help 
him achieve his ambitions. On January 15, 1976 Nasrallah arrived in Najaf after his friends 
and father collected some money for his trip. Upon his arrival he was almost penniless and 
homeless, only carrying a personal letter from Gharawi to his close friend Imam Sayyed 
Mohammad Baqer al-Sadr –the cousin of Imam Moussa al-Sadr-requesting him to accept 
Nasrallah at his hawza. 
It was Nasrallah’s first travel and he knew no one to resort to in Najaf except for a Sheikh 
known as Ali Karim. Nasrallah was advised by some Lebanese students not to visit Baqer 
al-Sadr to avoid any black mark on his name since the Iraqi regime was pressuring the 
Imam and had him under its surveillance. Karim finally introduced Nasrallah to one of 
Baqer al-Sadr’s followers, Sayyed Abbas al-Mussawi. On their first encounter, Nasrallah 
mistakenly thought Mussawi to be Iraqi due to his dark skin and started talking to him in an 
Iraqi accent. Mussawi laughed asking Nasrallah to relax since he was Lebanese from al-
Nabi Shayth village located in the Bekaa. Mussawi introduced Nasrallah to Baqer al-Sadr 
who decided to put the former under Mussawi’s wing at the educational and personal 
levels. Nasrallah was thus accepted at Baqer al-Sadr’s hawza andgiven a place to sleep and 
a monthly allowance. Mussawi was a strict and meticulous mentor and made Nasrallah and 
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his colleagues in the same group complete an introductory five-year- program in one-and-a-
half years time. The group studied extensively and never rested even on holidays. “We 
feared him because we loved him, and because his attitude toward us as a group went 
beyond that of a teacher and his students-- he was a father, an educator, a friend and the 
authority in charge,” says Nasrallah when describing the relationship with Mussawi (Noe, 
2007, p. 121). Nasrallah believes that Mussawi was someone “extraordinary” to look to and 
be guided by for the youth. “He was all that for us and we loved his way of doing things, 
his seriousness, honesty, and sense of responsibility,” he adds (Noe, 2007, p. 122).  
According to Nicholas Blanford, Mussawi introduced Nasrallah to the radical teachings of 
Baqer al-Sadr and of influential Iranian cleric Ruhollah Khomeini who formulated the 
theory of the Jurisdiction of the Jurist-Theologian (Noe, 2007, p. 4). He adds that Nasrallah 
was profoundly influenced by the teachings of Khomeini quoting Nasrallah as saying that 
Khomeini is “the greatest, most dignified, and undisputed personality of the [twentieth] 
century” (Noe, 2007, p. 4) 
During his stay in Najaf Nasrallah and his colleagues often visited Baqer al-Sadr and 
engaged with him in various discussions. The group built a good relationship with him 
which was also fortified by Mussawi given the two clerics’ closeness. During a ceremony 
held to hand over the turban to the students who completed the introductory program, Baqer 
al-Sadr told Nasrallah: “You are of great significance, and I smell leadership 
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[characteristics] in you. God willing, you are an adherent of the [Imam] al Mahdi,10” (Al-
Rida, 2009, p. 292).  
Starting in 1977, Lebanese students were expelled from Iraq as Saddam Hussein’s regime 
launched a huge campaign against the Shia Islamists. The Iraqi regime accused students 
from various nationalities and particularly the Lebanese of spying for Syria or of belonging 
to the Amal, Daawa and Syrian Baathist parties which were in enmity with the Iraqi 
Baathist Party. Iraqi intelligence forces raided the houses and schools of religious scholars 
and professors including the hawza where Nasrallah was studying. Baqer al-Sader was also 
arrested during the commemoration of the Fortieth day of al-Hussein for a long time and 
subsequently executed in 1980. In mid 1978, Nasrallah was lucky enough not to be at the 
hawza when the Iraqi forces raided it and arrested the students. He was informed of what 
happened and managed to calmly cross the borders and escape to Lebanon since no arrest 
warrant was issued against him yet. He thus got away from the detention and torture unlike 
some of his counterparts. Moussawi was not less lucky than Nasrallah since when the 
captures were taking place he happened to be on a visit to Lebanon and the Iraqi forces 
informed his family to tell him not to return to Iraq.  
Nasrallah is married to Fatmeh Yassin from the southern village of Abbassiyeh since 1978 
and is the father of four children Hadi, Mohammad Jawad, Zeinab, and Mohammad Ali. In 
1997, the Hezbollah chief lost his son Hadi, 18 years old, in an operation against the Israeli 
Armed Forces and his body was returned in the prisoners’ swap that followed.  
                                                            
10 Adherents of the Twelver Shia Islam believe that the 12th Imam is Muhammad al-Mahdi and he went into 
occultation in the eighth century but is still alive. The Shia still await the return of the Hidden or Awaited 
Imam as the Mahdi (the Guided One) to achieve peace, justice and Islamic rule on earth.  
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Nasrallah’s return to Lebanon in 1978 coincided with critical developments in the country 
and the region. In March, Lebanon witnessed the Litani Operation whereby the Israeli 
Forces invaded Lebanon for the first time and deployed in the South up to the Litani River 
in retaliation for a Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) attack on Israeli territory. In 
August, Imam Moussa Sadr disappeared along with two of his companions when they were 
on an official visit to Libya.11 Iran was also facing tremendous challenges in 1978 as huge 
demonstrations began in January to bring down the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and to 
topple the Iranian monarchy. That was the beginning of the 1979 Islamic Revolution which 
established the Islamic Republic of Iran on April 1. 
Amid these drastic changes, Nasrallah insisted on continuing his religious studies without 
abandoning his political activities as he remained a member of the Amal Movement. 
Nasrallah and his colleagues’ ambitions to continue their Islamic learning was pending on 
Mussawi’s decision (Noe, 2007, p. 123). The latter was to decide whether they would go to 
the Iranian city of Qom or somewhere else. In the end, Mussawi decided to establish his 
own religious school in the Bekaa region, from where he originates. Mussawi took the 
blessings of Imam Moussa al-Sadr (who had not disappeared by the time), Sayyed 
Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah and Sheikh Mohammad Mehdi Shamseddine, founded his 
hawza in Baalbek, and called it “The Awaited Imam’s Religious School.” Nasrallah was 
simultaneously a student and a tutor devoting most of his time to religious learning and 
teaching for almost one year. Then Nasrallah and his fellows started organizing various 
                                                            
11 Conflicting reports said that Imam Moussa Sadr arrived in Italy from Libya while others say he was killed 
by Libyan President Muammar al-Gaddafi. Prominent Lebanese Shia leaders consider Libya responsible for 
Sadr’s disappearance and demand it to reveal his fate. 
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activities, seminars, lectures, and awareness campaigns in the Bekaa in coordination with 
Amal.  This allowed him to develop relations with several people active at the Islamic level. 
Up until 1982, Nasrallah occupied organizational positions within Amal and was appointed 
in 1979 as the Movement’s political representative in the Bekaa region and thus a member 
of its political bureau, only 22 years old (Noe, 2007, p. 125).   
Nasrallah split from Amal alongside a number of the movement’s radical cadres in 1982 
following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in protest against the party’s political stances at 
the time. Amal Leader Nabih Berri had agreed to join the National Salvation Committee 
[Jabhat al-Khalas al-Watani in Arabic] formed by President Elias Sarkis to engage the 
strong Lebanese militia leaders in dialogue amidst the Israeli invasion of Beirut. “We 
therefore left Amal without any problem because, at least as far as we were concerned, the 
Movement was no longer up to the task required at that particular juncture, and we were 
seeking an alternative that would allow us to operate the way we wanted to,” reflects 
Nasrallah on the issue (Noe, 2007, p. 125). 
The group considered the Committee an “American-Israeli bridge” allowing the US to enter 
Lebanon and put it under its control (Norton 1987, p. 105). In addition, the group believed 
that Lebanese Forces leader Bashir Gemayel, who was a member of the committee, was 
plotting to become president and reach an agreement with Israel, the enemy they wanted to 
militarily confront (Norton 1987, p. 105). Other Islamist figures including Mussawi, Sheikh 
Ragheb Harb and Sheikh Subhi al-Tufaili, joined the protesting Amal members and formed 
the nucleus of Hezbollah. 
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Damascus at the time was ready to back up Hezbollah in order to counterbalance its old ally 
Berri who by joining the Committee revealed his willingness to consider a deal that favors 
Syria’s enemies (Norton, 2007, p. 23). Syria’s support for Hezbollah also had a regional 
extension pertaining to its will to preserve its relation with Tehran. However, one should 
note that Syria’s support for Hezbollah had its ups and downs within the period of the 
1980s. Damascus did not want to fully favor one Shiite group over the other and turn it 
more powerful, the reason why it maintained its relation with Amal. Also, Damascus 
experienced rocky times in its relation with Tehran and remained wary of Hezbollah’s ties 
to the Islamic Republic (Norton, 2007, p. 35).  
The Islamic Republic of Iran played a substantive role in the formation of Hezbollah and 
did not only provide the party with its political support but attributed great attention to 
building up the party’s military power.  The formation of Hezbollah was indeed a major 
chance for Iran to export its Islamic Revolution, especially that the party in its Islamist 
members and mission represented a model of Iran’s advocated Islamic State. Based on that, 
Ayatollah Khomeini granted his blessings to the party to start operating and as such the 
Shiite party gained its legitimacy from the Jurist-Theologian. Khomeini ordered the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards to assist Hezbollah to confront Israel through providing its members 
with the necessary military training and infrastructure. High-ranking Iranian military 
officials arrived in Lebanon through Syria, amid Iranian-Syrian coordination, and 
established military training camps for Hezbollah members in the western Bekaa. An 
advanced system of training, religious practice and personal as well as moral cultivation 
was devised, and large numbers of young men joined these military camps (Qassem, 2010, 
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p. 66). In a relatively short period of time, the execution of all the training began in the 
South and western Bekaa. According to Nasrallah, the role of the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards was limited to “firing us up with the spirit that prevailed on the front in Iran, but we 
also benefitted from their advanced abilities in our training camps” (Noe, 2007, p. 126). He 
adds that the Revolutionary Guards also helped on the organizational level in defining the 
movement’s operational context and political line (Noe, 2007, p. 126). 
In an interview published in 1993, Nasrallah comments on Hezbollah’s formation and 
assures that it was only a reaction to the partial Israeli occupation of Lebanon, adding that it 
was a “resistance movement, pure and simple” and it never tackled questions related to 
Lebanon’s system and Lebanese political life (Noe, 2007, p. 127). Nasrallah also believes 
that the party’s members deserved to call themselves the “Party of God” because they 
“dedicate[d] themselves to God Almighty and decide[d] to become martyrs in the fight 
against the enemy, in spite of the obvious fact that there is no balance of power either 
militarily or in fighting abilities,” (Noe, 2007, p. 127).  
As one of the party’s co-founders, Nasrallah assumed several positions within Hezbollah. 
He also played an important role in mobilizing young Shiites to join the party and by 1985 
he became the party’s representative in the Bekaa district. At the time, the party mainly 
operated in three Lebanese regions: the Bekaa, Beirut and the South and it only had a 
central command. Nasrallah was then dispatched to Beirut to assume an organizational 
position, especially that he had established good relations with cadres there. In February of 
that year, the party announced its “Open Letter” which was its political manifesto revealing 
the party’s shift from mere secretive resistance to public political work. The “Open Letter” 
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presented the party’s vision and ideology and stated its goals of resistance. The “Open 
letter” criticized the Lebanese sectarian political system and advocated the consensual 
establishment of an Islamic State in Lebanon. It also addressed a message to the US, the 
Zionist enemy, the Christians, the Palestinians, the UN, and the emergency forces.  
In 1987, Nasrallah was appointed as a member of Hezbollah’s Shura Council, the supreme 
corps running the party. He also chaired the party’s Executive Council which was a new 
position created in the party following its expansion. This Council was in charge of 
organization, jihad, cultural and social affairs, and activities without playing any role in the 
party’s political relations.  
Nasrallah remained in that position until he went to Qom in 1989 to resume his religious 
studies. His departure came at a critical time during which the party was amidst an intense 
internal debate. Its Secretary General, Sheikh Subhi al-Tufaili, refused the party’s 
participation in Lebanon’s political system following the adoption of the Taif Accord while 
Nasrallah and Mussawi called for Hezbollah’s necessary implication in politics following 
the end of the war. Blanford argues that the disagreement between Nasrallah and Tufaili 
was not only ideological but reflected a personal antipathy between them (Noe, 2007, p. 7). 
However, Nasrallah denies that his departure for Qom was due to internal disputes within 
Hezbollah and insists that it was due to his eagerness to continue his education which he 
labels as a personal desire (Neo, 2007, 130). After one year, Hezbollah’s Shura Council 
ordered Nasrallah to return as the party’s clashes with Amal had intensified since 1988.  
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Talking about the Amal-Hezbollah clashes, the formation of Hezbollah was in itself an 
objection to Amal’s policies since 1982. An ideological difference between Amal and 
Hezbollah is clearly spotted. While Amal holds on to the moderate teachings of Imam 
Moussa al-Sadr and his nationalist approach, Hezbollah is committed to Khomeini’s radical 
teachings and Shiite Islamist approach.12 Accordingly, tension can easily find its route 
between the two competing Shiite parties. The situation had worsened between Hezbollah 
and Amal starting in 1985 as the former started to further expand its activity in the South at 
the time when the latter had established its own strongholds in the area and had launched its 
resistance campaign against Israel since 1983. Violent inter-Shiite fights erupted in 1988 
during which Hezbollah gave a strong blow to Amal in the South and in the Beirut suburbs 
as well. A Syrian-brokered agreement brought the armed clashes to an end in January 1989. 
Syria allowed Hezbollah to deploy in the south and in return it deployed its own troops 
within southern Beirut. Clashes erupted again between the two parties in 1990 and lasted 
for the coming few years. Today, the competitors claim to be strong allies.  
When Nasrallah returned from Qom Sheikh Naim Qassem was filling in his place, so he 
helped him until the party carried out its new elections in May 1991. As an outcome, Tufaili 
was distanced and Sayyed Abbas al-Moussawi was elected as the party’s Secretary General, 
Qassem as his deputy, and Nasrallah resumed his position as chief of the Executive 
Council.  
                                                            
12 Imam Moussa al-Sadr is not an adherent of Imam Khomeini. Sadr rather adopted the teachings of Imam 
Khouii of Najaf. The latter has greatly opposed Khomeini’s Wilayat al-Faqih labeling it as a heresy.  
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This composition did not last long since on February 16, 1992 Israel conducted a 
helicopter-attack on Moussawi’s convoy killing him, his wife and two children as they were 
on their way back from the southern village of Jibsheet, where a ceremony commemorating 
the martyrdom of Hezbollah’s Skeikh Ragheb Harb was held. 
Only few days later, Nasrallah was unanimously elected Secretary General of the Party of 
God. Under his leadership Hezbollah and Lebanon have witnessed immense changes. 
Nasrallah has further developed the party into a more sophisticated paramilitary group, 
possessing various weapons and setting several strategies and tactics. Hezbollah regularly 
carried out military operations against Israel and the latter launched major aggressions on 
Lebanon most notably in 1993 and 1996. Since 1999, Hezbollah has also focused its 
military attacks against the South Lebanon Army (SLA), which collaborated with Israel. 
Under Nasrallah’s guidance, Hezbollah is accredited for forcing Israel to withdraw its army 
from Lebanon in May 2000. Up until UN Resolution 1701 which brought the 2006 July 
War to an end, Hezbollah insisted that the Lebanese Army should not be deployed in the 
South. 
Why among everybody else was Nasrallah chosen to sail the Hezbollah ship, and what 
allowed his rise to power and maintenance of his position are all essential questions to be 
answered in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Machiavelli’s Prince 
Before moving on to the detailed comparison between Hassan Nasrallah and the 
fictitious Prince in Machiavelli’s book, it is important to shed the light on this distinguished 
political philosopher and diplomat and give a glimpse of his life and of the conditions that 
made him write this book back in the 15th century.  
Machiavelli was born on May 3, 1469, in a Florentine family that has passed through 
difficult periods and lost much of its prestige and power. His father, Bernardo, was a lawyer 
and had accumulated a quite important library for his times, given his modest conditions. 
Machiavelli received a fine and broad early education from private tutors and knew how to 
benefit well from his father’s literary collection. Machiavelli was later accepted into the 
University of Florence where he studied humanities, literature and sciences (Ratliff, 1986, 
p.3). He began building up his career at the public affairs sector and was appointed as the 
Second Chancellor of the Republic of Florence in June 1498. Machiavelli’s appointment 
was facilitated by his university professor Marcello Adriani who, when appointed as First 
Chancellor, chose his brilliant student to fill in the vacancy at his chancery (Ratliff, 1986, p. 
3). There is also a possibility that Machiavelli’s father exerted some influence in this 
direction given his strong relations with respected humanist scholars (Ratliff, 1986, p. 3).  
Machiavelli was also soon assigned to the position of secretary of the Council of the Ten of 
War which was in charge of the diplomatic relations of Florence and of seeking means to 
avoid wars. This appointment engaged Machiavelli in a 14-year period of diplomatic 
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missions with foreign governments-including Germany, France and Switzerland in addition 
to his involvement in the domestic bureaucratic and political fields. Machiavelli handled his 
various political and diplomatic assignments with great facility something proven in his 
essays, and correspondences in addition to his shrewd talent in analyzing and understanding 
the personalities and institutions he dealt with (Nederman, 2009, p.5). Machiavelli also used 
these writings as examples for his political thinking in his writings (Nederman, 2009, p.5).  
Machiavelli got married in 1501 to Marietta Corsini and had seven children. He was often 
away from his family and had reportedly been unfaithful to his wife.  
Machiavelli had also accumulated a good military knowledge and experience aside from his 
diplomatic work. He was authorized by the governing council to organize and arm a local 
militia to help defend the city of Florence instead of the mercenary armies in which 
Machiavelli had no faith. However, Machiavelli’s militia was bitterly defeated in 1512 in 
the town of Prato against the Spanish soldiers that invaded Florentine territories to restore 
the Medici family to power. The Medici family led by Giuliano, the son of Lorenzo the 
Magnificent, returned to power and started dismantling the city’s republican rule and 
institutions including the Great Council. The free republic of Florence was replaced by an 
oligarchy in which the Medici family assumed total power. Machiavelli was among several 
significant figures from the previous republican rule who were dismissed from their offices. 
In 1513, he was accused of plotting against the Medici family and was punished by 
imprisonment and torture. That same year Machiavelli was released upon a political 
amnesty and moved to his farm in San Casciano where he dedicated all his time to writing 
with the hope of being reemployed although his aspirations remained unfulfilled.  
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During the latter part of the year 1513, Machiavelli wrote his masterpiece The Prince and 
dedicated it to Lorenzo De’ Medici who was responsible for his imprisonment and who 
succeeded his grandfather Lorenzo the Magnificent. Accordingly, some might perceive The 
Prince only as an apology offered by Machiavelli to Lorenzo De’ Medici to regain some 
lost power and influence. After all Machiavelli had lost an important position and might 
have simply been desperate to give all it takes to regain it. Opponents to this view might 
perceive sarcasm in Machiavelli’s dedication of this book in the sense that he is implicitly 
telling Lorenzo De’ Medici that he knows not how to rule and offers him guidelines to 
properly govern his principality. Add to that Machiavelli’s strong support to free republics 
as opposed to oligarchies.  
Jean-Jacques Rousseau has long ago held an interesting view as expressed in his Social 
Contract whereby the real lesson of The Prince was to warn people how their prince might 
rule them and to teach them the truth of the prince’s behavior.       
Putting the motives aside, one should admit that for a book to survive and remain applicable 
for almost 500 years, it must reflect its author’s uniqueness and special vision. Also, the 
book is very rich in examples that Machiavelli relies on to validate his ideas and which 
originally stem from his broad military and diplomatic experiences and knowledge.  
Throughout these centuries and until our modern times, history has witnessed several 
leaders who adhered to Machiavelli’s guidelines and ruled according to The Prince’s way. 
Remarkably, most of those leaders labeled as Machiavellian are known for their bloody 
history and have ruled with an iron fist. Leaders from the nineteenth and the twentieth 
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century such as Napoleon I, Adolf Hitler, Josef Stalin and others had been considered 
Machiavellian. This takes us to the general tendency to match Machiavellianism with 
evilness. When you look up the word “Machiavellianism” in the dictionary, you will find 
the offered definitions in line with this tendency. For example, the Oxford Dictionary 
defines the adjective Machiavellian as “cunning, scheming, and unscrupulous, especially in 
politics” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2010). The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines 
Machiavellianism as “the political theory of Machiavelli; especially: the view that politics 
is amoral and that any means however unscrupulous can justifiably be used in achieving 
political power” (Merriam-Webster, 2010). Hence, the word Machiavellianism holds a very 
negative connotation. In fact, Machiavelli was labeled as a diabolical figure immediately 
after the publishing of the book.13 The Catholic Church, in 1559, listed The Prince and all 
of Machiavelli’s works on its Index of Prohibited Books most probably because it viewed 
them as offending to the Catholic Christian Faith. The Protestant Church of England in its 
turn considered Machiavelli evil. For instance, in the prologue of Christopher Marlowe’s 
play “The Jew of Malta,” Machevil is the play’s villainous character who excitedly adopts 
Machiavellian concepts (Ratliff, 1986, p.9). 
Nonetheless, the term “Machiavellian” is in fact amoral in the sense that it is value-neutral. 
Machiavelli actually is not concerned with whether a prince’s actions are good or evil as 
much as he is concerned with having them comply with the necessities of the real world. 
Machiavelli has been severely criticized and misjudged especially in the period after his 
death. The Prince was only viewed as a guideline for tyrants and oppressors, and much of 
                                                            
13The Prince was published in 1532, seven years after Machiavelli’s death. 
39 
 
its richness was disregarded. Indeed, Machiavelli has presented in his masterpiece quite an 
advanced and important style whereby he merged between the philosophical or theoretical 
writing and the historical writing. Almost every single idea introduced in The Prince is 
backed up with real examples of successful as well as failing rulers. This raises the question 
whether what Machiavelli wrote was really new? Well, Machiavelli has perhaps 
courageously written what was known but not declared. He simply wrote what was on the 
mind and in the practices of the leaders of the medieval times. Taking into consideration 
Machiavelli’s humanist education, long diplomatic mission, and his various contacts with 
princes of his times, we can understand Machiavelli’s deep knowledge of the personalities 
of those leaders as well as their acquisition and maintenance of power.  It is also worth 
emphasizing that Machiavelli was a strong advocate of free republics and was highly 
concerned with the state’s security and power and as a matter of fact a true realist. His 
realism and patriotism are also evident in his direct call in the last chapter of the book for 
the unification of Italy and for freeing it from all the foreign invaders, which constitutes a 
true nationalist approach.   
Machiavelli is not only a political thinker but also a military one with an important 
influence, especially when it comes to his treatise The Art of War. In The Prince, 
Machiavelli defends national armies as opposed to mercenary armies, a position that 
complies with his aforementioned patriotism.  
Gerald Lee Ratliff puts it correctly when he describes Machiavelli as “a man of action, a 
statesman, and a diplomat” (1986, p.3). “Thus, he [Machiavelli] exemplifies the ideal of 
versatility, of the integration of thought and action that was so valued by people during the 
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Renaissance. This ideal of the “Renaissance man” can still be useful today, when many 
people feel their individuality is threatened by the tendency to specialize more and more 
narrowly” (Ratliff, 1986, p.3). 
Machiavelli fell sick and died on June 21, 1525. He was buried next to great artists and 
thinkers such as Michelangelo, Rossini and Galileo in the Florentine church of Santa Croce. 
“Tanto nomini nullum par eulogium” meaning “No praise can enhance such a great name” 
is carved on his tombstone.  
A quick overview of The Prince shows us that it is composed of 16 chapters divided mainly 
into four sections. The first 11 chapters define and discuss the various types of 
principalities, their establishment and maintenance. Chapters 12, 13, and 14 focus on 
military power and its importance in safeguarding the Prince’s rule and principality.  
Chapters 15 until 23 entail the qualities and personal traits a ruler must have to be 
successful. The last two chapters discuss Italy’s situation and include a call to unite and free 
Italy. The details entailed in these sections will be at the core of the following chapters of 
this research paper, which will dissect Machiavelli’s ideas and examine Hassan Nasrallah’s 
relevance to them.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Power in hand, ideology at heart 
As it has been earlier mentioned in this research paper, there is a huge time span separating 
between the time when The Prince was written back in the 1500s and our 21st century. The 
types of rule that existed in Machiavelli’s times have changed and shifted toward 
democracies; of course, with the exception of some oligarchies and dictatorships that still 
exist in some part of the world. The world order is different today and so is the international 
political system and relations among the states. In this new order, some non-state actors 
have evolved and reached very advanced levels. They have proved to be vital actors 
occupying an important space in politics and in the military; also acquiring remarkable 
domestic, regional and international power. Based on that, we will consider the sub-state 
group Hezbollah to be the principality run by Nasrallah in the Lebanese supposedly 
democratic republic. Again, this research paper approaches the descriptive aspect of The 
Prince and is mostly concerned with applying the governance guidelines and leadership 
traits suggested by Machiavelli to Lebanon’s Hassan Nasrallah.  
The first section of The Prince, Chapters 1 till 11, focuses on the kinds of principalities and 
how they are acquired, governed and maintained. Here, Machiavelli gives a lengthy 
explanation of the different types of principalities and does not talk much about republics, 
of which he is a strong advocate. In a previous work, The Discourses, Machiavelli 
extensively discussed republics- which are democratic states where the power is in the 
hands of the people and the representatives they elect. In The Prince, Machiavelli confines 
himself to explaining how principalities should be governed and maintained (Griffith ed., 
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1997, p.5). He points out that states are habituated either to live under the prince or to exist 
as free states (Griffith ed., 1997, p.5). He adds that states are attained through the arms of 
others, or by the conqueror’s own troops and arms, or by fortune, or by valor (Griffith ed., 
1997, p.5). Machiavelli mainly distinguishes between hereditary principalities and new 
principalities. Under the second category he mentions two types: those principalities that 
are entirely new and those that are mixed meaning that a territory has been annexed to 
them. He also talks about civil principalities and ecclesiastical ones. 
In brief, hereditary principalities refer to those where the prince’s family has held power 
and governance for a long time. According to Machiavelli, these could be held easily as the 
family sustains its right to power without much objection from the people who rarely 
express any desire to rebel and break the existing status quo (Griffith ed., 1997, p.6). The 
rebellion threat is rather eminent in the mixed principalities which necessitates forceful and 
colonization policies to keep the people of the newly annexed territories under the rule of 
the old hereditary state’s prince (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 7). These mixed principalities are 
only maintained by force and by military power which paves the way for cruelties and 
oppression of freedoms (Griffith ed., 1997, pp.8-10). However, Machiavelli asserts that the 
governing prince will always need the people’s good will and support to succeed in being in 
firm possession of the principality (Griffith ed., 1997, p.7). The civil principalities are those 
where the prince is a prominent shrewd citizen who rises to power by the favor of his 
fellow citizens who could either be the people or the nobles (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 37). 
Machiavelli points out that in the case of the nobles, they often hide behind the prince to 
fulfill their desires and they pose a higher threat to him as they consider themselves his 
43 
 
equals (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 38). On the other hand, when the people bring the prince to 
power they would also be hiding behind his authority to protect themselves because they 
cannot resist the nobles; yet they pose a lesser danger on his power (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 
38).  
Moving on to the ecclesiastical type, these are church-related which makes them difficult to 
acquire. According to Machiavelli, they are achieved through virtue or good fortune; 
however, they could be easily maintained because they live by the powerful ancient 
ordinances of religion (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 44). Hence, they are less likely to witness 
rebellions whereby the princes maintain their position regardless of their conduct and mode 
of life (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 44). Given the case, they enjoy some sort of political stability.  
Hezbollah is the closest to be considered an ecclesiastical principality in the sense of it 
being religious and of course not Christian or church-ruled.14 The Party of God is a Shiite 
Islamic Resistance Movement born in 1982 and is chaired by a religious figure and is 
religiously, ideologically, emotionally, politically, financially and militarily bonded to the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.  
Nasrallah’s vice and co-founder of the party, Qassem, specifies that Hezbollah has three 
main objectives which constitute the primary pillar on which the party is based: Belief in 
                                                            
14It is important to note here this study does not suggest that Hezbollah is an ecclesiastical principality like the 
ones that existed during Machiavelli’s time. Even the latter was aware that his political thought which applies 
to the West does not apply to the East and that the rule of the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire is different. In 
addition, Hezbollah has certain beliefs that surely do not apply to the ecclesiastical principalities which 
Machiavelli refers to. For instance, Hezbollah believes in self-martyrdom and Jihad which do not exist in the 
Christian beliefs of the ecclesiastical principalities in Machiavelli’s times. The resemblance is only in the fact 
that both components have a religious nature.  
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Islam, Jihad15, and the Jurisdiction of the Jurist Theologian [Wilayat al-Faqih] (2010, p. 67, 
86,112). “Belief in Islam is both a conviction and a code of law,” states Qassem also noting, 
in another section of his book, that the Hezbollah members are “utterly committed” to 
Shiite Islam (2010, pp. 67, 83).  
Talking about the belief in Islam, Nasrallah notes in a 1986 interview on how Hezbollah 
came to be, that following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the “faithful” believed that 
a “revolutionary and Islamist current” should be established to face the Israeli challenge 
(Noe, 2007, p.26). He asserts, “This current was to have a clear Islamist vision, and operate 
through a consistent ideology based on the principles and political line of Imam al-
Khomeini, and according to the principle of Wilayat al-Faqih in which we believe,” (Noe, 
2007, p.26). In another notion, Nasrallah mentions that Hezbollah “took advantage of the 
climate created by the Islamic Revolution, and Syrian support, to launch a resistance 
movement against occupation” (Noe, 2007, p. 96). In other words, Hezbollah’s formation 
came in line with the trend of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and consequently abides by its 
religious and political guidelines. 
Nasrallah believes that the real essence of Islamic Resistance in Lebanon and in Palestine is 
that it belongs to Islam, faith, Taklif Sharii, Fatwa, and to religion (Al-Lahham, 2007, vol. 
                                                            
15 The Arabic word Jihad means Holy War and it literally translates to the verb “to struggle” or “to strive.” In 
his book on Hezbollah, Naim Qassem explains that it signifies “endeavoring and making every effort to battle 
against the enemy.” He adds that Jihad in its Islamic context “has a broader reach than military combat, 
embracing as well the struggle against man’s internal foes as represented by the soul’s insinuations and 
temptations to evil or satanic calls to falsehood, and all that leads to straying and corruption.” He also assures 
that Jihad highly influences the path of a Muslim’s life. “It is an integral part of one’s true belief, without 
which God’s acceptance of such belief is not granted. Jihad is a complete not partial, fulfillment, for which 
complete readiness is required.” See (Qassem, 2010, pp. 86, 87). 
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13, p. 89).16 He says that the “spirit of the Resistance” is Islamic, faithful and ideological 
(Al-Lahham, 2007, vol. 13, p. 89). 
In fact, the Party’s religious nature is first self-evident in its name whereby the word 
“Hezbollah” is derived from the Quran and literally translates to “Party of God.” 
Hezbollah’s flag, which closely resembles that of Iran’s Pasdaran17, clearly conveys the 
party’s Islamist nature, goals, ideology and Jihadi duties. The yellow flag has at its center 
the party’s logo which consists of the two words Hezbollah written in Arabic calligraphy. 
The first letter in the word Allah extends upward, reaches a gap, to become a fist holding an 
Ak-47 rifle. The Quranic phrase “Fa inna Hizbu Allah houm al ghaliboun” (Quran, Sura 
no.5, al-Maedah, verse 56) meaning “Lo! The Party of Allah, they are the victorious” is 
printed in red above the green logo. Beneath the logo, it says “Al-Moqawama al-Islamiya fi 
Loubnan” meaning “The Islamic Resistance in Lebanon.” Along with the weapon, the logo 
also features a book-the Quran most probably, a globe, and [controversially] an olive 
branch of seven leaves. An additional phrase appeared on Hezbollah’s flag during the 2006 
July War in the background behind Nasrallah while he was delivering a speech on August 
9. A black banner was added to the bottom part of the flag with a Quranic phrase depicted 
from the Sura pertaining to preparations to confront the enemy and relying on God, and 
which translates to “Prepare for them whatever forces you can muster,” (Quran, Sura no.8, 
al-Anfâl, verse 60). A Hezbollah official, Hussein Rahhal, points out that this is the official 
flag of the party while those used by the partisans in demonstrations are incomplete and 
                                                            
16 Nasrallah made this statement in a speech he delivered during a ceremony to support the Palestinian 
Intifada in 2002 in which he lashed back at what he called attempts to “strike the spirit of the Resistance.” 
17 The Pasdaran are the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Iran which constitute a branch of the 
Islamic Republic’s military established after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. It includes ground, air and naval 
forces and is in command of the Basij militia. 
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unofficial (Abbas, 2006, para.5). Hezbollah skillfully knows how to transmit its messages 
through multiple methods starting with the composition of its flag which also draws the 
attention to the party’s Jihadi duties. In times of war, the Hezbollah supporters and 
members are reminded of their Jihadi duties in every possible way, starting with minor 
details such as an alteration to the flag up to reaching fiery speeches that accompany the 
military action. In times of calm, Nasrallah is always keen, in most of his speeches, to 
express gratitude to Hezbollah’s “Mujahidin” for defeating the enemy and liberating the 
land.  
Hezbollah’s Islamic nature is also reflected in the composition of its seven-member Shura 
Council which is the party’s higher governing body. In 2001, the only two non-clerical 
members of the Shura Council, Mohammad Raad and Mohammad Fneish, were replaced by 
clerics except for Hajj Hussein Khalil who is a close advisor to Nasrallah (Norton, 2007, p. 
123). Norton does not consider this replacement coincidental clarifying that Raad and 
Fneish were skeptical of the organization’s “belligerent risk-taking” (2007, p. 123). 
Extending the power of clerics within the party, particularly in its decision-making body, 
makes it to some point resemble the theocratic rule in Iran. The persistence of Iran’s 
theocratic structure will continue to have considerable bearing on the country’s domestic 
and foreign policies (Moshaver, 2003, vol.3).  The ruling theocratic elite in Iran sets the 
priorities of Iran’s foreign policy and partially uses it as a tool to legitimize the regime and 
as an extension of domestic policy (Moshaver, 2003, vol.3). In the case of Hezbollah, the 
party has always sought to consolidate its legitimacy through emphasizing its foreign policy 
choices of opposing the US and fighting Israel. The party has focused on its resistance 
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duties to justify its domestic behavior such as arming itself, creating its own strongholds 
and security zones in parallel to the state’s army.  
Extending the power of clerics within the party may possibly represent a guarantee that the 
party’s Islamic principles will be well attained and preserved. This takes us back to Islam’s 
basic principle: religion is inseparable from the state and as such the religious figures are 
the political actors. 
While Hezbollah’s Islamist nature is undeniable, the party’s chief insists that his party is 
not sectarian. In response to a question whether Hezbollah is an Islamist party in the sense 
that its goals and activities surpass Lebanese territory, Nasrallah says, “We are an Islamist 
Party because we follow an Islamic ideology”, adding that the party is concerned with all 
that happens on the Islamic and Arabic scenes (Noe, 2007, p. 183). However, Nasrallah 
clarifies that Hezbollah is a non-sectarian Islamic Lebanese party that is not “isolated” 
within Lebanon’s borders (Noe, 2007, p. 183). Qassem seconds Nasrallah’s view in a long 
argument presented in his book on Hezbollah in which he states that the Shiites’ 
participation in Hezbollah was the result “of doctrinal and not confessional allegiance, as 
many other party members do not follow the sectarian element-thus rendering the common 
ground doctrinal as opposed to confessional” (2010, p.85). 
However, this argument does not sound totally convincing when one looks at the party’s 
composition and finds that its members and cadres are exclusively Shiite. Had the 
belonging to this party been only ideological then how come Christians and Sunnis who 
wish to militarily fight Israel do not join the party. A Christian member cannot adopt the 
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principle of Jihad, the same way a Sunni member cannot adopt the principle of Wilayat al-
Faqih and take part in the party’s huge Ashura ceremonies. Perhaps the ideological 
belonging makes sense with respect to the Shiite community only in the sense that the 
Shiites who do not adhere to the principle of Wilayat al-Faqih and to Hezbollah’s strictly 
Islamist identity do not join the party and take more secular options. They rather join Amal, 
leftist parties or remain non-partisan.  
Not only does Hezbollah consider itself a non-sectarian party it also calls for a non-
sectarian Lebanon. Hezbollah called for the abolition of political sectarianism in Lebanon 
in its first political platform, the 1985 Open letter, and has since then persisted in raising 
this demand. The party has also renewed this call on several occasions including its 2009 
new political platform. Political sectarianism according to the party is a flaw in the 
Lebanese political system and is hindering the achievement of true democracy and the 
execution of a majority-minority rule (Al-wathiqa as-siyasia li-Hizbullah, 2009). 
Hezbollah’s call for the abolition of political sectarianism raised many fears among the 
other communities in Lebanon, especially the Christians, who felt threatened by such a call 
thinking that it would minimize their political role in the country given all the demographic 
changes Lebanon has witnessed. In analyzing such a demand, it sounds really paradoxical 
to find an Islamic party calling for the abolition of sectarianism at the time when its nature 
carries in itself a sectarian element. Maybe Hezbollah does not find the power-sharing 
system established in the 1943 National Pact adequate enough bearing in mind the Shiite 
community’s rapid growth on all levels. 
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Moving on to Jihad, the overwhelming Jihadi spirit which was at the heart of Hezbollah’s 
formation remains a major element safeguarding its existence today. In an interview with 
An-Nahar newspaper in 1992, Nasrallah clearly states that Hezbollah was never a military 
party or militia but a “jihadi movement to confront the ongoing [Israeli] occupation and the 
aggression on our people and land” (Noe, 2007, p.82).  
In many of his speeches, Nasrallah intentionally reminds his supporters and his adversaries 
of the Karbala battles, thus emphasizing the profundity of the party’s Shiite beliefs. 
Nasrallah also sets an analogy between the battles conducted by his men against the enemy-
Israel and the US- and the battles that preceded Hussein’s death with the difference that 
God will render his people victorious this time. The Hezbollah chief especially 
contemplates the Karbala battles every year during the first ten days of the month of 
Muharram during which he delivers long televised speeches that include both a religious 
and a political section. The contemporary politicization of Ashura rituals, by Hezbollah and 
Amal politicians, has impressively succeeded in harnessing the Shiites’ sentiments to their 
advantage (Norton, 2007, p. 67). According to Norton, Nasrallah exploited the occasion of 
Muharram to further legitimize Hezbollah as a social and political force among the Shia 
and he succeeded in gaining a wave of support for fighting Israel and pressuring it to 
withdraw from Lebanon in May 2000 (Norton, 2007, p. 68).  
Not only does Nasrallah compare his party’s repetitive wars with Israel to the Karbala 
battles, but he also links the party’s leaders to key figures on whom Shiite Islam was based. 
For instance, he associates the 1992 assassination of Hezbollah Secretary General Abbas al-
Moussawi to al-Hussein’s martyrdom. In his elegy on Moussawi, Nasrallah said, “As if 
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your bombed and destroyed cortège were Hussein’s tents burning in the desert, as if you 
were that same Hussein, the commander on the battlefield, Hussein the rebel in the face of 
oppression and despotism, and Hussein who rejected humiliation and shame. Just like the 
committed and faithful Abbas18, loyal to the revolution and to the leader, You, My Master, 
epitomize all that Karbala represented, from resistance to enthusiasm, to the path, to the 
tragedy” (Noe, 2007, p. 52).  
Prior to the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, Nasrallah’s rhetoric focused on fighting the 
enemy, and he keenly highlighted the resemblance of Hezbollah’s resistance process to the 
Karbala battles. For instance, in an interview published on February 16, 2000 in Egypt’s Al-
Ahram newspaper, Nasrallah states that Hezbollah’s men are precisely obeying the Quran 
where God promised victory to the mujahidin if they do Jihad and go to war (Noe, 2007, p. 
231). “Ever since we started the resistance in 1982, and up to today, we rely on the fact that 
God will grant us victory if we obey him. Only God can grant the young men of the 
resistance peace of mind, and although we have no missiles or aircraft to shell Tel Aviv 
with, the Israelis live in constant fear of our operations” (Noe, 2007, p. 231).   
Nasrallah’s main concern after the withdrawal was to show that this time the Shiites, with 
the aid of God, came out victorious. The same day of the Israeli withdrawal from the south, 
Nasrallah addressed a cheerful vast audience in the southern village of Bint Jbeil, assuring 
to them that this “victory” was achieved by martyrdom and blood and is “a gift from God 
almighty, who has led us to the path of resistance” (Noe, 2007, p. 233).  
                                                            
18 The Half brother of Hussein who was early killed in the Karabala battles and has both hands cut off. 
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The belief that God is aiding the Hezbollah fighters is deeply imprinted in the minds and 
hearts of the committed grass-roots level through various direct and indirect methods which 
are sometimes implemented by Hezbollah and other times approved by it. While we can see 
the direct intervention through Nasrallah’s speeches and the party’s doctrine and activities 
we find other indirect elements working in the same direction. For example, following the 
2006 July War, a book was published entitled “Karamat al Waad el Sadeq” which translates 
to “Dignities of the Honest Vow.” The author, Majed Nasser al-Zoubaidi, cites examples of 
how Godly power intervened during the July War and helped the Hezbollah Jihadists 
achieve the “Divine Victory”. The 226 pages depict stories from the July War and show 
how God, in person, helped the Hezbollah fighters defeat the Israelis. The book also lists 
historical Islamic battles and sets an analogy between them and confrontations from the 
2006 July War. In one of the chapters, an unnamed Hezbollah fighter narrates that during 
one of the war days, Al-Imam al-Mahdi appeared to him as he was praying individually. 
The Imam asked the fighter to lead him to his three other comrades who had just clashed 
with the Israelis. Soon the Israelis started firing missiles at the Hezbollah men so the Imam 
ordered one of the missiles to change its direction and it hit the Merkava Israeli tank. The 
Hezbollah fighter continues saying that his comrade was able to hit a second Israeli tank as 
he called the name of Imam Ali. The Imam, according to the cited fighter, ordered the 
Hezbollah men to draw back victorious (Al-Zubaidi, 2008, p. 191-192). Significantly, the 
book was sold out in Dahiyeh book shops and recorded 10 editions until 2008.  
While some might view such a book as untrue, misleading or even a joke, it remains a fact 
that some people truly believed what it said. The book was not banned by the party which 
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shows that its leadership did not oppose the book’s content and indirectly accepted it as part 
of its ongoing mobilization process. This also denotes that some Hezbollah supporters are 
ready to believe in God’s personal intervention to help out the party; a belief often 
reinforced by the party leadership. 
After discussing belief in Islam and Jihad, comes Hezbollah’s third main objective: the 
Jurisdiction of the Jurist Theologian [Wilayat al-Faqih]. 
Machiavelli suggests that ecclesiastical principalities are happy and secure “under the 
direction of that supreme wisdom to which human kinds cannot attain” (Griffith ed., 1997, 
p. 44). He also sarcastically justifies his abstention from thoroughly discussing this type of 
principalities by saying that they are “raised up and sustained by the Divine Power and it 
would be a bold and presumptuous office for any man to discuss them (Griffith ed., 1997, 
p.44).”  
If an analogy is to be set between the ecclesiastical principality and Hezbollah, the concept 
of Wilayat al-Faqih, to which Hezbollah adheres, best fits here. A brief explanation of this 
conceptis helpful to understand the depth of Hezbollah’s ideology and to show why the 
Party of God cannot easily disengage from it; despite its announced openness to foster 
relations and maintain alliances with parties of opposing ideologies, political views, and 
religions.  
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This old concept was revived by Imam Khomeini and stems from the Islamic belief that 
there is no real separation between religious and political duties.19 Khomeini states that in 
the essence of Islam there is no distinction between political and religious leadership, 
adding that political strife is an integral part of religious duty and that it is within the 
religious leaders’ responsibilities to lead this political strife and steer it in the right direction 
(Qassem, 2010, p.115). As such, the Guardianship by the Jurist Theologian is imperative 
for the preservation and the implementation of Islam (Qassem, 2010, p.115). So it is the 
Jurist Theologian [Wali al-Faqih] who can achieve the ultimate aim of Islam’s large scale 
project of bringing the Islamic nation together (Qassem, 2010, p.115). The Jurist 
Theologian’s authority and role is believed to be a continuation of that of the Prophet and 
the Infallible Imams.  This nonetheless does not mean that the Jurist Theologian resembles 
the Prophet or the chosen Imams. He is rather the prophet’s secondary and is supposed to 
carry out their doctrinal and jurisprudence functions (Qassem, 2010, p.116).  
So what does the Jurist-Theologian exactly do? Well, the Jurist Theologian clearly has 
enormous powers and privileges. Alongside implementing the Islamic Jurisprudence, he is 
to guard the Islamic structure and take all the major political decisions that affect the 
nation’s interest. He is entitled to take the war and peace decisions and is responsible for 
the people’s security, wealth and honor through implementing the verdicts. He is also in 
                                                            
19 In his book on Hezbollah, Qassem explains that the Jurisdiction of the Jurist-Theologian was not a new 
issue and was mentioned over time by the leading clerics. He names al-Sheikh al-Mufid and the Shiite 
congregation’s prominent Sheikh al-Tusi, followed by al-Muhaqqiq al-Helli in his book Islam’s Codes; al-
Muhaqqiq al Karaki, the sage al-Helli, the second Amili Martyr, Najaf Sheikh, author of al-Jawaher, narrators 
al-Sayyed al-Burujerdi; and al-Sayyed al-Kalbaykani, in addition to the martyred al-Sayyed Mohammed 
Baqer al-Sadr and Imam Khomeini among others. (Qassem, 2010, p. 118) 
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charge of the nation’s wealth collected through zakat and khums20. He sets the doctrinal 
jurisprudence of any Islamic state since its establishment and is concerned with preserving 
its interests in harmony with Islam. Given these vast duties, the Jurist theologian cannot 
function alone and thus delegates some authority to particular individuals and high-level 
offices. Most importantly, the power of the Jurist-Theologian transcends the borders of his 
native country and he could be of any nationality and not necessarily Iranian (Qassem, 
2010, pp.117-118).  
As all these powers are allocated to one person who more or less seems to have “supreme 
power”, it becomes important to know on what basis this person is appointed by the 
Assembly of Experts and what qualifications he must possess. Qassem mentions that the 
Jurist-Theologian’s authority is not distinct from his qualifications among which he first 
mentions doctrinal knowledge at the ijtihad [interpretative-judgment] level enabling the 
inference of Shari’a verdicts. However, high religious education alone is insufficient and 
the Jurist-Theologian should possess political capabilities and practicality and should be 
able to properly address the society’s needs, in addition to personal qualities such as being 
just and religiously devoted to preserving the Shari’a (Qassem, 2010, p.118). 
According to Nasrallah, his party has viewed the legitimacy of Imam al-Khomeini and 
Imam Khamenei’s leadership and guardianship based on its tenet that the legitimate leader 
is a hardworking and religious scholar with many important qualities such as “ability, 
                                                            
20 Every Muslim should pay one fifth of his yearly earnings which will later be distributed among the needy 
people as decided by the ruler. 
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knowledge, a sense of justice, experience, historical awareness, good management skills 
and faith” (Noe, 2007, p.70).   
Now that the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih was introduced, it is crucial to understand the 
implications of Hezbollah’s adherence to this ideology. What commitments is the party 
supposed to fulfill and to what extent is the Party of God independent in its decision making 
process and in administering its own affairs? 
The most recent public acknowledgement of Hezbollah’s belief in Wilayat al-Faqih was 
given by Hezbollah’s secretary general during Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s 
visit to Lebanon in October 2010. Nasrallah enthusiastically addressed the crowd that 
gathered around the Iranian President in Al-Raya Stadium in Dahiyeh via a giant screen and 
stated that Iran is fulfilling its “divine duty” in the Middle East region and is harmonious 
with its ideology and religion. He added, 
“Iran wants [for Lebanon] what the Lebanese people want […] I bear witness before you 
that Iran, which has always supported us and still does, has never asked me to take a 
[particular] stance, has never issued a command and has never expected from us to express 
gratitude although we are proud of our deep faith in the just, wise and courageous Wilayat 
al-Faqih [Jurisprudence of the Jurist-Theologian]” (Abbas, 2010). 
When Nasrallah says that Iran has never given him orders, such a statement contradicts 
Qassem’s abovementioned explanation of Hezbollah’s relation to Wilayat al-Faqih and of 
the latter’s jurisdiction. It was clear in Qassem’s words that the Wali al-Faqih leads the 
Islamic nation and as such gives orders and sets the political and social guidelines, which 
Hezbollah and its leader are compelled to follow. Nasrallah is by default obliged to defend 
the Wali al-Faqih’s stance and side with any option the latter deems to be best. In fact, this 
is not the first time Nasrallah tries to distinguish between his party’s religious commitment 
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to Iran and its political affiliation with Tehran. In an interview in 1998, Nasrallah explains 
that his party distinguishes between two positions in its relation with Iran: that of the 
regime and that of the religious reference (Noe, 2007, p. 184). He argues that Hezbollah is a 
totally independent movement from Iran’s political regime which he says does not 
constitute a reference to the party (Noe, 2007, p. 184). Regarding the religious authority in 
Iran, Nasrallah states that its high rank and influence “provide religiously founded 
legitimacy to our struggle [against Israel]” (Noe, 2007, p. 184).  
Nasrallah’s distinction seems highly skeptical if one closely observes the functioning of the 
Iranian regime. After the Islamic Revolution, the clerical elite in Iran gained control over 
the country’s institutions and its domestic and foreign policies. The most powerful decision 
making institutions in Iran are the non-elected Wali al-Faqih and non-elected Council of 
Guardians who vet the candidates for the two only elected organs: the president and the 
parliament (Moshaver, 2003, vol.3).  
Significantly, Nasrallah’s own words in 1993, present a contradiction to this distinction he 
tried to introduce later on between Iran as a religious reference and not a political one. He 
says that Hezbollah is an “Islamic, Lebanese jihadist movement that has its own 
independent internal and local decision-making process, and its own independent leadership 
and cadres. Its relationship is with the supreme leader, who draws general policy lines not 
only for Hezbollah but for the nation as a whole, of which Hezbollah is only a part. Since 
this fundamental relation is with the wilayat al-faqih, it is only natural for the Islamic 
Republic to feel comfortable in its relationship with us, and to be especially interested in 
mentoring and assisting us in certain cases. It is also natural because the Islamic Republic is 
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the wilayat al-faqih’s authority structure, and we have a relationship with him (…) this is 
the nature of our relationship with Iran” (Noe, 2007, 135).” 
Nasrallah uses the word “mentoring” which implies giving instructions. One deduces the 
impracticality of separating between religious and political authority in Iran when Nasrallah 
highlights that Iran is the “structure” for the Wali al-Faqih’s authority. 
Perhaps Nasrallah’s main concern is to make a point that his party functions as an 
independent entity, and is not an Iranian proxy as many other parties label it. Nasrallah 
proves that his party is “an entity unto itself” that takes its own decisions by saying that it 
has its own Shura Council that is elected and not appointed by the General Conference 
(Noe, 2007, p. 69). In 1992, he refused to consider Hezbollah an Iranian community in 
Lebanon and its fighters Iranian citizens (Noe, 2007, p. 92). He says that Hezbollah has the 
right to seek assistance from its “friend” Iran to liberate the land as it is stipulated by 
international law and norms (Noe, 2007, p. 92). Nasrallah’s distinction between the political 
and religious authorities in Iran is even more controversial in this statement, since it is the 
Iranian political regime that will offer assistance to Hezbollah. 
Understanding Hezbollah’s ideology is essential to correctly interpret the party’s policies 
and public statements. Hezbollah has very well known when to go loud when speaking of 
its allegiance to Wilayat al Faqih and when to tone it down according to the prevalent 
circumstances. In view of that, the question on whether Hezbollah is determined to 
establish an Islamic state in Lebanon is raised. The Party of God has always insisted that it 
would not fulfill this objective by force but through consensus among all the Lebanese 
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parties. According to Qassem establishing an Islamic state “represents the ultimate justice 
to which man aspires” (2010, p. 81). 
As for Nasrallah’s stance on this issue, one should distinguish between his early rhetoric in 
the 1980’s and 1990’s and his recent statements. For example, in an interview in 1986, 
Nasrallah said that Hezbollah does not believe in multiple Islamic Republics but in a single 
Islamic world governed by a central government adding that all borders in the Muslim 
world are fake and will disappear (Noe, 2007, p. 32). Shortly after his election as secretary 
general of Hezbollah, Nasrallah states in an interview that an Islamic government 
historically only survives if it has a wide and full support of the nation (Noe, 2007, p. 67). 
He adds that every Lebanese is entitled to aspire to the best project which in his opinion 
would lead to the “most just, prosperous, secure, and peaceful society” citing Iran as a valid 
example to his words (Noe, 2007, p. 67). In another interview, Nasrallah assures that his 
party will never propose the option of establishing an Islamic Republic “neither through 
statements, slogans or speeches” and would hasten to support such a project if the Lebanese 
people choose it. He explains that his party will never impose such a project by force 
because the nature of the Islamic republic rejects forceful action (Noe, 2007, p. 90). Within 
the same statement, Nasrallah says that based on his party’s Muslim faith, a system built on 
Islamic principles is capable of solving all of Lebanon’s legislative, legal, intellectual, 
spiritual or moral problems (Noe, 2007, p. 90). After the 2006 July War, several figures 
from the March 14 camp raised questions on whether Hezbollah was determined to form a 
Shiite State in Lebanon. Nasrallah responded in an interview with a local TV channel 
reassuring everyone that his party does not impose its ideas on anyone (Noe, 2007, p. 401). 
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This time Nasrallah notes the country’s diversity and multiethnicity and states that Lebanon 
cannot take the form of an Islamic or Christian state be it a Shia-Islamic or a Sunni-Islamic 
or a Maronite Christian or an Orthodox Christian (Noe. 2007, p. 401). He rather voices 
support for what he calls a “consensus state” which he defines as one where all sects are 
represented, protected and served by the state with their dignities preserved (Noe, 2007, p. 
401).  
Nasrallah is skillfully choosing his words whenever he addresses the issue of establishing 
an Islamic State in Lebanon in such a manner to calm the other communities’ fears and at 
the same time maintain the motivation of his supporters to reach this ideal state. As such, 
the question is not whether Hezbollah wishes to carry out this project since it is 
indoctrinated in its beliefs, but when and how. Although Nasrallah has repeatedly reassured 
the other Lebanese communities that this project will not be implemented by force, the 
image of “how” remains blurred, especially that the party has domestically used its 
weapons in May 2008. However, here one should take into consideration the complexities 
of the Lebanese structure. Years of civil war and violence did not allow any Lebanese party 
to fully implement its project on its adversaries, so how can such a goal be attained in times 
of peace? One should not forget the intertwined regional and international factors, which 
Hezbollah is assumedly aware of, that are prevalent on the Lebanese scene and that hinder 
the ability of Lebanese parties to fully implement their plots.  
During the first seven years of its life, Hezbollah operated under a group leadership rather 
than an individual one. The Shura Council took the lead and the number of its members 
varied from one council to another. Its members were chosen upon deliberations among the 
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party’s cadres and key authority figures. It was until 1985 that the post of Official 
Spokesman was introduced to announce Hezbollah’s Open Letter-the party’s first political 
platform. As the party progressed, its organizational set-up developed and new internal 
regulations were set for the Shura Council. The number of its members became limited to 
nine and they were elected by the party’s cadres who occupied the position of head of party 
sections. The council was delegated the responsibility of electing a secretary general from 
among its members. In November 1989, the party’s first such elected council [the fourth in 
sequence] elected Sheikh Subhi Tufaily as its first secretary general and thus Hezbollah 
moved from a group leadership organizational structure to an individual one. The one-year 
mandate of that council was extended for six extra months due to the Hezbollah-Amal 
clashes that annulled the party’s annual conference. New amendments were later introduced 
to the council’s internal regulations whereby its mandate became two years and its number 
of members was reduced to seven. The post of Deputy Secretary General was also created. 
Sayyed Abbas al-Moussawi was elected the party’s second secretary general in May 1991. 
As he was killed by Israel on February 16, 1992, Hassan Nasrallah, only 32 years old, was 
elected as his successor in May 1993. Two new amendments were also introduced in the 
coming period whereby the council’s mandate was extended to three years and the secretary 
general was granted the right to be elected in more than two successive elections (Qassem, 
2010, pp.128-130). This amendment explains why Nasrallah still assumes his post since 
1993. 
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Other regulations were also set on the party’s organization level, and five internal councils 
were established. The description and functions of these councils will be discussed in 
details at a later stage of this research paper.  
Still, the question remains why was Hassan Nasrallah unanimously elected Secretary 
General? How did this young man rise to power, by virtue or by good fortune? 
The choice fell on Nasrallah although he did not occupy the position of deputy secretary 
general and despite his young age in comparison with all the members of the Shura Council 
(Citation of the Biography of his Eminence Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 2008)21. Sentimental 
reasons stood behind choosing Nasrallah to succeed Moussawi as a vow of respect to the 
latter whom Nasrallah was the closest person to (Citation of the Biography of his Eminence 
Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 2008). It was said within the party that “Abbas and Hassan were 
two sides of the same coin, they were the same thing” (Citation of the Biography of his 
Eminence Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 2008). As we have seen earlier, the bond between 
Nasrallah and Moussawi started in Iraq, was fortified in Lebanon and remained strong 
between the two men as each assumed his position within Hezbollah. Nasrallah considered 
Moussawi his master, teacher and friend and explicitly expressed it in his elegy for the 
assassinated Hezbollah leader. (Noe, 2010, p. 52)  
At the time of his election, Nasrallah chaired the party’s Executive Council and was known 
for his vast relationships with the party’s popular bases, and he was capable of 
strengthening Hezbollah’s unity after the strong blow of Moussawi’s assassination (Citation 
                                                            
21Magazine published an interview with Hassan Nasrallah on its pages on 28-11-1997. In this interview, 
Nasrallah talks about his life, expresses his beliefs and touches on politics.  
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of the Biography of his Eminence Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 2008). Nasrallah was also the 
best candidate to emotionally invest in his friend’s martyrdom at the grass-roots level to 
consolidate the party’s cause (Citation of the Biography of his Eminence Sayyed Hassan 
Nasrallah, 2008).   
Nasrallah says that he was greatly confused on the day of his election by the Shura Council 
because he was the youngest member, and because his duties were restricted to internal 
organization and he was not implicated much in the party’s foreign relations.“But they 
insisted,” despite his primary rejection, he adds, noting that a second vote by the party’s 
“wise” men confirmed him as the party’s leader (Citation of the Biography of his Eminence 
Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 2008). 
Naim Qassem, who at the time assumed the post of deputy secretary general, ranked higher 
than Nasrallah which should have logically meant that he had higher chances to replace 
Moussawi.  Noe reflects on this point and concludes that Nasrallah’s election raised 
speculations that “Qassem was, in effect, passed over for the top post, perhaps because of 
Nasrallah’s allegedly closer ties to Tehran and Khamenei” (2010, p.131). Qassem retained 
his same post after Nasrallah’s election and still occupies it. Noe’s comment becomes more 
valid when one thinks from the perspective of Hezbollah’s relation with Iran and the 
powers and privileges of the Jurist-Theologian. Nasrallah in fact lived in Iran for some time 
and was somehow forced to come back to Lebanon during the Amal-Hezbollah clashes. As 
a religious scholar, Nasrallah had the chance to build his own relations with Iranian clerics.  
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According to Nasrallah, no obstacles impeded the unanimous vote that brought him to 
power; neither possible extraordinary circumstances nor the elapse of the legal period (Noe, 
2010, p. 131-132). The Hezbollah chief explains that some of the brethren suggested he 
assume the position of secretary general and his name was proposed for the second time 
(Noe, 2010, p. 132). 
As for the qualities that the secretary general should have, Nasrallah sums them up as 
follows: cultural and scientific abilities, political acumen and administrative skills, and 
having the trust of the party’s leaders who entitled him to shoulder this responsibility (Noe, 
2010, p. 132). This drives our attention to what Machiavelli calls “virtù” and presents as a 
basic concept for the ruler to achieve political success as opposed to “fortuna” or good 
fortune.  
According to Nederman, the Italian word “virtù” has been variously translated as skill, 
wisdom, ability, strength, prowess and vigor (among other equivalents) which ensure 
political success in exercising power (2009, p. 12). He adds that the successful ruler needs 
special training in order to acquire this ensemble of qualities (2009, p. 12). The word 
“virtù” does not have the same significance as the word “virtue” in English and does not 
mean moral goodness but rather strength, ability, courage and vitality (Ratliff, 1986, p.4). 
Thus, the ruler’s political success depends on the virtue which is the force of his character 
(Ratliff, 1986, p. 5).   
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In her turn Kekewich explains that the ambiguity of the word “virtù” and the failure in 
providing an exact translation to it have led to the hostility in receiving Machiavelli’s 
treatise (1997, introduction 
 XVIII). She adds that when Machiavelli uses the Italian word “virtù” he is not referring to 
the traditional Christian virtues such as charity, humility, and compassion; he rather sees it 
originating from the Latin word “virtus” which means power and energy.  In her 
interpretation, Kekewich sees “virtù” as a moral and physical force operating on behalf of 
the state and its ruler for the common good (1997, introduction XVIII). 
Machiavelli clearly states in his writings that the best means for the prince to acquire power 
is through one’s capabilities rather than relying on good fortune only because the leaders 
who solely depend on chance circumstance to maintain themselves are frustrated in 
achieving their goals (Nederman, 2009, p. 40). Despite this strong advocacy of practicing 
intelligence in human affairs, Machiavelli admits that there is a side of life which people 
have little or no control of, such as the prince’s health among other things (Ratliff, 1986, p. 
5).  
To answer the question whether young Nasrallah rose to power by “virtue” or by good 
fortune is not an easy task. We have seen in the Chapter 3 that Nasrallah came from a very 
modest family that had absolutely no political or religious power in Lebanon. In this sense, 
it was not mere good fortune that gave the man advantage over others. Nasrallah certainly 
possessed important qualities and his above-mentioned listing of the secretary general’s 
qualities is only an indirect way of him saying that he has it all or else someone else would 
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have been chosen. Nasrallah had been a hard-working religiously committed student and 
had developed very close relationships both in Iraq and Iran throughout his religious 
studies. These relationships drive our attention to what Machiavelli refers to as 
“opportunity”. Let us closely reflect on Machiavelli’s following argument on rulers who 
rose to their ranks by their courage and ability and not by fortune: 
“And as such an event as to become a prince from a mere private individual presupposes 
either great courage or rare good fortune, it would seem that one or the other of these two 
causes ought in a measure to mitigate many of these difficulties. But he who depends least 
upon fortune will maintain himself best; which will be still more easy for the Prince if, 
having no other state, he is obliged to reside in his newly acquired principality […]” 
(Griffith ed., 1997, p. 20) 
 “We shall also find in examining their acts and lives, that they had no other favour from 
fortune but opportunity, which gave them the material which they could mould into 
whatever form seemed to them best; and without such an opportunity the great qualities of 
their soul would have been wasted, whilst without those great qualities the opportunities 
would have been in vain [...] These opportunities therefore made these men fortunate, and 
it was their lofty virtue that enabled them to recognize the opportunities by which their 
countries were made illustrious and most happy” (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 20).  
Nasrallah certainly grasped all the possible opportunities to make of himself a better person 
and to create for him an important ranking as he moved from a poor Shiite villager, to a 
serious Islamist scholar, to an active partisan, and an important leader. Had he simply 
accepted the very little fortune he had without putting an effort to improve his situation, he 
would have simply turned out to be another desperate Lebanese fighting for his living, and 
not for a whole nation. Nasrallah established all the necessary connections, and was smart 
enough to maintain his relations with the key persons. Not only that, but he was able to 
invest in those relations even after the death of the other person as in the case of Abbas 
Moussawi. He also maintained his allegiance to the Jurist Theologian and preserved the ties 
with Khamenei after Khomeini’s death. The resolute Iranian support for Nasrallah drives 
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our attention to the section of The Prince where Machiavelli discusses new principalities 
that have been acquired by the aid of others and by good fortune. Since we have previously 
eliminated the option of “good fortune” it remains important to consider whether Nasrallah 
has risen to power by the aid of others. Machiavelli states that the emperors who come to 
power by the favour of some powerful monarch who bestows it upon them “simply remain 
subject to the will and the fortune of those who bestowed greatness upon them, which are 
two most uncertain and variable things” (Griffith ed., 1997, p.24). 
Iran surely had a role in allowing Nasrallah to rise to power, but the man had the 
recommended qualifications and skillfully merged between his religious education and his 
building up of his political career. While we find Nasrallah subject to the “will and fortune” 
of Iran, which played a role in “bestowing greatness upon him” we should emphasize that 
the Hezbollah-Iranian relationship is in the first place ideological and religious before 
anything else. This relationship has been thoroughly explained throughout this chapter, and 
by now it has become clear that the ties are deeper than pure materialistic ones. In this 
sense, Nasrallah does not belong to this category of emperors mentioned by Machiavelli 
and the risk of uncertainty and variation is less. Iran’s support for Nasrallah continued 
following his election and the man was kept in his position up to this moment, completing 
almost twenty years of rule. Iran has even made unprecedented gestures toward Nasrallah 
such as in 2008 when it handed him the Imam Rida's Flag as a tribute to Hezbollah’s 
achievements. This flag is raised on the Holy shrine of the eighth infallible Imam, Ali Ibn 
Moussa al-Rida with the printed phrase “Nasron Min Allah wa Fathon Qarib” which 
translates to “help from Allah and a victory near at hand”. Such flags were never given out 
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to people before but were kept inside the holy shrine (Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah receives 
Imam Rida flag, 2008). 
Despite all this significance attributed to Nasrallah, he is always modest and simple when 
addressing his supporters. He always tries to affiliate himself with the people rather than 
with the ruling political elite. When celebrating Hezbollah’s “Divine Victory” Nasrallah 
told the crowd, “If my beard and turban have an honor, it is from you, from this Resistance 
and the blood of our martyrs […] I, Hassan Nasrallah, will not be silent if the Resistance’s 
people are humiliated. We are not a totalitarian system or group. Neither my father was a 
beik22, nor my grandfather was a beik nor will my son be a beik […] Let no one think that 
they can feed our stomachs at the expense of our dignity for which we have offered blood” 
(Kalimat al-amin al-aam li-Hizbullah samahat as-sayyed Hassan Nasrallah fi mahrajan al-
intisar al-ilahi, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
22 The word Beik has Turkish origins and means lord. It was used in Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and other 
countries that were under Ottoman rule.   
68 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
The “Princely” Sayyed 
6.1. Part I 
While Chapter 5 thoroughly discussed Hezbollah’s ideology and components as well as 
Nasrallah’s rise to power, our attention in this chapter is focused on his leadership traits. In 
his book, Machiavelli dedicates Chapters 15 till 23 to list the personal qualities and general 
characteristics that should be present in a successful leader and how he should act. 
However, many sentences could be extracted from other chapters of the book where 
Machiavelli describes the efficient leader. 
Machiavelli’s image of the ruler revolves around the following main components: gaining 
the people’s love and support, being feared but not hated, conveying virtues, being smart, 
and establishing one’s own army. Perhaps he sums it all up when he talks about the new 
prince who creates a present that is in favor of his people and who would thus have “the 
double glory of having established a new principality and of having strengthened and 
adorned it with good laws, good armies, good allies and good examples” (Griffith ed., 
1997, p. 92). On the other hand, he considers that it would be a “double shame” when the 
hereditary prince loses his state through the “want of prudence and ability” (Griffith ed., 
1997, p. 92).  
In a global view, Machiavelli has his own realistic image of the powerful leader. His 
perception stems from the real world of deceit and vices; thus, he does not speak of an ideal 
leader in an ideal world that is hard to find. Machiavelli’s political thought expressed in The 
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Prince bluntlyopposes the traditional moralistic view of authority, present during the 
Middle Ages and the Renaissance, where it was thought that the rulers did well when they 
did good and gained the people’s obedience and respect inasmuch as they revealed 
themselves spiritually and morally upright (Nederman, 2009, p. 10). Machiavelli defies the 
conventional political philosophy which connected moral goodness to legitimate authority, 
and he considers that there is no moral basis to judge between the legitimate and 
illegitimate uses of power (Nederman, 2009, p.10). In other words, Machiavellichallenges 
and criticizes the conventional standards of ethical goodness and introduces the concept that 
later came to be known as raison d’état or reason of state. Rulers must be ready to do bad 
things at the expense of moral considerations when the political realities demand it (Ratliff, 
1986, p.4). As it has been mentioned earlier, the term Machiavellian is amoral and value-
neutral.  
In Machiavellian belief, the end justifies the means whereby the major concern is the 
acquisition and maintenance of power. Here, it is important to shed the light on 
Machiavelli’s understanding of human nature and his view of man as a political animal. 
While Machiavelli admits that people have good qualities and are capable of doing 
venerable things, he is keen to accentuate the ungrateful, disingenuous and greedy side of 
humans who are in constant pursuit of gain and are mainly concerned with their own safety 
(Ratliff, 1986, p.4). However, Machiavelli does not advocate that government is impossible 
due to this human nature; he rather says that government should take into consideration this 
human nature and use man’s qualities for its purposes (Ratliff, 1986, p.4).   
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In Machiavelli’s political thought, achieving political success is impossible without the 
possession and display of political power. In fact, he stresses much on political power and 
considers it superior to any other aspect. For him, the prince’s authority and right to 
command are meaningless and cannot be imposed if they are not accompanied by superior 
political power (Nederman, 2009, p. 12). He believes that this political power defines the 
prince’s political activity which renders it mandatory for every prince to know how to use 
power (Nederman, 2009, p. 11). The significance of political power is that it keeps the 
people obedient because they live with the fear of the consequences of failing to abide by 
the state’s rules. When he talks about the prince’s political power, Machiavelli always 
associates it with the state’s power; the same way he repeatedly links maintaining the 
prince’s power with maintaining the state. 
As a start, and before delving into details, Nasrallah’s broad concept of power resembles 
that of Machiavelli. This likeness can be viewed in Nasrallah’s words when he says that in 
a world of injustice, it is through power that you can own a stature in your nation, in the 
eyes of your enemy and in the eyes of the whole world (Lahham, 2007, vol. 14, p. 30). 
6.1.1. Virtue against fury 
In Chapter 15, Machiavelli sets the framework for his long argument that being “good” or 
“bad” is based on what necessity requires (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 59). He thus links the 
prince’s ability to maintain his power to the way in which he deals with reality or necessity. 
Machiavelli decides to put aside the “imaginary things” about princes which, according to 
him, include all the spoken-of virtues and qualities and confines himself to the “realities” 
where the prince has to compete with all the bad people surrounding him to survive 
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(Griffith ed., 1997, p. 59). Having this in mind, he plainly advises princes to “learn to be 
not always good, but to be so or not as necessity may require” (Griffith ed., 1997, p.59). 
While he admits that it would be “praiseworthy” for the prince to have good qualities, he 
argues that the human nature does not allow the person to be entirely good (Griffith ed., 
1997, p. 60). He believes that man will eventually follow his “natural inclinations” but 
should always be aware to avoid the vices that would distort his reputation the most, 
endanger his state, or rob him of his state (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 60). Machiavelli had earlier 
referred to this argument in Chapter 8, when he talked about “well-applied cruelties” and 
“ill-applied cruelties.” He defines the well-applied cruelties as those “committed once from 
necessity for self-protection, afterwards not persisted in, but converted as far as possible to 
the public good” (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 35). Ill-applied cruelties are those that are few in the 
beginning but keep on increasing with time rather than declining (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 35). 
While he believes that the second type of practices will fail to keep the prince in his 
position, he assures that the first type will “with the help of God and man” somehow serve 
the state (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 35). Machiavelli calls for executing the harsh measures all at 
once “at a single blow” in order to be more appreciated, because he believes that the 
repetitiveness of harsh measures will make the prince lose the people’s support and neither 
side would be able to rely on the other (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 35).  
When applying this Machiavellian concept to Nasrallah, we find that Hezbollah has applied 
both types of cruelties, but not on the same level and each leads to various results. While 
the party practiced well-applied cruelties at the domestic level, it resorted to ill-applied 
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cruelties in its ongoing fight against Israel since 1982, with the exception of some full-scale 
wars, the last of which was in 2006.  
When talking about the well-applied cruelties that are committed at a single blow, we can 
take the recent example of the May 2008 conflict that occurred in Lebanon. For the first 
time since the end of its civil war, Lebanon witnessed serious military clashes between the 
Sunni and Shiite communities and some Shiite-Druze fights. The Christians did not engage 
in any direct military confrontation this time, and the death toll touched 81. In brief, tension 
rose when the Lebanese cabinet headed by Fouad Siniora decided during a meeting, which 
extended overnight on the 5th-6th of May, to shut down Hezbollah’s private 
telecommunications network. It also decided to dismiss the head of the airport security, 
Brigadier General Wafiq Choucair, for allegedly allowing Hezbollah to install hidden 
cameras at the airport focused at the point of arrival and departure of VIPs. At the time, 
Lebanon had been living through a presidential void since November 2007 and an 18-
month-sit-in in downtown Beirut against the government.23 Hezbollah’s gunmen, 
accompanied by Amal and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), went into the streets 
of Beirut, put the airport under siege, and blocked all the main roads with burning tires, 
stones and soil mounts.24 Beirut restored its previous experience of sectarian strife, militia 
                                                            
23 The Hezbollah-led opposition was calling for the cabinet’s resignation as it considered it “illegitimate” and 
“unconstitutional” because it did not represent the Shia community after all the Shiite ministers resigned in 
November 2006 (See Ch. 1 p. 9). 
24 The Labor Union had cancelled its previously announced and campaigned for demonstrations that were to 
be held on May 7, 2008 to demand raising the minimum wages.  Naim Qassem’s version of the story said that 
armed groups belonging to the Future “militia” and the Progressive Socialist Party started on May 7 to stop 
this demonstration by the force of weapons. Then these groups started firing at the opposition supporters and 
party offices.  (See Qassem, 2010, p. 258-259) 
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acts, house raids, and street wars. Gunmen attacked the offices of the Future Movement and 
of its media outlets in Beirut. They forcefully banned the Al-Mustaqbal newspaper after 
attacking its offices. They forced the employees out of the Future television station, stopped 
its broadcasting, and occupied the building after burning its archive. By May 8 and 9, they 
controlled West Beirut. However, the state buildings were neither attacked nor occupied. 
The Lebanese Army only came onto the scene few days after the attacks were halted when 
the opposition handed over its occupied spaces to it. The fighting spilled over to the Bekaa, 
North, and Druze inhabited Shoueifat and Aley. Conversely, the attacks did not yield the 
same results with the Druze who united despite their political differences and succeeded in 
protecting the Shouf from any Hezbollah invasion of their Mountain.  
Nasrallah courageously and loudly defended all those “well-applied cruelties” in a public 
televised address25. With his regular highly expressed self-confidence, he considered the 
whole matter a part of the party’s fulfillment of its “duties.”  
“They [the cabinet] want to push the Lebanese army and the Lebanese security forces into 
a direct confrontation with the Resistance through delegating to them [the task of] shutting 
down this [telecommunications] network. Whoever starts a war with us, even if he were a 
brother or a father, it is our right to confront him by defending ourselves, our weapons, our 
resistance and our existence. This telecommunications network is the most important part 
of the Resistance’s weapons and not a part of it […] After the dark decisions of the black 
cabinet, we consider that the war has started and it is our duty to defend our weapons, our 
resistance and its legitimacy and the one who warned is not to be blamed […] For us, the 
topic crossed all the red lines. No leniency with anyone, whoever it is. We know and our 
information confirms that other steps will follow that of the telecommunications” (Annahar, 
9 May 2008, p.5). 
                                                            
25 Nasrallah held a press conference on May 8, 2008 and addressed the journalists via a large screen to 
comment on the cabinet decisions and the party’s reaction. 
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One clearly concludes from Nasrallah’s firm tone that his party is ready to defend its 
violent actions until its last breath. He is simply saying that Hezbollah will defend itself by 
all means, at any time, and at any cost regardless of all the consequences.  
In Machiavellian terms, Nasrallah is carrying out the “bad” act of invading Beirut because 
the “necessities” which are the cabinet’s decisions demand it; amid the tough competition 
of “survival” with all the surrounding “bad” people represented by the Western backed 
Lebanese government. In Machiavellian thought, the things that appear to be “vices” might 
if followed lead to safety and well-being (Griffith ed., 1997, p.60). Not only did Nasrallah 
insist that his party had the right to react the way it did, he also tried to convince everybody 
that those acts served the public good. According to his logic, the public good achieved was 
defending Lebanon against its enemy, Israel, through preserving the party’s weapons and 
keeping Hezbollah’s power intact. Nasrallah skillfully turned the matter into a patriotic 
cause, a battle of existence as opposed to it being a matter of the state’s sovereignty. In the 
eyes of his partisans, Nasrallah’s advocated “public good” was quite convincing to the 
extent that they were ready to engage in a gloomy street war for the ulterior aim of 
Resistance even if it required assaulting other Lebanese. Nasrallah was clear enough when 
he said that he would even fight his brother or father for the sake of protecting the 
Resistance. Within the same speech, Nasrallah dares his opponents and advises them not to 
“try him” warning that the hand that will touch any person who supports the resistance will 
be “cut-off” (Annahar, 9 May 2008, p.5).  
“No need for the judiciary,” continues Nasrallah, noting that the issue is in his hands and 
challenging his opponents to dare talk about violations of sovereignty and the law citing 
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their misuse of the state’s treasury (Annahar, 9 May 2008, p.5). The Hezbollah chief refuses 
to resort to any judicial procedures because he does not care whether his actions are judged 
as good or bad as long as Hezbollah’s well-being is preserved. Although Hezbollah was 
showered with criticism for its actions, and the Sunni Grand Mufti of the Republic 
[Mohammad Rachid Qabbani] among many others considered its actions “tragic violations 
of Beirut’s sanctity,” (Annahar, 8 May 2008, p.1) Nasrallah remained indifferent to what 
was being said and deemed his men’s actions as necessary to safeguard the Resistance. 
Here comes Machiavelli’s statement that “the actions of all men, and especially those of 
princes, are judged by the results where there is no other judge to whom to appeal (Griffith 
ed., 1997, p. 69).” The result in this case was that Nasrallah had all the demands he raised 
as conditions to stop the strife met: the government withdrew its decisions, Wafiq Choucair 
remained in his post, and all the Lebanese leaders sat for dialogue in Doha this time and 
agreed to form a national unity cabinet that granted veto power to the Hezbollah-led 
opposition.26 Not only did Hezbollah get its awaited national unity cabinet, but imposed its 
recognition in the Ministerial Statement.27 
Nasrallah’s achievement of these political successes came as a direct result of the party’s 
display of power, and we have seen Machiavelli’s emphasis on the need to display power to 
attain success. This time Hezbollah’s success raised its opponents’ fears that the party 
                                                            
26 The Doha agreement also included: the election of Army Chief Michel Suleiman as a consensus President , 
removing the opposition’s tents erected in downtown Beirut, an agreement on a small district based electoral 
law for the upcoming parliamentary elections, an agreement not to resort to weapons to resolve future political 
disputes or to resort to sectarian rhetoric and accusations of treason, resuming national dialogue under the 
sponsorship of Sleiman. (See Appendix )   
27 The article on the resistance stated that Lebanon with its people, army and Resistance has the right to 
liberate or restore the Shebaa Farms and the Lebanese sections of the occupied Ghajar villages. It also 
stipulates the right to defend Lebanon in any confrontation or attack, to hold on to its water rights through all 
available and legitimate means.  
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moved into a new phase of actually using its weapons to impose its political will or to 
object to any decision that goes against that will. Lebanese parties became aware of what 
Hezbollah can do if it feels threatened or if its rules are broken. Those parties were only left 
with the option of objecting to the clause pertaining to the Resistance in the Ministerial 
Statement. Naim Qassem explicitly comments, “They had no other alternatives due to the 
objective conditions [set by the opposition] and the political balances of power on the 
Lebanese arena” (2009, p. 264) 
Hezbollah’s gun had always been on the table and had given the party leverage in many 
aspects; however, the act of pointing that gun to the heads of some Lebanese changed the 
whole formula. According to Norton, the May 2008 realities on the ground forced an 
adjustment in Washington’s thinking which initially rejected a consensus government but 
ended up “grudgingly” supporting the hastily organized Doha initiative (Norton, 2007, p. 
170).  
Nonetheless, Norton states that “the Hezbollah-led thrust was a brutal object lesson in 
power, but it also illustrated the limitations of power,” citing the Shouf region where the 
“Hezbollah fighters met their match” (Norton, 2007, p.169). While the Sunnis in Beirut 
surrendered, they turned violent in Northern Halba. Shared videos on the internet revealed 
how Future Movement supporters brutally executed 11 Syrian Social Nationalist Party 
members.  
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6.1.2. Liberality versus Parsimoniousness 
Moving on to Chapter 16, Machiavelli concentrates on the economic side of the prince’s 
reign and talks about liberality and parsimoniousness. In this context, Machiavelli suggests 
that liberality is injurious for the prince and will bring him either hatred or contempt 
(Griffith ed., 1997, p. 61). This concept seems quite sound when one looks at Machiavelli’s 
times when princes spent a lot of money on themselves. They allocated huge sums of 
money on personal projects that did not benefit the whole state such as on arts and on 
building monuments for themselves. Machiavelli’s preference is of course to spend this 
money on the armies in order to better defend the state. In this same chapter, Machiavelli 
talks about princes who spend other people’s substance after leading their armies into 
foreign countries (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 62). In his view, this type of spending will increase 
rather than diminish the prince’s reputation (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 62).  
How does Nasrallah relate to all this? Of course Nasrallah did not lead his army into some 
other state and ripped off its money and resources. The distinction between Nasrallah and 
Machiavelli’s spoken of prince within this context is clear-cut. However, Hezbollah is 
spending the funds of the Islamic Republic of Iran, not by the force of invasion but as a 
consequence of the ideological ties between both sides. This Iranian financial support has 
actually started since Hezbollah’s inception. We have already discussed the role played by 
the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps during the early formation of Hezbollah and their 
training of the young Lebanese Islamists. 
Hezbollah’s first leader and later rival of Nasrallah, Sheikh Subhi Tufaili, validates the 
assumption on Hezbollah’s persistent need of Iranian funding. He says, “To deny the 
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Iranian aid issued to Lebanon’s Hezbollah would be like denying that the sun provides light 
to the earth. Who can deny such a thing?”(Jaber, 1997, p.150).  
In the early years of Hezbollah’s formation, reports spoke of figures ranging between $5 
million to $10 million per month, but the party might have received larger amounts (Jaber, 
1997, p. 150). When Hashemi Rafsanjani came to power after the death of Ayatollah 
Khomeini in 1989, Iran began decreasing its funds as radical factions lost power (Jaber, 
1997, p. 150).28 US State Department annual reports on global terrorism repeatedly charged 
Hezbollah with receiving approximately $100 million from Iran in the 1990s period (Noe, 
2007, p. 92). 
Nasrallah denies these figures. “It is not true that we receive between $100 million and 
$150 million per annum,” says Nasrallah highlighting that figures in media are incorrect 
(Noe, 2007, p. 229). Then he defines Hezbollah’s resources as three (Noe, 2007, p. 229-
230). First, he mentions a semi-official Iranian organization that assists the martyrs’ 
families, prisoners and the wounded as well as a non-Iranian organization responsible for 
reconstruction and rehabilitation. The second source of financing of the party’s political 
dimension consists of donations from inside and outside Lebanon. The third source is the 
Khoms and Zakkat for the resistance and these come from the four Muslim denominations.  
According to Hala Jaber, Hezbollah also receives money from Iran’s theological leadership 
as independent contributions from those of the Iranian official authorities (1997, p. 
                                                            
28 Hezbollah’s sponsor and chief source of finance Hojjatoleslam Ali Akbar Mohtashemi who was the Iranian 
Ambassador to Syria fell out of favor and Iran began its negotiations with the West for the release of hostages. 
Iran was moving toward a more moderate stance and a sure sign of that was the presence of Amal leader 
Nabih Berri at the mourning ceremonies for Khomeini (Jaber, 1997, p. 150-151).    
79 
 
151).29She explains that the Khoms and Zakkat are not only distributed to charitable 
organizations and religious leaders around the world but can also be endowed to Islamic 
organizations for their political advancement (1997, p. 151).Shiites in Lebanon and around 
the world strictly adhere to this duty on a yearly basis and the sum of collections is never 
made public (Jaber, 1997, p. 151). The sum of the collected money can equal the domestic 
budget of a wealthy nation according to the [former] head of Hezbollah’s social welfare 
programs (Jaber, 1997, p. 151). How is all this money collected? Some of these amounts 
are directly transferred to the Hezbollah leadership which redistributes them to finance its 
social services, and the party also has collection boxes all over Lebanon, in shops, banks, 
mosques, street corners and neighborhoods (Jaber, 1997, p. 151). 
When talking about the party’s resources, Nasrallah controversially points out that the 
Khoms and not Iran cover the party’s military needs. He states that the funds that come 
from the Khoms largely solve the problem of the mujahidin’s expenses and weapon 
purchases “which are not Iranian but bought on the weapon market” (Noe, 2007, p. 230). 
He adds that anyone can purchase Hezbollah’s weapons if they have the right amount of 
money (Noe, 2007, p. 230). “It is not worth endangering any particular country by exposing 
it to accusations of arming the Islamic Resistance, although such an accusation should 
rather be a source of honor.”  
A 2010 Pentagon public report to Congress revealed that Hezbollah is receiving Iranian 
funds of around $100 to $200 million per year (Entous, 2010). Despite Nasrallah’s 
explanation of the party’s resources and although Hezbollah does not reveal any real 
                                                            
29 We have seen in the previous chapter that the Jurist theologian is in charge of the nation’s zakat and khoms 
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numbers, such figures of money coming from Iran make sense when one regards 
Hezbollah’s huge military arsenal and highly advanced technologies as well as the party’s 
numerous services and welfare system.  
Machiavelli believes that it is essential for the prince to seem generous and to work on 
producing this public image. He stresses that a prince should avoid being hated by the 
people for exploiting their resources and imposing on them taxations and extraordinary 
burdens to procure money (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 61).  
Nasrallah is absolutely on the safe side within this context. On one hand, the Hezbollah 
supporters are enjoying the benefits of all the Iranian funds without feeling that the party is 
exploiting their own money. This keeps them proud of their generous leader who was 
reassuring them that the party will rebuild their houses and properties when Israel shelled 
them in July 2006.30 On the other hand, even when those supporters and especially the 
wealthy among them provide Hezbollah with money they do it out of religious duty, and 
thus the public image of their generous yet modest leader remains unharmed. 
Nasrallah tries to explain this complicated reliance on Iranian funding in very simple words. 
He says international law and internationally recognized norms stipulate the right to resist 
occupation for a people whose land is occupied. “It also has the right, whenever it needs 
assistance, to reach out to friends who are ready to lend it the support and assistance it 
needs to liberate a land” (Noe, 2007, p. 92). Nasrallah’s mentioning of the international law 
is very odd and selective, given that Hezbollah does not believe in the international 
                                                            
30 Nasrallah delivered a speech on August 14, 2006 in which he discussed how the party will compensate for 
all the people whose houses were damaged during the war. 
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community and its institutions.31 Nasrallah is trying by all means to legitimize the Iranian 
aid to his party, even if he had to give credit to the international law, which he does not 
believe in, in order to block the way for any criticism against the party. 
Hezbollah did not limit itself to the above-mentioned resources, and has worked to become 
self-sufficient through investing in various enterprises beyond charitable organizations. It 
has also known how to benefit from the rich Lebanese Shiites through advertising for some 
projects and encouraging those to engage with it in financial partnership on a percentage 
basis (Jaber, 1997, p.152). Hezbollah also made deals with owners of sites to develop for 
welfare projects (Jaber, 1997, p.152). The party entered into the real world of business and 
has revenues coming from schools, supermarkets, bookshops, stationers, farms, fisheries, 
factories, and bakeries (Jaber, 1997, p.152). Hezbollah entered the world of real estate and 
developed housing projects at low costs and long-term loans without interest for young 
couples (Jaber, 1997, p.152). Hezbollah wove close relations with Islamist business tycoons 
around the world, in Europe, the US, Africa, and South America who sympathize with its 
cause (Jaber, 1997, p.152).  
All these efforts made by Hezbollah convey that the party is aware that it will not always be 
able to rely exclusively on Iranian funds because these might vary in the case of any 
political or theological changes in the Islamic Republic which has already happened before. 
Despite the fact that the party has been able to strengthen its self-sufficiency, Hezbollah 
cannot dispense Iranian support when it comes to the military domain and the confrontation 
                                                            
31 In an earlier speech in 2003, Nasrallah says that his party has never believed in the credibility and 
seriousness of the international community and its institutions (Lahham, 2007, vol. 15, p. 31) 
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with Israel. Being militarily powerful is always too costly and the economic losses 
following any war with Israel are too heavy for the party to carry alone. For instance, 
during the devastating 2006 July War, Hezbollah relied to a large extent on Iranian aid for 
the reconstruction of the South and of Dahiyeh. Not only that, but the party also had to 
conduct an immense campaign to defend Iranian money and to criticize the Lebanese 
government for failing to properly meet its compensation duties. In his first interview after 
the ceasefire that followed the 34-day July War in 2006, Nasrallah said, “What is important 
to the people is that the money is honest, - clean, pure, and without political conditions- and 
I repeat: without political conditions” (Noe, 2007, p. 406). Nasrallah said Iran is “accused” 
of financing and arming Hezbollah and assured that regardless of whether such 
“accusation” is right or wrong, his brothers in the Party of God “do not take money, arms, 
or support with conditions attached from anyone” (Noe, 2007, p. 407). 
In another notion within the same talk-show he narrates how Iran will assist in rebuilding 
roads, schools, mosques and churches, and hospitals in coordination with the state and 
municipalities (Noe, 2007, p. 407). However, Iran, unlike all the other countries that gave 
funds to the Lebanese government for reconstruction purposes, gave its funds directly to 
Hezbollah and not to the official authorities. 
Nasrallah reiterated this talk about “clean money” in a speech on November 14, 2006 “We 
will not quit the people. As we had said from the first day of victory, we are committed to 
build up your houses and firms with clean money,” said Nasrallah (Nasrallah: A new and 
hand-clean government is coming…don’t fear the civil war choice, 2006). Within the same 
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speech he promised that a “new and hand-clean government” will come to carry out the 
building process (A new and hand-clean government is coming, 2008).  
Once again, in 2011 Nasrallah bluntly admitted that Iran was behind all the reconstruction 
process. “Without Iran’s basic stand next to Lebanon, many houses would not have been 
reconstructed,” said Nasrallah casting doubt on where Prime Minister Siniora’s cabinet did 
spend the funds that came from other countries. “I am not accusing anyone […] but where 
was that money spent: on reconstruction or something else” (Kalimat al Amin al Aam li- 
Hizbullah haoul al Moustajidat as-siyasiya, 2011).  
To further reduce the burdens laid on his people during the 2006 July War Nasrallah issued 
a public call, in a speech on the day of the ceasefire, to all the emigrants around the world 
“who are used to helping Hezbollah at all times” to contribute in the reconstruction of the 
damaged homes of the “noble” people without whom victory could not have been attained 
(Kalimat al-amin al-aam li-Hizbullah as-sayyed Hassan Nasrallah ila al-loubnaniyin, 2008).  
Nasrallah’s promises of reconstruction were not new in 2006, for he vowed to do so during 
the 1993 July War and during Israel’s 1996 Grapes of Wrath operation against Lebanon. In 
an interview with Lebanese As-Safir newspaper, Nasrallah explained that Hezbollah will 
launch a large scale rebuilding campaign after the devastating 1996 Israeli aggression as it 
did in 1993 (Noe, 2007, p. 166). He said Hezbollah would pay the rents, for a six-month to 
one-year period, for the people until their damaged homes are reconstructed (Noe, 2007, p. 
166). “We do not want our people to live in tents,” says Nasrallah (Noe, 2007, p. 166). He 
explained that all the party’s institutions in the south were mobilized including engineers, 
84 
 
doctors, clinics and reconstruction tools to repair roads and rebuild houses (Noe, 2007, p. 
166).  
Nasrallah repeatedly fulfilled his reconstruction promises which reflected positively on his 
public image as a generous leader who sympathizes with his people and meets their needs. 
His public image is so well conveyed and preserved in such a manner that the supporters 
seem to forget that all the damage inflicted upon them as a consequence of wars could have 
perhaps been avoided. Hezbollah’s supporters never felt abandoned even as they faced 
tremendous losses and they were never left to compensate for those wars from their own 
money. Consequently, they remained faithful to the party and to its leader.   
6.1.3. Feared or Loved 
After discussing the economic side of the prince’s rule, Machiavelli moves to a very 
important argument in Chapter 17 where he discusses cruelty and clemency. Within this 
context, he raises an interesting question: Is it better for the prince to be loved than feared 
or to be feared than beloved?  (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 65) 
Machiavelli believes that it is too difficult to be both at the same time, and if one has to 
choose between the two it is much safer for the prince to be feared (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 
65). However, Machiavelli makes it clear that the prince should not incur the people’s 
hatred and emphasizes that being feared and not being hated can go very well together 
(Griffith ed., 1997, p. 65). How does Nasrallah relate to this argument?32 
                                                            
32Within this context, the people we are referring to are the various Lebanese groups and each will be 
discussed separately. 
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To start with, Nasrallah is surely not loved by all the Lebanese, and above all not by his 
political rivals. Whether this hatred is accompanied by fear is relative based on each party’s 
history, capabilities, previous experiences, composition and future. In May 2008, Hezbollah 
succeeded in occupying West Beirut and inflicted huge damages upon the Future 
Movement that is unknown for any previous military experience. Meanwhile, the Party of 
God failed to defeat the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) which is known for its strong 
military involvement in the long years of the civil war. Still, this military success for the 
PSP, and for the Druze as a community, did not bear any fruit at the political level. Soon, 
the PSP Leader Walid Jumblatt, whom Nasrallah ruthlessly criticized and called a 
“criminal” after holding him responsible for the cabinet’s decisions, shifted his position. 
Jumblatt drastically toned down his offensive rhetoric against Hezbollah, withdrew from 
the March 14 alliance in August 2009, and headed toward rapprochement with Nasrallah. 
The fear factor was irrevocable; and Jumblatt realized that the balance of power is not in his 
Druze community’s favor. Nasrallah was perhaps unable to pose an immediate danger 
during the clashes with the Druze, but he surely opened the PSP leader’s eyes to what might 
happen in the future and in this sense prepared the ground for Jumblatt’s arising fears. 
These fears made Jumblatt restore his old and once abandoned Arab nationalist principles, 
and he turned into a staunch defender of the Resistance.   
One should keep in mind that the Lebanese political parties’ rhetoric is not always 
sufficient to reveal their true intentions, fears or plans. Some parties might find in 
announcing their fear of Hezbollah a way to gain the affection of the latter’s dissenters and 
to provoke the sympathy of the international community. Others might think that 
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announcing this fear would be a clear declaration of their political impotence and would 
lead to the frustration of their masses and the decrease of their popularity. Nasrallah’s 
opponents disguise their fear of Hezbollah by stressing issues like the state’s sovereignty 
and its resistance duties, a national defense strategy in addition to establishing a strong 
army in full control of all its territories. Christian parties such as the Lebanese Forces and 
the Kataeb adopt such rhetoric emphasizing that they have struggled for so long to preserve 
these principles and are unready to abandon them. 
Machiavelli strictly warns the prince against taking his people’s property and hints at man’s 
animalistic nature by saying that a man would forget his father’s death and not the loss of 
his patrimony (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 65).  
Although Nasrallah and Saad Hariri reconciled after the 2008 conflict, the Sunnis could not 
easily forget the people they lost in the battles. Neither were they able to forget the way 
Amal and Hezbollah fighters insulted them, raided their houses, and reportedly stole their 
property. This was interpreted through the recurrent tension and minor clashes that occurred 
in the Sunni-Shiite mixed areas of Beirut even after the Doha Agreement and the 
reconciliation. 
All of these factors contributed in distorting the image of Hezbollah and its leader and made 
him hated by his rivals. However, this hatred was accompanied by the fear of his significant 
power vis-à-vis the other parties. Nasrallah frequently reinforces this fear by reminding 
everybody through a violent dialect that he is always up to his word. “I have clearly stated 
that we will cut-off the hand that will try to disarm the Resistance, and today is the day to 
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be faithful to this decision,” said Nasrallah in his first comment after the 2008 conflict 
(Annahar, 9 May 2008, p.1). 
Besides the announced rivals, do all the Shiites love Hassan Nasrallah? What about the 
Amal Movement’s stance, does it support Nasrallah out of love or fear? 
To be able to address this question we should move from the long history of tension 
between the two parties only halted through a Syrian-Iranian brokered agreement in 
November 1990. Nasrallah says that the two “referees” Iran and Syria wrote the provisions 
of the Agreement noting that no such “comprehensive political agreement” was concluded 
in the past between both countries regarding the Shiites (Noe, 2007, pp. 35, 36). In addition 
to the ideological difference between the two parties [See Chapter 3], Amal and Hezbollah 
are engaged in a low-profile struggle for power within the Shiite community. Hezbollah has 
in the end emerged as a leading party among the Shiites at the expense of Amal’s 
decreasing popularity. Although Hezbollah probably has the upper hand in this competition, 
given all its resources and military capacities, Nasrallah always stresses the strong alliance 
between the two parties, particularly in the choice of resistance. Hezbollah has refrained 
from nominating any parliament speaker other than Nabih Berri who in his turn never 
ceased to announce his full support for the resistance choice. At the time when both parties 
have run on the same lists during parliamentary elections since 1992, the municipal 
elections that took place in 2010 revealed the strong competition between the two parties. 
Each party ran a separate list and results varied from one village to another which denoted 
the delicacy of the situation between both parties. As such, to assume that the Amal 
supporters love and admire Nasrallah remains very hypothetical; yet any renewed 
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confrontation between the two parties might lead to an unwanted divide among the Shiites 
keeping in mind Amal’s long experience in street wars. 
It is very natural to have Nasrallah’s rivals or Shiite competitors hate or fear, him but this 
does not really mean that Nasrallah should be afraid that this would affect his leadership as 
it was suggested by Machiavelli. The issue is deeper than that and many elements that are 
beyond sentimental feelings are involved in giving Hezbollah its position and in 
establishing the balance of power in Lebanon. In this sense, Hezbollah would not 
necessarily be a weaker party if led by another figure, because it is the party’s weight that 
empowers its leader. 
How does Hezbollah keep its own supporters in-check? Do those people love Nasrallah or 
simply fear him? Machiavelli mentions that as long as the prince showers benefits upon his 
people, they will be loyal (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 65). They will be ready to offer him their 
blood, substance, lives and children “provided the necessity for it is far-off but when it is 
near at hand, then they revolt” (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 65).  
According to Robin Wright, Nasrallah is an icon in Dahiyeh, renowned for his oratory and 
honored as a “champion” of Lebanon’s long-dispossessed Shia (2006, para.9).  
During the 2006 July War, television reports showed Shiite mothers saying that they accept 
the death of their children for the sake of the Sayyed. Others were wishing for the 
martyrdom of their sons for the sake of the Moqawama [Resistance] and the Sayyed. 
Families were filmed in front of their smashed houses and shops shouting that they do not 
mind the material damage for the sake of the Sayyed. People from the South and Dahiyeh 
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stood before their completely burned properties shouting that God will render his men- the 
Hezbollah fighters- and the Sayyed victorious. Long endless queues of cars stood in the 
middle of the damaged roads amidst the summer heat, and the drivers and passengers 
heading south expressed their joy over the “Divine Victory.”  
If one contemplates these scenes from an ideological and religious perspective, those 
people perfectly make sense and their authenticity is doubtless. For the strong believers, 
martyrdom is a gift from God who promised them victory. This strong religious belief is 
fortified by their full conviction in Nasrallah’s honesty and in that Hezbollah will 
compensate for all their losses. Their damaged houses will be rebuilt, their shops will be 
reopened, their lands re-cultivated. The Sayyed vowed to do so, and has done it before. On 
the other end, other people in Lebanon did not share that joy and love for the Sayyed. They 
were rather furious due to the enormous economic losses that resulted from the war with 
Israel and were absolutely irritated by the image of their burning country.  
To sum up, Nasrallah is undoubtedly a beloved leader among his people. This love is 
attributed to the many factors we mentioned above. It is also strengthened by the fact that 
Nasrallah has risen to power from the people’s ranks and is always keen on conveying his 
“modest image.” Yet, this does not necessarily mean that his people do not fear him at all. 
In the end, he is a powerful leader with religious and political authority leading a dogmatic 
party.  
Within this same chapter Machiavelli talks about punishment and the need that the prince 
remains aware not to misuse his merciful image. He states that if the prince was obliged to 
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inflict death penalty he should only do that when there is a manifest cause and a clear 
justification for that (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 65). 
Prior to the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Nasrallah distinguished between two 
groups of what he called “enemy agents” in reference to the Lebanese who collaborated 
with Israel (Noe, 2007, p. 198). In Nasrallah’s words, the first category consists of those 
who served Israel until the last moment, while the second refers to those who gave up their 
activities as collaborators and remained in the occupied areas including Jezzine (Noe, 2007, 
p. 198). 
Nasrallah dismissed calls for pardoning and showing mercy to members of the first group 
labeling such calls as unfair and based on sectarian, electoral and political reasons (Noe, 
2007, p. 198). In the case of the second group, Nasrallah voiced support to granting those 
people a pardon and promised to work with the legal authorities to reduce their sentences if 
they surrender to the resistance or to the army (Noe, 2007, p. 198).   
On the day of celebrating the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, Nasrallah in his “victory” speech 
called for severe punishment of the collaborators to serve as example for the future (Noe, 
2007, p. 238). Starting 2009, Nasrallah further hardened his tone on this issue and began to 
call for capital punishment of the Lebanese convicted of spying for Israel. In a speech on 
May 22 he addressed the spies who were not arrested yet and told them that they were 
totally exposed (Full text of H.E. Nasrallah’s speech in Nabatiyeh: Execute spies starting 
with Shiite collaborators, 2009). However, this time he asked them to surrender to the 
91 
 
Lebanese judiciary and security services and not to Hezbollah (Full text of H.E. Nasrallah’s 
speech in Nabatiyeh: Execute spies starting with Shiite collaborators, 2009).  
To strengthen his cause, especially among his supporters, Nasrallah refused to give any 
sectarian basis to his demand and called for the execution of the Shiite collaborators first 
(Full text of H.E. Nasrallah’s speech in Nabatiyeh: Execute spies starting with Shiite 
collaborators, 2009). To add an emotional value to his cause and better justify it, he said 
that he was raising this demand in the name of all the martyrs, wounded and people who 
were affected by the war (Full text of H.E. Nasrallah’s speech in Nabatiyeh: Execute spies 
starting with Shiite collaborators, 2009). Nasrallah maintained his threatening language and 
said that anyone who treats the matter lightly is considered an “accomplice” (Execute spies 
starting with Shiite collaborators, 2009).  
He renewed this call on several occasions in 2010 as well. For instance, on July, 16 he said 
that collaborators should be sentenced to death citing how they significantly helped Israel in 
the 2006 aggression. He also attributed to them a role in inciting sedition in the country and 
urged the government to launch an investigation in the cabinet’s May 5 decisions to 
uncover the “big spies” and “mastermind” behind its actions. He called on the political 
leaders to find out who “fooled” them (Sayyed Nasrallah: Execution of death penalty 
against spies should come about without further delay, 2010).  
Nasrallah will not execute these death sentences himself or as a party because this will be 
the responsibility of the Lebanese state. Nonetheless, Hezbollah has enough power to lobby 
for this cause and exert the necessary political pressure into that direction. On this issue, 
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Nasrallah has the law on his side and his cause is thus “manifest” and could be “well 
justified,” as Machiavelli points out.33 On June 30, 2010 President Michel Sleiman said he 
is willing to sign death sentences against spies issued by military courts. From 2009 until 
February 18, 2011 six men were sentenced to death on charges of spying for Israel (AFP, 
Lebanon Sentences Israeli Spy to Death, 2011). These verdicts are yet to be executed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
33 The Lebanese Constitution stipulates that the President, Prime Minister and Justice Minister should sign 
death sentences issued by the judiciary.  
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6.2. Part II 
6.2.1. How to keep faith 
Machiavelli begins Chapter 18 by stating that the prince who has his feet in the real world 
must learn not to always keep his word especially when doing so endangers his interest 
(Griffith ed., 1997, p.67). Machiavelli invites the prince to be a “great hypocrite and 
dissembler” (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 68). This call demonstrates the importance of the leader’s 
public image and how crucial it is that he always seem to have virtues without necessarily 
having them. He assumes that common people are always taken by appearances and results 
and will thus find all the means adopted by the prince to preserve the state honorable and 
will praise him (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 69). 
Nasrallah has not really always kept his word although he reiterates on several occasions 
that he is honest, trustworthy and a fulfiller of his promises. In a 2006 interview Nasrallah 
raises a series of interesting questions to which he responds with the word “never.” He asks: 
“Have we ever threatened the Lebanese? Have we ever used these weapons to wage a battle 
inside Lebanon? Have we ever used our weapons as a source of strength in municipal or 
parliamentary elections, or to impose certain shares or conditions?” (Noe, 2007, p. 403) 
In reality, the party has completed all of the above. To start with, Nasrallah’s threatening 
tone is hardly absent in any of his speeches. Hezbollah did engage in a war against Amal in 
the 1980s. Wasn’t that a battle inside Lebanon? Hezbollah waged a battle against the 
Communist Party in 1986. Nasrallah narrates that the Communist Party intentionally killed 
one Hezbollah fighter, citing as evidence the communists’ deployment in that area (Noe, 
2007, p.28). He continues that while the party intended to contain the incident, the equation 
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changed when the communists fired rockets at the Iranian embassy from the Communist 
Center, and Hezbollah retaliated severely (Noe, 2007, p. 28). Clashes repetitively broke out 
between both parties and Syria had to intervene once again to calm the situation.34 
Nasrallah insists though [within the same statement] that Hezbollah was careful “not to be 
dragged into the quagmire of Civil War”, adding that “God Almighty” protected the party 
from doing that (Noe, 2007, p. 28). He points out as well that the party is very keen not to 
fight with any party that is ideologically different from Hezbollah like the Communist Party 
(Noe, 2007, p. 29). Again in May 2008, Hezbollah used its weapons to teach anyone who 
touches the sanctity of his party a lifetime lesson. Hezbollah’s military move eventually 
brought the governmental changes the Hezbollah-led opposition was calling for and a 
national unity cabinet replaced Siniora’s. Ironically, Nasrallah himself had once stated that 
force does not give its beholder the right to do whatever he wants or to impose his will on 
whomever he wants (Lahham, 2007, vol. 13, p. 16). 
During the 1992 parliamentary elections, Hezbollah practiced an “overt” armed presence in 
the Bekaa and South which of course affected the results in the party’s favor (El-Khazen, 
1993). However, Nasrallah when asked about the issue said those were rumors (Noe, 2007, 
p.80). Not only did he deny the issue but also chose to impose his statement as the absolute 
truth regardless of what had really happened. “Neither the people, the army, nor journalists 
saw any of that,” said Nasrallah in an interview that followed the elections (Noe, 2007, 
p.80).  
                                                            
34 Tension rose between Hezbollah and the Communist Party because the latter was displeased with 
Hezbollah’s takeover of the resistance role. For years, the communists have gained their legitimacy from 
fighting Israel. With Hezbollah’s emergence and its insistence of its exclusive resistance duties, communists 
were afraid to lose that role which would put them outside the political and military scene.   
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In an interview with Hezbollah-owned al-Manar TV station in December 2005, Nasrallah 
said, “We are people of dialogue and logic; we do not want anybody to be afraid of us” 
(Lahham, 2007, vol. 15, p. 142). He added that his party’s only red lines at the domestic 
level are Lebanon’s unity and Arabism, civil peace, coexistence, and political and 
administrative reform (Lahham, 2007, vol. 15, p. 142). 
Hezbollah is an advocate of dialogue; however, it has not responded yet to the basic 
objective of the Lebanese National Dialogue: establishing a national defense strategy. The 
party has not presented yet any official proposal on its own vision in this regard and only 
listened to the views of the other participants. Meanwhile, Hezbollah officials and Nasrallah 
continuously declare that the party will not disarm. Hezbollah seems to favor the passing of 
time while some of its Lebanese counterparts are calling for resolving the matter. In 2007, 
Nasrallah called for dialogue (Annahar, 6 October 2007, p. 1) at the time when his 
supporters and the allied opposition parties maintained their sit-in in downtown Beirut and 
conditioned the removal of their tents with the government’s resignation. Such calls for 
dialogue are not necessarily reassuring for Nasrallah’s opponents amidst the party’s display 
of its power on the ground.  
The Hezbollah chief stresses Lebanon’s unity is a red line and in parallel vows to “cut-off” 
any Lebanese hand that dares to touch his party’s weapons. The validity of Nasrallah’s call 
for national unity is also challenged through the party’s accusations of treason to anyone 
who suggests disarming the party which helps provoke further division in the fragile 
Lebanese society.  
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The party’s public stand on reform is also challenged by the fact that some of its supporters 
refuse to pay their taxes and electricity bills and beat tax-collectors in Dahiyeh. The Internal 
Security Forces (ISF) members were assaulted, on several occasions, when they tried to 
eliminate violations of the law pertaining to illegal constructions in Hezbollah’s Dahiyeh. 
In parallel to all these actions, Hezbollah’s leader calls for establishing judicial committees 
to investigate into corruption. For instance, in 2006 Nasrallah urged the cabinet which it 
participated in to establish a judicial committee of clean judges to open all corruption files 
starting with the party’s ministers (Lahham, 2007, vol. 15, p. 158). Meanwhile, Hezbollah 
does not disclose any information on its funding and sources of armament. The Lebanese 
did not really know how Hezbollah spent the amounts of money which it received in US 
dollars from Iran and distributed to its people in envelopes in Dahiyeh in 2006 for 
reconstruction.  
In his speech during the “Victory Celebration” in 2000, Nasrallah said that his party has no 
intention to replace the Lebanese state. “We neither are a security force nor aspire to be 
one, neither are a security authority nor wish to be one,” he said (Noe, 2007, p. 238). But in 
fact, Hezbollah forbade the Lebanese Army from deploying in South Lebanon until 2006, 
following the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701 that ended the 
war with Israel. The Lebanese army cannot enter the Dahiyeh stronghold to carry out any 
security operations. For instance, when an explosion occurred in Dahiyeh in December 
2009, Hezbollah security forces deployed in the area of the blast, carried out their 
investigation, and then allowed the Lebanese Security Forces to perform their job 
(Naharnet, 28 December 2009, para.25). Journalists and reporters were forbidden from 
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covering the blast on the ground and from taking pictures (Naharnet, 28 December 2009, 
para.26).  
Nasrallah’s double standards were most obvious during the 2011 Arab revolutions against 
the oppressive regimes. While Nasrallah vigorously defended the revolutions in Tunisia, 
Egypt, Libya, Bahrain and Yemen the party opposed those emerging freedom movements 
in Syria and Iran. 
These double standards constitute good material for Nasrallah’s opponents to better 
criticize him. However, it does not really seem that Hezbollah’s supporters give high 
attention to any inconsistency in their leader’s policy. Those supporters’ commitment to the 
party’s ideology entails a full acceptance of what its leader chooses to say or do. Leaders 
like Nasrallah do not really need to worry about losing the partisans’ support due to 
changes in their rhetoric. It is religious and ideological commitment that would make those 
people adhere to the party’s choices under all circumstances. It is this same commitment 
that makes those people believe in “divine” victories when losses are uncountable, and in 
“Godly” paths followed by a “sacred” resistance that merits all efforts to preserve its 
“sacred” weapons. This constant emphasis on God keeps the supporters’ faith in the party. 
It is a compelling force that would make them think that it is sinful to oppose God’s will 
and to abandon Hezbollah. Slogans like “Death to America and Israel,” might seem 
outdated for some, but for Hezbollah supporters they are still at the core of their battle for 
existence.  
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Machiavelli wants the prince to be both a fox to know the traps and snares and a lion to 
scare the wolves (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 67). He is against being a lion constantly because he 
believes that sticking to this nature implies that the prince does not understand his business 
(Griffith ed., 1997, p. 67). So Machiavelli is searching for the cunning in a prince rather 
than a constant and irrational display of force.  
Nasrallah knows how to convince his people that he never intended to inflict any damage 
upon them and that his wars with Israel stemmed from his keenness not to fall into the 
Israeli trap. “We did not fall into the trap,” said Nasrallah in his first interview after the 
2006 July war insisting that the Israelis were going to carry out a large scale war against 
Lebanon at the end of September or early October (Noe, 2007, p. 390). In a remarkable 
contradiction, Nasrallah says at a later stage of the same interview that had he known that 
there was even 1 percent chance that the capturing operation would have led to war like the 
one that happened, he would “absolutely” not have done it. “I would say no, absolutely not, 
for humanitarian, moral, social, security, military, and political reasons. I would not agree 
to it, and neither would Hezbollah, the prisoners in Israeli prisons, nor the family of the 
prisoners” (Noe, 2007, p. 394). Nasrallah tried to make his justifications sounder by saying 
that no experience throughout history shows that such could be a reaction to a capturing 
operation (Noe, 2007, p. 393). Once again Nasrallah is self-contradictory because the party 
itself has witnessed in 1986 how Israel would react to abducting its soldiers. When 
Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli military personnel on February 16, 1986 in the southern 
village of Kounin, Tel Aviv responded by occupying 17 villages outside the security zone 
and carried out an extensive campaign against the party and its supporters.  
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The Hezbollah chief is considered the “shrewdest” and “most dangerous” of all Arab 
leaders even by the former Israeli Ambassador to the US, Daniel Ayalon (Wright, 2006, 
para.4). Nasrallah knows how to jump over the traps of the Lebanese political scene, and 
understands the business of practicing force to scare anyone who wants to undermine 
Hezbollah’s security. Here we will consider the “trap” of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(STL) probing into the assassination of Ex-Premier Rafik Hariri. With the establishment of 
the STL, Nasrallah accused Israel of carrying out the assassination in Lebanon and said that 
Tel Aviv wanted to use the STL to topple the last resistant regime in the region, Syria 
(Annahar, 6 October 2007, p. 5). This rhetoric changed when media reports and leaks 
started pointing fingers at Hezbollah as the killer of Hariri. Nasrallah went on the defensive 
even before the STL issued any indictment and revealed the “fox and the lion” in him. He 
officially started the defense process through a long televised press conference on August 9, 
2010 (Full text of Hezbollah S.G Press conference on Evidence of former PM Hariri 
assassination, 2010) during which he pointed fingers at Israel. This time he presented the 
profiles of Israeli spies and showed how they contributed to the Hariri assassination. He 
also revealed footages which he said were linked to Hariri’s murder.35 Almost one month 
later, he called on all the Lebanese officials and citizens to boycott the STL and not 
cooperate with the investigators (Full speech: Sayyed Nasrallah on the performance of the 
international investigation committee, 2010). With time, Nasrallah went louder and louder 
on the issue until he vowed to “cut-off” any hand that tries to get to Hezbollah’s Mujahidin 
toarrest them (Sayyed Nasrallah Full Speech on Martyr’s day, 2010). The Hezbollah chief 
                                                            
35 Hezbollah’s technology team was able to breach Israeli UAVs and decode their filming of Lebanese sites. 
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preemptively justified any step that the party might take. “Mistaken is he who believes that 
the resistance will not defend itself and its honor against any accusation or attack by the 
means it finds appropriate, in agreement with its faithful and truthful allies in the Lebanese 
National Opposition who are concerned about Lebanon's honor and invincibility,” he said 
(Sayyed Nasrallah Full Speech on Martyr’s day, 2010).  
Before launching this huge campaign against the STL, Nasrallah had himself approved 
during the first rounds of National Dialogue Lebanon’s commitment to the truth and justice. 
Revealing the truth and achieving justice were also mentioned in the ministerial statements 
of the two cabinets which Hezbollah was part of. Nasrallah thus seems to have the 
“versatile mind” that is capable of swerving readily from good to evil if necessity demands 
as Machiavelli describes it (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 68).  
Speaking of the “versatile mind” takes us back to the previously mentioned point 
concerning Nasrallah and his party’s flexibility, whereby Hezbollah pragmatically deals 
with certain events instead of exclusively applying a dogmatic and rigid approach.   
6.2.2. Avoiding hate, overcoming conspiracy 
Moving on to Chapter 19, Machiavelli chooses to talk about the prince’s security and 
focuses on how he can avoid any conspiracies against him. Machiavelli speaks of two kinds 
of conspiracies that a prince should fear: attempts against him by his own subjects and 
attacks by powerful foreigners (Griffith ed., 1997, p.70-71). In all cases, Machiavelli 
advises the prince “to be on his guard.” 
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Machiavelli states that the prince can protect himself from any plots against him by his 
subjects through gaining their love and support (Griffith ed., 1997, p 71). He highlights 
over and over again that it is necessary for the prince to avoid his people’s contempt and to 
keep them satisfied because their hatred will lead them to conspire against him (Griffith ed., 
1997, p. 71). Nasrallah offers a similar statement when he talks about the lesson that could 
be derived from the situation in Iraq one month after the US invasion.  He says, “What can 
really protect a certain regime are its own people and its citizens, if they are well treated by 
it; if it oppresses them, none of its rallying speeches will do them any good” (Noe, 2007, p. 
297). 
As far as Nasrallah’s supporters are concerned, the Sayyed seems to be respected and loved 
by his subjects who not only express readiness to defend their leader by words but do it in 
actions and at any cost. In June 2006, Hezbollah’s supporters were outraged when a 
satirical TV show broadcast a sketch36 that mocked Nasrallah. The sketch showed a 
disguised Nasrallah replying to when the party would disarm. He started giving a list of 
endless comic conditions such as liberating the garden of an “Abu Hassan” in Detroit after 
it was confiscated by the Jews. Hezbollah’s supporters swiftly rallied into the Christian area 
of Ashrafieh, damaged cars and shops and clashed with a group of young men, and as a 
result several were wounded and transported to the hospital. Hezbollah also blocked the 
road leading to the airport with burning tires. The sketch writer, Sharbel Khalil, was 
demanded to apologize and he did. Hezbollah’s officials justified the supporters’ passionate 
                                                            
36 Could be viewed on http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MuyKghN14EM 
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reaction to making fun of their cleric.37 Voices were heard saying that it is not allowed to 
mock Nasrallah because of his religious status. Of course, Hezbollah was sending a double 
message: one against the content and the other was that no violation of Nasrallah’s sanctity 
will ever be tolerated. According to Michael Young, “In seeking to silence critics of their 
leader, in momentarily shutting down the airport, Hezbollah struck a blow against 
Lebanon’s tolerant, if always paradoxical, openness” (2006, para.4).  
To defend himself against powerful foreigners, the prince needs good armies and good 
allies, according to Machiavelli (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 71). Should Nasrallah fear any 
conspiracies from foreign powers? Israel has announced on several occasions that it wants 
to kill Nasrallah. Former IDF chief of general staff Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz announced in 2009 
that Israel had attempted but failed to assassinate Nasrallah during the 2006 July War (The 
JPost., 31 May 2009, para.1). Nasrallah has the “good army” mentioned by Machiavelli and 
reaching him would not be an easy task given his exceptional security measures. Nasrallah 
enjoys a very high level of secrecy concerning his activities, and reaching him might be 
impossible especially amid the party’s underground infrastructure and reportedly highly 
sophisticated tunnels. Nasrallah challenged Israel and made a public appearance for the first 
time in few years during the “Divine Victory” celebration on September 22, 2006 although 
the Israelis had publicly vowed to kill him.  
                                                            
37 The Christian TV channel LBCI that broadcast  the show was forbidden from broadcasting in the Hezbollah 
controlled Dahiyeh and was only allowed to resume after it showed a documentary on a Hezbollah military 
operation in Ansariah.   
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Nasrallah has never again appeared live on stage in any of the party’s rallies or celebrations. 
Since July 12, 2006 and with the exception of the “Divine Victory Celebration,” Nasrallah 
has chosen to appear live on huge screens at all times. Crowds and officials gather before 
the screen and interact with their leader as he gives out his fiery speeches. People who enter 
the stadiums to watch Nasrallah speak are subjected to strict security measures and 
screening. Women security direct the females where to get seated and men assist the males. 
People are not allowed to change their seats once the leader starts speaking and they are 
directed on what slogans to raise (Authors’ Personal Observation upon attending a speech 
at the Raya Stadium in Dahiyeh). Nasrallah’s appearances via the screen only contradict his 
previous statement in 1992. “…We cannot put our secretary-general and our entire 
leadership in hiding and ask them to address the people through television screens,” said 
Nasrallah adding that such an attitude does not suit his movement’s nature (Noe, 2007, p. 
61). He explains that the party should balance between its security measures and the need to 
maintain a public presence (Noe, 2007, p. 61).38 
Machiavelli raises another interesting point and says that when the conspirators know that 
the death of the prince will offend rather than conciliate the people, “they will not venture 
upon such a course for the difficulties that surround the conspirators are infinite (Griffith 
ed., 1997, p. 71).”  
Israel is surely aware that killing Hezbollah’s leader does not mean weakening the party. 
History offers clear evidence in this regard. When Israel killed Moussawi, the assassination 
                                                            
38 Nasrallah gave these comments as he was talking about the “shock” that followed Moussawi’s assassination 
and people’s belief that the new secretary general should not attend the funeral and should not appear on 
certain occasions for security reasons (Noe, 2007, p. 60). 
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was supposed to be a strong blow that would weaken the Party of God. However, it failed 
to do so and created an opposite effect. Nasrallah came as a strong successor and dragged 
his legitimacy from Moussawi’s legacy. He emotionally invested in the assassination to 
solidify his cause and led the party’s ongoing boom. Taking into consideration Hezbollah’s 
current position and Nasrallah’s significance, any attempt against his life might have a very 
unpleasant and reverse effect on Israel. Examining Nasrallah’s words during his 
challenging appearance in 2006 on stage to celebrate the “Divine Victory” clearly reflects 
the negative repercussions on Israel in the case of any attempt on his life. 
“Yes, to stand before and among you entails a risk on you and on me. There were other 
options and we were still discussing [the matter] in the last half an hour. However, my 
heart, mind, and spirit did not allow me to address you from far or through the screen. The 
maximum a person can expect is that the enemy commits a mistake or crime. But doesn’t 
this enemy [Israel] know who we are? We are the sons of that Imam who said: ‘Are you 
threatening me with death oh Ben al Talqaa’. Death is a habit for us and our dignity comes 
from God through martyrdom.’” (Mahrajan al-Intisar al-Ilahi, 2006) 
In a previous speech, in 2004, Nasrallah touches on the same matter and calls on the enemy 
to understand and the friend to be confident that the current resistance movements are no 
longer in a dilemma and their continuity is not limited to one person be it the funder, or 
icon or great leader (Lahham, 2007, vol. 15, p. 80). “[…] Let nobody in the world think that 
resistance movements can be eliminated through eliminating their leaders,” he adds, 
highlighting that the “Zionists” ignore the moral relation between God and these 
movements (Lahham, 2007, vol. 15, p. 80). 
Even if we were to assume that killing Nasrallah will have the desirable effect for Israel and 
create divisions among the party ranks, do these divisions really serve Tel Aviv’s best 
interest? Dealing with one unified party is troublesome enough so how would the situation 
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be for Israel it had to deal with sub-parties that will most probably maintain enmity toward 
it to ensure their survival. In another notion, Israel can better maintain the support of the 
international community when it makes its case against an exceptionally powerful 
Hezbollah rather than weakened rivaling factions. 
Chapter 20 of The Prince falls more or less within the same context of Chapter 19 whereby 
Machiavelli elaborates further on building fortresses. He clearly points out that the prince 
who is beloved by his people should worry less about building fortresses adding that his 
subjects’ affection is the best fortress (Griffith ed., 1997, p.82). Well, Nasrallah has both 
fortresses mentioned by Machiavelli, that of the people’s support and that against the 
powerful enemy. In this sense, and according to Machiavelli’s logic, he does not have to 
worry much about conspiracies.  
Machiavelli touches on the issue of purposely made party divisions and considers them 
unproductive of any good (Griffith ed., 1997, p.80). He notes that while such divisions were 
considered as wise by the ancestors such as in Pistoia, this principle does not apply 
anymore to his days (Griffith ed., 1997, p.80). Did Nasrallah encounter any remarkable 
internal divisions within Hezbollah and how did he deal with them? In 1997, Hezbollah’s 
first Secretary General, Subhi al Tufaili, announced what he called “thawrat al-jiyaa” or 
“Revolution of the Famished” to revolt against Hezbollah’s failure to meet the demands of 
the deprived supporters. Tufeili organized rallies, which although banned by the 
government gathered thousands of people, and his demands included: creating jobs, crop 
subsidies, free education, electricity, water and state benefits and pensions for service with 
the resistance in lieu of army service (Norton, 2007, p.106).Hezbollah’s leadership was 
106 
 
aware of how attractive such a movement could be in the dense Shiite suburb of Beirut 
(Norton, 2007, p.106). Tufaili was able to exploit his movement during the 1998 municipal 
elections where he won in his hometown village in Bekaa and in another one and split some 
other villages.  
Tufaili’s opposition to Hezbollah’s leadership had begun in 1992 when he opposed the 
party’s participation in the 1992 parliamentary elections. Qassem explains that several 
mediation committees were formed to resolve the dispute with Tufaili but they came to no 
avail (2010, p.222). The conflict turned public on Jerusalem Day, which Khomeini assigned 
on the last day of Ramadan, and Hezbollah wanted to hold in Baalbeck. Tufeili, in his turn, 
said he wants to hold the celebration in the same place and as a result the party issued a 
statement and dismissed Tufaili on January 24, 1998 (Qassem, 2010, pp.222-223). The 
statement described Tufaili’s actions as an attempt “to divide the domain, partition it and 
impose himself on it with all his available means irrespective of the losses and damages 
foreseen” (Qassem, 2010, p. 223). Interestingly the statement justified Hezbollah’s decision 
by blaming Tufaili and said that he “deliberately swayed from the party’s path” through his 
actions.   
Before this announcement Hezbollah did not go public in its internal divisions. Hezbollah 
does not act in the same way other Lebanese parties do and always tries to convey itself as a 
strictly unified party from its secretary general to the bodyguards that protect its offices 
(Jaber, 1997, p. 72). Tufaili was indicted for killing an army lieutenant [in January 1998] 
yet remained free and harshly criticized Nasrallah and charged him with being an 
intelligence agent for Iran which gives him a huge freedom of action (Norton, 2007, p. 
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106). He also accused Hezbollah of being a “tool of Syrian foreign policy and a servant of 
Israel” (Norton, 2007, p. 106).  
Nasrallah was able to preserve his party’s unity and wisely eliminate his rival Tufaili 
without engaging in a one-on-one public dispute. He rather gave legitimacy to his 
elimination of this adversary through a decision issued by the Shura council to dismiss the 
revolting sheikh. 
This chapter of The Prince also hints at how the prince should develop his relations with his 
friends and rivals. According to Machiavelli, when a prince acquires a state by the favor of 
his citizens, it will be much easier for him to win the friendship of those who before he 
assumed power were content with the government and thus were hostile to him than those 
who became his friends because they were malcontent with the previous government and 
favored his rise to power (Griffith ed., 1997, p.81-82). 
Before we explore the bulk of this argument, it is noteworthy to mention that Nasrallah’s 
rise to power was not by the favor of his citizens as defined by Machiavelli. Chapter 5 has 
shown in detail Nasrallah’s acquisition of power. Our concern here is the content and 
malcontent of the surrounding parties. Take the Amal Movement as an example. Prior to 
Hezbollah’s emergence, Amal was content with its position in the Shiite community where 
it almost enjoyed a military and political hegemony among its marginalized community. 
Amal was renowned for its determination to carry on the legacy of Imam Moussa Sader. 
When Hezbollah came into the picture, the whole balance of power changed and as a matter 
of fact both parties turned hostile toward each other and clashed. Once Syria and Iran 
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settled their conflict, they learned to live with each other. When Hezbollah and Amal 
clashed, Nasrallah was not yet secretary general but was called in from Iran to be present. 
Since his assumption of power, Nasrallah has led the party through its so far golden times. 
Although it was not really as easy as Machiavelli mentions to win that party’s friendship, 
today Hezbollah and Amal declare they have it. Both parties never cease on any occasion to 
emphasize publicly their strong alliance and assure that their ties are way deeper than 
thought and cannot be broken. By relying on the public image displayed to the audience by 
both parties, Nasrallah eventually gained Amal’s friendship. Still, does this apply on the 
ground? Is it not true that the two parties are in constant competition, which so far 
Hezbollah has succeeded in winning? 
What about Hezbollah’s relation with the Sunni community following Nasrallah’s 
acquisition of power? The tension between Hezbollah and the Future Movement is not new 
although there have been times of cooperation among the two parties. Hezbollah, under 
Nasrallah’s leadership, had lived through serious tension with Rafik Hariri. This tension 
was renewed with Hariri’s son, Saad.  When Nasrallah came to power, Rafik Hariri was 
officially beginning his political career in Lebanon. The Taif Accord had been concluded 
and the Saudi-backed Sunni billionaire had his own projects for Lebanon upon his return 
from Saudi Arabia. Hezbollah’s resistance projects were to some extent unpleasant to Hariri 
who had his own plans for rebuilding Lebanon.  
In a speech delivered after Hariri’s assassination, Nasrallah reflects on the fluctuations in 
the relationship with the ex-premier. “Our relationship with him fluctuated between 
disagreement and cooperation, on many levels and on various domestic issues, until a deep 
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understanding settled between us for good, and later developed into a close friendship” 
(Noe, 2007, p. 331). The agreement, Nasrallah explains, entailed preserving the resistance 
as it is with its men and weapons to defend Lebanon against any Israeli aggression within 
the framework of the state’s defense strategy (Noe, 2007, p. 331). The agreement was also 
on building a modern and just state and to commit to Taef Agreement as the “mutual and 
common understanding” concerning Lebanon’s future, added Nasrallah (Noe, 2007, p. 
331). 
Relationships with the Future movement have worsened swiftly after the May 2008 conflict 
and today Hezbollah is on its guard regarding the STL. The Party has launched a whole 
preemptive war against the STL’s awaited indictment amidst reports that it will accuse 
Hezbollah members of the murder. While Rafik Hariri was content with the situation prior 
to Hezbollah’s booming and had high hopes to exercise an economic hegemony over the 
country, hostilities emerged with the Party of God due to the clash of interest between both 
sides. However, both parties had to silence their quarrels and build a friendship that never 
lasted. The complexities of this relationship are intensified by the constant fear of Sunni-
Shiite strife.  
6.2.3. Acquiring a reputation 
Machiavelli’s main concern in Chapter 21 is the prince’s reputation which he considers 
essential to make the prince esteemed. In modern terms, Machiavelli is talking about the 
leader’s public image.  
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“Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as the undertaking of great enterprises and the 
setting of a noble example in his own person” is the opening sentence of this chapter of The 
Prince (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 84).  Machiavelli wants the prince to empower all his actions 
with a character of grandeur and excellence (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 85). He has earlier 
mentioned this point in Chapter 19 where he said that the prince should display in all his 
actions “grandeur, courage, gravity and determination” in his attempt to avoid inciting his 
people’s hatred (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 70). 
Nasrallah somehow offers a similar statement when he says that the leader and his 
followers in any modern movement or one related to the Prophet or al-Hussein should have 
"courage and determination” in taking decisions and in being on the battlefield (Lahham, 
2007, vol. 14, p. 139). He adds that these alone are not enough and the leadership of such 
movements should be ready to offer sacrifices, of money and lives (Lahham, 2007, vol. 14, 
p. 139).  
Machiavelli advocates that the prince “should set an example of his affability and 
magnificence and always preserve the majesty of his dignity which should never be 
wanting on any occasion or under any circumstances” (Griffith ed., 1997, p.87). Nasrallah 
offered the Resistance a huge sacrifice and as such set himself as a noble example for his 
people. Nasrallah lost his eldest son, Hadi who was killed in a military confrontation with 
Israel at the security zone in 1997. It was after 9 months that Hadi’s body returned to 
Lebanon among others in a prisoners swap with Israel. Nasrallah made it clear the Israelis 
did not kill Hadi because he was the son of the secretary general and they did not score any 
victory (Noe, 2007, p. 172). He said the mujahid [Hadi] went to the frontlines and came to 
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the enemy on his own feet (Noe, 2007, p. 172). For him, this martyrdom is a victory and 
honor for Hezbollah and for the concept of Resistance (Noe, 2007, p. 172). Nasrallah gave 
Hadi’s example as a proof that Hezbollah’s leadership do not spare their sons but rather 
send them with pride to the battlefield and are proud to have them fall as martyrs (Noe, 
2007, p. 173). 
Nasrallah is renowned for his capability of presenting himself as a merciful yet decisive 
person, a humble yet powerful leader, and an evolving yet ideological figure. In the eyes of 
those who love him he is divine and glorious and we have seen what they did when they 
believed he was offended. Nasrallah has gained a high esteem among his people and credit 
among his adversaries and enemies through always attributing a character of “grandeur, 
courage, gravity and determination” to all his actions.  
On July 12, 2006 Nasrallah announced the abduction of the two Israeli soldiers and called it 
“AAmaliyat al-Waad al Sadeq” or “The Honest Vow Operation” (Aaqada Nasrallah 
mou’tamaran sihafiyan ams fi masjed al-Imamayn al-Hassanayn fi Haret Hreik, 2006).  
Nasrallah is referring here to the vow to free the Lebanese detainee in the Israeli prisons, 
Samir al-Quntar. In his third speech after the beginning of the war, Nasrallah’s words 
reflected determination and gravity as he responded to the international community’s call 
for the immediate and unconditional release of the two abducted soldiers. Nasrallah said 
that even if the whole world came to free the two soldiers, they will not be able to take them 
back except through indirect negotiations and exchange of prisoners (Aaqada Nasrallah 
mou’tamaran sihafiyan ams fi masjed al-Imamayn al-Hassanayn fi Haret Hreik, 2006).  
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On September 22, 2006, Nasrallah celebrated Hezbollah’s “Divine Victory.” The choice of 
the word “divine” beholds a clear declaration that this victory is indisputable for Nasrallah 
regardless of all the voices that focused on the damages and losses created by the war. This 
word also entails the “Godly” element which Nasrallah always attributes to the war against 
Israel. This concept of “divinity” is not new in Nasrallah’s rhetoric. In a 2003 speech 
commemorating the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, Nasrallah calls that revolution 
“the great, divine, reverberating victory” (Lahham, 2007, vol. 14, p. 92). Within the same 
speech, he explains how the revolution relied on God and on itself and relates it to what has 
happened with the Prophet (Lahham, 2007, vol. 14, p. 92). In his various speeches during 
the 2006 July War Nasrallah insisted that God was on Hezbollah’s side and He will render 
the Resistance victorious. Long before 2006, Nasrallah had explained [in 2003] that God 
personally intervenes in the Resistance’s battles relying on a verse from the Quran which 
implies that it is God who killed the enemy and hit the targets and not the fighters (Lahham, 
2007, vol. 15, p. 17). He says that the years of Resistance in Lebanon showed that God 
lends his hand to help the fighters, to fight and to hit the target (Lahham, 2007, vol. 15, p. 
17). Giving this religious pretext to Hezbollah’s war against Israel helps glorify the party’s 
image in the eyes of its supporters and marks its activities with grandeur and excellence. It 
also gives legitimacy to Hezbollah and keeps the faith of the people in Nasrallah. This takes 
us back to the previous chapter of The Prince that discussed the leader’s constant need of 
the people’s love and support.  
Nasrallah says in an interview prior to the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 that the 
young men of Hezbollah believe that ending the Israeli occupation is a “sacred duty tightly 
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linked to their religion, prayers, and fasting and to the thereafter; this is what the resistance 
in south Lebanon is all about” (Noe, 2007, p.219). The day Nasrallah celebrated the Israeli 
withdrawal he told the masses that gathered in the southern village of Bint Jbeil that this 
“victory is a gift from God Almighty, who has led us to the path of resistance” (Noe, 2007, 
p.233). “He is the one who has led us to the righteous path, given us enduring courage and 
internal peace, and made us love martyrdom,” he added (Noe, 2007, p.233). 
In 2005, Hezbollah led a huge campaign against the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1559 [issued in September 2004] that called, among other things, for 
the disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. The resolution and all the 
voices that supported it and considered Hezbollah a militia provoked an extremely strong 
rejection by the party. The Party of God strongly refused to be called a militia and insisted 
that it is a Resistance. Hezbollah interpreted its strong determination to be called Resistance 
at the level of the government in 2005. The party conditioned its return to the cabinet to 
having an official statement by PM Fouad Siniora that Hezbollah is not a militia; knowing 
that Amal and Hezbollah suspended their participation in the cabinet for a different reason. 
The Shiite ministers walked out of the cabinet when the latter voted for establishing an 
international tribunal and for including all assassinations [the last of which was the murder 
of Gebran Tueni on the same day] within the mandate of the International Independent 
Investigation Commission (IIIC) probing into Hariri’s murder.  
Hezbollah, once again, wanted to preserve its public image and refused the usage of any 
naming that might undermine the “sanctity” of its Godly guided resistance and Islamic 
duties. Nasrallah considered anyone who wishes to call Hezbollah a militia as being 
114 
 
disrespectful to the Lebanese people’s will (Noe, 2007, p. 361). His main objective was to 
defend his party’s dignity even if his explanations contradicted the prevalent political and 
military concepts and definitions.  
Even at the political level, Nasrallah wants to put his party in a position superior to all 
others. While the party has its MPs in parliament since 1992 and ministers in cabinet since 
2005, it does not grant its vote of confidence to any government. Nasrallah says that in 
Hezbollah’s culture and understanding granting the vote of confidence to a cabinet is a "big, 
dangerous, very precious and complicated issue” (Lahham, 2007, vol. 15, p. 92). “Our vote 
of confidence is the most precious thing we have and offering it to a cabinet is subject to 
tough conditions,” he says (Lahham, 2007, vol. 15, p. 92). Given such attitude, a quite 
important question is raised: how can the Lebanese state survive when a party views itself 
as more important and precious than the state itself and than any other party? How fair will 
the political game be when one party moves from the premises that it is sacred and above 
all others? 
In many of his statements, Nasrallah displays a trait of arrogance when he talks about 
members and accomplishments of Hezbollah compared to other Lebanese people and 
parties. Nasrallah claims that Hezbollah’s “Lebanese patriotism is superior” and its identity 
“more genuine” than all other “patriots” in Lebanon “because we have shown proof of the 
highest form of loyalty to the land, the motherland, and the people” (Noe, 2007, p. 160). In 
a 2005 speech, Nasrallah says that only the Resistance has the right to issue patriotic 
certificates to other Lebanese, emphasizing within the same statement his previous call on 
Hezbollah to be “humble in victory” (Noe, 2007, p. 338).  
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This public image does not develop on its own; it rather requires that both Hezbollah and 
Nasrallah invest in it. Hezbollah established its own media empires that include Al-Manar 
TV station, An-Nour radio station, Al-Intiqad newspaper with an e-version, and its multi 
languages website moqawama.org. Hezbollah also has its own publishing houses such as 
Dar Al-Hadi named after Nasrallah’s martyred son. In this sense, the party is media wise 
fully equipped which paves the way for spreading its propaganda on a large scale and to 
audiences beyond Lebanon.  
Nasrallah believes that Hezbollah is in the hearts and minds of the Egyptians, Algerians, 
North Africans, in the Arab and Islamic world, Iran, Pakistan, India noting in an interview 
with Al-Manar in 2005 that the party’s flags are raised in Palestine (Lahham, 2007, vol. 15, 
p. 141). 
Al-Manar deploys considerable efforts to preserve the public image of Hezbollah and its 
leader starting with its news, talk-shows, prayers, religious shows, documentaries, video 
clips, and terminology. The ulterior aim of this station is to show Hezbollah’s glory, 
emphasize the party’s successes, and spread the word of the Resistance. Al-Manar becomes 
highly efficient in days of war and conducts most of the psychological warfare tasks. So far, 
it has proved to be highly equipped and the Israelis could not interrupt its broadcast for 
more than few hours during the 2006 July War. For instance the TV station, just like the 
party members and leader, uses words like mujahidin to refer to Hezbollah fighters, shahid 
or martyr [of God] to refer to any Hezbollah member or supporter killed by the Israelis, al-
moqawama or Resistance to refer to Hezbollah. Such words by themselves, reflect 
Machiavelli’s aforementioned “courage, grandeur, gravity and determination.” Not to 
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mention all the songs broadcast by al-Manar which glorify Hezbollah and Nasrallah, and 
show pictures of Hezbollah’s military training and parades as well as footages of defeated 
Israeli soldiers crying as they retreated from the battlefield. Al-Manar posts comments in 
Hebrew and Arabic on such short clips. A recorded daily segment shows a Hezbollah 
martyr saying his last will and holding the Quran before going to the battlefield.  
Machiavelli says that a prince should give striking examples of his interior administration 
through punishing or rewarding anyone who has in civil affairs either rendered a great 
service to the state or committed a crime so that it may be much talked about (Griffith ed., 
1997, p.85). In November 2009, Hezbollah put into action a campaign entitled “Order is of 
Faith” in its Dahiyeh stronghold. The campaign finally allowed the Internal Security Forces 
to carry out their duties which were taken over by Hezbollah’s Indibat or Disciplinary 
Corps. The ISF, in coordination with Amal and Hezbollah, were allowed to impose order 
on the Beirut suburbs, control traffic and unregistered vehicles and to reorder sidewalks.  
Hezbollah raised banners in all the streets calling for the people’s support. Shortly after the 
campaign was launched, Nasrallah voiced concern over the spread of drug trafficking and 
addiction, especially among the young in schools and universities. In a speech on 
November 30, Nasrallah considered drug trafficking as “murder” since drugs “kill the 
mental state and stability of our youth” (Full Speech of H.E. Sayyed Nasrallah: Hizbullah’s 
new political manifesto, 2009). Prior to that Nasrallah even forbade drug trafficking to 
Israelis saying that it is haram meaning forbidden by religion (H.E. Sayyed Nasrallah: send 
all your powers, 2009).  Nasrallah stressed that fatwas of all various religious authorities 
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and scholars forbid the sale and trafficking of drugs even in the enemy community (H.E. 
Sayyed Nasrallah: send all your powers, 2009). 
Although Hezbollah’s abovementioned campaign constitutes a striking example and was 
used by the party to show that it has rendered a great service to the state through helping it 
impose the rule of law; this call for order reflects the party’s selectivity when dealing with 
the state institutions. In other words, Hezbollah’s allowing the ISF into Dahiyeh was more 
or less only limited to the social aspects. The army and ISF are still not allowed to enter all 
locations and carry out any investigations pertaining to major security breaches and 
tracking down perpetrators. 
In another notion, Machiavelli wants the prince to show himself either as a true friend or a 
real enemy (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 85). He believes that despite the consequence, is it more 
creditable for a prince to declare himself openly for or against another instead of being 
neutral (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 85). Nasrallah’s enemies are well known and so are his 
friends. Israel and the US top the list of Hezbollah’s enemies and the party adopts a 
dehumanizing language toward them. 
According to Nasrallah, enmity toward Israel is the “genuine and realistic common 
denominator” that serves Lebanon’s interest and helps it face future challenges (Noe, 2007, 
p. 64). Nasrallah says in one his speeches in 1997 that the Jews are the most “cowardly, 
lowly, weak, and frail” people in their “spirit, mind, ideology and religion” (Noe, 2007, p. 
171). He continues, “and I am not saying the Israeli: we have to know the enemy we are 
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fighting,” (Noe, 2007, p. 171). Nasrallah later described the Zionist Jews as the 
“descendents of apes and pigs” (Noe, 2007, p. 188).  
In another notion, Nasrallah vows before God that Hezbollah as part of the nation will 
never accept or recognize Israel even if the whole world does (Full Speech of Sayyed 
Nasrallah on al-Quds Day: we will never recognize Israel’s right to exist, 2009). “Our faith, 
belief and declaration will remain unchanged: Israel is an illegal presence and a cancerous 
gland and must be wiped out of existence” (Full Speech of Sayyed Nasrallah on al-Quds 
Day: we will never recognize Israel’s right to exist, 2009). These words remind us of 
statements made by Imam Khomeini and other Iranian leaders.  
The situation does not vary much when it comes to the US. “Our enmity to the biggest 
Satan is absolute and we tell those betting on the US administration: you are suspects and 
wrong [whether you are] in Lebanon or in Palestine or in any other place in the world,” says 
Nasrallah in a 2002 speech commemorating the anniversary of the Al-Aqsa Intifada 
(Lahham, 2007, vol. 14, p. 44).   
Despite such statements Nasrallah still gives credit to the enemy when he sees that the latter 
deserves it. For instance, when he commented on the January 2004 mutual prisoner 
exchange, Nasrallah remarkably valued Israel’s care for its prisoners. “We are Israel’s 
worst enemy,” he said “but I stand here today in respect of the enemy because of the way in 
which he cares about his prisoners and the bodies of his dead soldiers, and because he 
works for them day and night and declares, unabashed, his readiness to pay what is 
sometimes an exorbitant price to recover them” (Noe, 2007, p. 302).  
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Investing in this enmity toward the US and Israel has so far helped Hezbollah maintain its 
people’s support. However, investing in this enmity is not allowing Hezbollah to gain any 
legitimacy in the eyes of its political rivals. Those are persistently calling for allocating the 
duties of defending Lebanon to the army and are seeking a national defense strategy that 
would eventually lead to the disarmament of Hezbollah. In this sense, it is important to ask 
till when Hezbollah will rely on this enmity to further justify its armed existence. All 
Lebanese territories have been liberated according to international law which does not 
regard the Shebaa Farms- that Hezbollah today holds on to- as a Lebanese territory.39 What 
is Hezbollah practically doing to liberate those farms? 
Talking about Hezbollah’s friends we will take the example of the Free Patriotic Movement 
(FPM). It is not within the scope of this research paper to get into the details of the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between both parties in February 2006; but 
to focus on its political repercussions. The Maronite Ex-Army Commander General Michel 
Aoun, who had previously been a staunch critic of Hezbollah, aligned himself with the 
Resistance and took the lead in defending the party’s armed presence in parallel to the state. 
Only two months prior to signing the MOU, Nasrallah explained that his party preferred 
allying with the PSP and Future in the June 2009 parliamentary elections rather than the 
FPM because Aoun did not object to UNSCR 1559 (Lahham, 2007, vol. 15, p. 142). In the 
same interview with Al-Manar Nasrallah confirmed that preparations were underway for a 
meeting with Aoun (Lahham, 2007, vol. 13, p. 148). 
                                                            
39 Syria has not yet presented any documents that prove the Lebanese identity of those farms. 
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Both parties have since 2006 proved to be loyal to each other, in good and bad times, in all 
parliamentary elections, cabinet formations, and political activity. This MOU provided a 
Christian cover to Hezbollah’s weapons, given Aoun’s large representation of Christians 
that was proved in two consecutive parliamentary elections. Aoun and other FPM officials 
believe the MOU has rendered benefits to the Christian community at the national, social, 
security and economic levels. According to them, the MOU has protected the Christian 
areas during the 2008 conflict for instance. They also advocate that the MOU has allowed 
the Christians residing in the southern border villages to benefit from Hezbollah’s services 
and achieve an economic growth in that area.   
The 2006 July War constituted the first real challenge to the MOU; yet the FPM stood by 
Hezbollah’s side with an unwavering support. Hezbollah, however, did not convey any 
openly strong support to Aoun’s candidacy for presidency in 2006. Nasrallah offered the 
following justification to his party’s stance. He said that if the party were to announce its 
public support to Aoun’s nomination as president, the people “who could not imagine him 
as a president for one moment”, will “seize upon” Hezbollah’s words and send them around 
the world to the US, France, EU, Britain, Australia and Italy saying that Aoun is 
“Hezbollah’s, the terrorist organization’s candidate” in Lebanon (Noe, 2007, p. 377). 
Nasrallah goes further with his argument saying that in case Hezbollah does not nominate 
Aoun for president those same people will tell the FPM: “See-now go at each other’s 
throat” (Noe, 2007, p. 377). Then Nasrallah finds his way out and calls on the Christians to 
meet and unanimously decide on whom to nominate as president saying that his party will 
support that candidate (Noe, 2007, p. 375-376). Despite the positive and understanding tone 
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conveyed through his words, the Hezbollah chief is fully aware that the Christians will not 
likely be able to do so, given their deep divisions and unending disputes.   
It was never clear whether Hezbollah really wanted Aoun to become president, because 
even after the 2008 May events Hezbollah accepted Michel Sleiman as president, although 
it imposed its demand of forming a national unity cabinet. It remains highly debatable, 
whether Hezbollah approved of Sleiman because deep down it opposed Aoun’s presidency, 
or because the Doha Agreement and Lebanon’s consociationaldemocracy imposed those 
results. One thing remains somehow indisputable; Hezbollah and the FPM have so far not 
faced any dramatic incident that put their alliance on the verge of collapse. With the current 
political divisions in Lebanon, it is none of the two parties’ interest to abandon the other. It 
is their unity that is allowing them to impose their rhythm on the flow of events in the 
country. The FPM’s alliance with Hezbollah has also contributed in strengthening the 
divide among the fragile Christian community, which is rooted in the bloody days among 
the Christian rivals. The Lebanese Forces and the Kataeb party have aligned themselves 
with the Sunni Future Movement, and criticize Aoun for going against the historical 
Christian choices. On the other hand, FPM advocates that the MOU has protected the 
Christians on several occasions and has allowed them to restore their lost leading role in the 
country.    
Moving on to Chapters 22 and 23 of The Prince, Machiavelli focuses on the prince’s 
ministers and counselors. In Chapter 22, Machiavelli expresses his belief that if those are 
competent and faithful, the prince will be reputed wise because he had known how to 
distinguish their competences and how to be sure of their loyalty (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 88). 
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Machiavelli continues that if those ministers and counselors turn out to be the opposite that 
would mean that the prince lacked good judgment in their selection, and would thus not be 
considered wise (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 88). Machiavelli explains that the prince’s ability to 
distinguish the good from bad will make the ministers and counselors realize that they 
cannot deceive him and will as a result serve him faithfully (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 88). The 
prince should not trust a selfish minister who thinks of himself more than of the 
government (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 88). Machiavelli is also of the belief that the prince 
should bestow abundant honors and riches on his ministers to secure their devotion and 
bind them to him by obligations (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 89). 
In Chapter 23, Machiavelli speaks of the necessity that the prince avoid flatterers. He 
develops his idea by saying that the prudent prince should adopt a middle course when 
dealing with his ministers: he should give them full power to tell him the truth but at the 
same time restrict them to only answering the questions he raises (Griffith ed., 1997, p.90). 
Machiavelli advises the prince to be an extensive questioner and a patient listener and to 
express his anger when not told the truth (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 90). He concludes his 
chapter by saying that it is the prince’s shrewdness that brings good counsels and not vice 
versa (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 90). 
Having discussed earlier [Chapter Five] the hierarchy inside Hezbollah, it becomes clear to 
us that the party is to a large extent influenced by its ideological and religious commitment 
to Iran as far as its general policy guidelines are concerned. In this sense, Nasrallah does not 
really seem to have a wide margin of independently taking major decisions that will 
influence the party’s existence without any prior consultations with Tehran. When it comes 
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to major decisions, Nasrallah does not have the capacity to surpass their will and act on his 
own. Moreover, these “ministers and counselors” are more or less imposed on him and he 
will always have to deal with the ruling Iranian cleric elite.  
Within his party and as far as its internal regulation is concerned, Nasrallah has a different 
kind of counselors. To get a closer understanding of those we will look at the party’s 
organizational structure which reflects its strong interior administration. In addition to the 
leading body, the Shura Council, which we already talked about in Chapter 5, Hezbollah 
has five main boards or assemblies and each has very specific duties and responsibilities 
(Qassem, 2010, p.130-131). 
The political assembly is in charge of the party’s political portfolios and includes members 
of the Analysis Committee. This assembly provides the Shura Council with analysis and 
works on building alliances with political parties in Lebanon. 
The Jihad Assembly is responsible for the resistance activity including oversight, 
recruitment, training, equipment, security or any other resistance-related endeavors. 
The Parliamentary Assembly includes the party’s MPs who are in charge of studying 
legislation proposals and following up on the people’s needs. These MPs express the 
party’s political views inside the parliament. 
The Executive Assembly includes the head of cultural, educational, social, professional 
units. It is in charge of the party’s activities and of supervising Hezbollah’s organizations 
through a board of directors. 
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The Judicial Assembly includes the judicial representatives in the various areas. Their work 
is limited to Hezbollah members and are concerned with conflict resolution, verdicts related 
to abiding by the Shariaa and the reinstatement of rights.  
Every member of these assemblies is considered a Unit Head and supervises a committee of 
sections heads. The sub-unit levels are interconnected at the jihad, recruitment of support 
levels.  
According to Qassem, the Shura council is at the top of the strategic objectives, oversees 
Hezbollah’s general strategies and takes political decisions. The Secretary General has 
supervisory, administrative and guidance responsibilities. He coordinates between the 
Shura Council members and Assembly Heads. He also expresses the party’s official 
leadership stance (2010, p. 130-131). 
The structure is very clear and the responsibilities are clearly stated. Thus, the Secretary 
General is not an absolute decision maker but has a Council to refer to and Assemblies to 
rely on their input because he cannot always be on the ground. Nasrallah’s strict security 
measures hinder his freedom of movement and action and in this sense he will always need 
to rely on trustworthy people to guide him through. This faithfulness can be guaranteed if 
one assumes that all of Hezbollah’s high-ranking officials are well selected, continuously 
supervised and committed to the party’s ideological identity. 
Nasrallah tries to point out that he is not the sole decision maker in Hezbollah and goes to 
exaggerating his modesty, “I do not wish to laud myself, since I am just one of a large 
group of decision-makers, and the youngest and weakest among them” (Noe, 2007, p. 175).   
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Nasrallah clarifies following the 2006 July war that he does not take decisions pertaining to 
military operations on his own, but a group does that (Noe, 2007, p. 393). The group, 
according to Nasrallah,  consists of no less than 25 individuals, including military and 
political personnel, who have a long political and Jihad experience and have been the 
resistance’s leadership from 1982 till 2006 (Noe, 2007, p. 393).   
This statement shows that Nasrallah did not necessarily consult with the Iranians on 
abducting the two soldiers prior to the 2006 July War. The party has relative freedom in 
taking decisions in domestic issues outside Iran. Of course, this operation comes within the 
general Iranian guidelines of resisting Israel, but the party decides on its military operations 
as opportunities to attack Israelis erupt on the ground. However, Nasrallah miscalculated 
the Israeli response as well. 
According to Diaz and Newman, Hezbollah’s leaders are “well-educated, sophisticated, 
thoughtful, and among the most deliberately calculating in the Middle East (2005, p. 130). 
They add that the party’s masters were able to run “an efficient international operation that 
skillfully manipulates the devotion to martyrdom that is increasingly a ‘normal’ 
psychological state among radical Shiite Islamists” (2005, p.130). Hezbollah always knows 
how to speak with one voice that is invariant from Nasrallah’s tone. You find the party’s 
ministers and parliamentarians, just like Nasrallah, waving fingers, issuing threats, and 
daring anyone to try and obstruct their resistance duties. Saying this intends to show that it 
is never possible to hear voices of dissent coming out of the party’s ranks.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Keeping an Army in the field 
Since this paper moves from the premise that Hezbollah is the state ruled by Nasrallah, this 
chapter will revolve around two main sections. The first will discuss Hezbollah’s military 
power under Nasrallah’s leadership, while the second section will discuss Hezbollah’s 
military power vis-à-vis the Lebanese state and its sovereignty.  
Machiavelli explores the prince’s military power in three chapters, 12 till 14. After 
discussing the types of principalities, Machiavelli moves to elaborating on the means of 
defense and offense that princes should employ. He is not a blind fan of military power, but 
offers advice on what kind of armies a prince should have to be victorious. 
Machiavelli begins his talk on military power by saying that good laws and good armies are 
the main foundations of all states be they old, new or mixed (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 47). He 
stresses that there cannot be good laws where there are no good armies (Griffith ed., 1997, 
p. 47). Machiavelli is of course not limited to the legislative meaning of “good laws” but he 
is rather speaking of order in society. He refrains from discussing laws and rather confines 
himself to discussing armies.  
Machiavelli speaks of three kinds of armies that a prince can use to defend his state: his 
own army, mercenaries, and auxiliaries. He is a robust objector to the last two types and 
considers them dangerous and useless (Griffith ed., 1997, p.47). He believes that mercenary 
armies cannot be trusted and they will damage and ruin the prince (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 
48). In his opinion, mercenary armies ruined Italy although they were successful for some 
time but failed when the foreign enemy showed up (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 48).   
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Auxiliary troops are those led by a powerful ally whom the prince calls upon to help and 
defend him (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 52). Machiavelli says that although these might be useful 
and good in themselves, the danger lying in this kind of troops is that if they render the 
prince victorious, he will become like a “prisoner” in their power; and if he is defeated he 
remains “undone” (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 52). Auxiliary troops are more dangerous than 
mercenaries for Machiavelli and the prince should employ them when he wishes to be 
defeated (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 53). 
If we shall consider how the nucleus of Hezbollah’s armed wing was formed, we will find 
that the party has called for the help of its stronger ally, Iran, to help it against their 
common enemy, Israel. We have seen in Chapter 3 that Khomeini ordered the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards to provide Hezbollah with the necessary military training and 
infrastructure to assist the party to confront Israel. We have also seen in Chapter 6 that Iran 
provides Hezbollah with military and financial assistance. The important distinction to be 
made here is that Nasrallah has not become a “prisoner” in Iran’s power, in the strict sense 
implied by Machiavelli. Hezbollah and its leader are committed to the general policies of 
their regionally powerful ally Iran, due to the religious and ideological reasons that have 
been discussed extensively in Chapter 5. Contrary to Machiavelli’s suggestion, Hezbollah’s 
call on Iran for assistance has rendered the party more powerful and did not result in its 
defeat. Whether you consider Hezbollah’s position at the domestic or regional level, you 
will find that the party has developed into a more powerful player.  
After presenting the dangers lying in mercenary and auxiliary troops, Machiavelli states 
that a wise prince should avoid both and rely exclusively upon his own troops (Griffith ed., 
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1997, p. 53). He even goes to the extreme of suggesting that a prince should prefer defeat 
with an army of his own rather than victory with the troops of others “with whom no real 
victory can ever be won” (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 53). 
Machiavelli is of the view that a prince who does not have his own army can never be 
secure and will be entirely dependent on fortune as he lacks the bravery to defend himself 
(Griffith ed., 1997, p. 55). “And wise men have ever held the opinion, that nothing is more 
weak and unstable than the reputation of power when not founded upon forces of the 
prince’s own; by which I mean armies composed of his own subjects or citizens, or of his 
own creation; all others are either mercenaries or auxiliaries” (Griffith ed., 1997, p. 55). 
Hezbollah today neither has mercenary nor auxiliary troops, although it still relies on 
military assistance from Iran. The Party of God’s armed wing is composed of its 
predominantly Lebanese Shiite subjects. Nasrallah’s fighters are his own people, deeply 
rooted in the party’s Islamist and ideological beliefs. Nasrallah puts in plain words that the 
issue of fighting occupation is linked to the party’s “thinking, ideological background, and 
particular structure as well as to our references and clerics whether they are in Najaf, Qom, 
Karbala or Jabal Amil” (Noe, 2007, p. 110).   
To join the ranks of Hezbollah and become one of its Mujahidin demands certain 
requirements which unless met, the person can always remain an ordinary distant supporter 
without being militarily involved in the party. Qassem explains the recruitment procedure 
into Hezbollah which gives clear evidence of the homogeneous composition of the party. 
Qassem assures that the person’s qualifications and personality are at the heart of the 
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Resistance’s design (2010, p. 140). He explains that before granting any person the 
acceptance into the Resistance’s ranks his file is accurately scrutinized (2010, p. 140). The 
person’s belief in Hezbollah, his readiness to further this belief, his cultural and military 
capabilities as well as the absence of any security doubts or suspicions around him are all 
put under focus (2010, p. 140). Then the person is closely watched and evaluated 
throughout the trainings so as to properly judge his capacities and see how he could benefit 
the party (2010, p. 140). This investigation into the person’s status presents clear evidence 
Hezbollah is very keen to recruit its fighters from its own people which would definitely 
enlarge the scope of their loyalty to the party. Qassem also highlights the secrecy that 
surrounds Hezbollah’s military operations. He elaborates further by saying that this secrecy 
is at the core of Hezbollah’s Jihad noting that preserving the surprise factor increases the 
chances of success with minimum losses (2010, p. 140). This secrecy is also mandatory to 
obstruct Israel’s spying and surveillance activities, adds Qassem (2010, p. 140). The deputy 
secretary general points out that the knowledge of any military operation is strictly 
restricted to those planning and carrying it out (2010, p. 140). This accuracy in choosing 
those members hindered the enemy’s capability to know of the operations beforehand 
which made them “surprising and successful” (2010, p. 140). Hezbollah’s fighters work in 
extreme secrecy and the nature of the confrontation requires only a limited number of 
fighters, especially those with professional specialization or experience at the frontlines 
(Qassem, 2007, p. 138). 
Nasrallah himself says that the party’s fighters spend more time in their civil life than 
military one and that they do not have the hobby of killing (Lahham, 2007, vol. 13, p. 96). 
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When delivering a speech during the graduation of 1350 Hezbollah university students in 
2006, Nasrallah says that Hezbollah’s university students, whether they graduated or not,  
are people of faith, education, Jihad, sacrifice, benevolence, accomplishment, and victory 
(Lahham, 2007, vol. 15, p. 153). Then he cites the martyrdom of one or more of university 
students every year, and stresses that Hezbollah’s members achieve victory wherever they 
are, on the battlefield and in education (Lahham, 2007, vol. 15, p. 153). 
This brings up to our attention Qassem’s comments on the efficiency of the youth inside 
Hezbollah. He says that the increasing presence of educated and cultured members in the 
resistance allowed it to speedily progress in developing its human resources and to benefit 
from new technologies such as computers and communications, and various engineering 
related fields (2010, p. 138).  
In Hezbollah’s understanding all these military capabilities cannot be separated from the 
fighter’s faith, his cultivation, courage and fearlessness of martyrdom (Qassem, 2010, p. 
139). 
After showing how Nasrallah’s “army” is composed of his own subjects, we will move to 
discussing those fighters’ loyalty to the party and to its leader. Is this loyalty absolute? 
Where does it come from and how is it maintained? 
To start with it was very clear in the above statements by Qassem and Nasrallah that faith is 
a key element to enter Hezbollah’s ranks. Perhaps the highest expression of loyalty would 
be to die for the cause or leader you are defending.  
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Let us start by discussing loyalty to the cause. Nasrallah believes that martyrdom is the 
project of every member, cadre and leader of the resistance movements in Lebanon and 
Palestine which aim at liberating the land, the sanctities and man from hegemony and 
humiliation (Lahham, 2007, vol. 13, p.85). Nasrallah believes that the nation’s self-martyrs 
should be presented as the most magnificent civilized image facing the West (Lahham, 
2007, vol. 14, p. 61). He says that all the American and Israeli military and security 
generals and think tanks have failed to find a solution to the weapon of self-martyrdom that 
began 20 years ago in this nation (Lahham, 2007, vol. 14, p. 61). Nasrallah advocates that a 
believer should adore martyrdom and should love to meet God; however, this believer 
should be wise and alert and should know which battle is Jihad and which death is 
martyrdom (Lahham, 2007, vol. 15, p. 74). The essence of the resistance is that it should 
obey the Divine will and Shariaa, continues Nasrallah (Lahham, 2007, vol. 15, p. 74). To 
keep the fighters’ faith in God, Nasrallah insists on many occasions to remind the fighters 
that God will make their victory certain. In a 2002 speech Nasrallah says that the strongest 
weapon that rendered the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon victorious is prayer and reliance 
on God (Lahham, 2007, vol. 13, p. 130). He warned against downplaying the importance of 
that weapon saying that even when conditions were unfavorable for the fighters God was 
hitting the target, He was killing the enemy when the fighters were shooting, and He was 
terrifying the enemy soldiers hiding inside their tanks and aircrafts (Lahham, 2007, vol. 13, 
p. 130). These statements remind us of the book “Karamat al Waad el Sadeq” mentioned in 
Chapter 5 which narrated examples of how God personally intervened in the battles of the 
2006 July War.  
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This faith factor explains to a large extent the loyalty of Hezbollah’s fighters to their cause 
and compels them to fight even amidst the imbalance of military power with the enemy. In 
a 2003 speech, Nasrallah said that although Hezbollah will need decades to be able to create 
a strategic military balance with Israel; it will never abandon the basic power it relies on: 
high morale and determination (Lahham, 2007, vol. 14, p. 129-130).     
Building up this high morale and determination to defeat Israel, begins at a young age. 
Hezbollah involves children in military parades, even has them carry weapons sometimes, 
and makes them chant party songs. The young join theAl-Mahdi Scouts that is founded by 
Hezbollah, and are thus exposed to the party’s principles and take part in its activities. The 
recruitment at this young age helps mold the minds of those youth to always respect and 
admire Hezbollah and to sincerely love the party.  Consequently, loyalty to the party 
becomes a natural result. Al-Manar television shows an animated video clip, especially 
designed for children, showing Hezbollah fighters on the battlefield and a child’s voice is 
heard singing a song entitled “I loved you, oh fighter.”40 The song teaches children how to 
love the Hezbollah fighters and admire their accomplishments and sacrifices. It also tells 
them how while they sleep at night, the fighters remain awake to guard their safety.   
Nasrallah believes that loyalty is the most important element that has led to the Resistance’s 
success (Noe, 2007, p. 201). He says that his party’s fighters do not go to war to “flex their 
military muscles, score a publicity coup, or achieve material advantages; they fight and do 
jihad with serious intent and a deep conviction that the only way to regain their usurped 
territory is by waging war on the enemy” (Noe, 2007, p. 201).   
                                                            
40 The song is written by Nasri Hijazi and composed by Kamal Youssef. 
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What about the loyalty to Nasrallah’s person? 
To distinguish between the Hezbollah fighters’ loyalty to Hezbollah as a party and to 
Nasrallah as a leader seems absurd. Nasrallah heads this pyramid-hierarchy structured Party 
that never goes public about any of internal debates; it becomes unlikely to find its 
members disloyal to Nasrallah. A very precise example that describes the relationship 
between Nasrallah and the men fighting for him are the letters exchanged between both 
during the July War.  
The letter addressed by the Mujahidin to Nasrallah begins with sincere salutation to their 
“beloved Sayyed.” The Mujahidin say that they want the Lebanese, the nation and the 
world to hear their vow to defeat the enemy.  
“Our leader, we will keep our vow to you and to the martyrs […] We are your honest vow 
[…] We are the adorers of Hussein, we are the surprises […] We are the coming victory, 
God willing” (Risalat Moujahidi al-Moqawama al-Islamiya ila al-amin al-aan as-Sayyed 
Hassan Nasrallah, 2008). 
 
In his response, Nasrallah told the Mujahidin,  
“Yes you are the honest vow and the coming victory, God willing! […] After God, you were 
and will forever be the hope [to hold on to] I kiss your heads that raised every head [up 
high], I kiss your hands firmly pressing the trigger […] I kiss your feet that are rooted in 
the earth. Do not disappear from there even if the mountains did […] My answer to you is 
thank you for accepting me as one of you, your brother, because you are the leaders and 
you are the masters, you are the crowns and the umma’s pride. [you are] the men of God 
through whom we will win” (Rad as-Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah aala risalat al-moujahidin, 
2008).  
To question the truth of the intentions and feelings conveyed in these exchanged letters and 
to assume that they are mere propaganda is hypothetical. Such speculations also contradict 
what has been so far revealed concerning the party’s nature. The words that might seem too 
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affectionate or exaggerated to some are often used in the Arabic literature, and might not 
necessarily be an indicator to measure the genuineness of the meanings.   
Besides loyalty, Nasrallah mentions two other elements that have led to the success of his 
party’s military operations: the secrecy and precision of the operations, and constant 
improvement and creativity (Noe, 2007, p. 201-202).  
About the secrecy of the fighters’ movement, Nasrallah says that the enemy has no prior 
knowledge of their activity; they rather do their job “quietly and in secret” and nobody feels 
their presence (Noe, 2007, p. 201). He explains that the fighters carry out their operations in 
a precise manner because they care about the inhabitants on the Lebanese side of the border 
(Noe, 2007, p. 201-202). He believes that this precision has made the people love the 
fighters and want to protect them; otherwise, they would have blamed them for all their 
losses and sadness (Noe, 2007, p. 201-202). However, one asks: Do all the people residing 
in that Southern area approve, without any exception, of Hezbollah’s armed presence and 
control of the area? Do dissenters dare to object to the repetitive wars and damages inflicted 
upon their families and properties? It is noteworthy to mention here that many border 
villages, especially Christian-populated ones, welcomed the Lebanese Army very warmly 
when it entered those areas in 2006 based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1701.  
During the 2006 July War, Israel continuously justified its shelling of inhabited areas by 
saying that Hezbollah fighters were hiding inside the people’s houses, schools, and even 
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ambulances. To defend its atrocities, Israel revealed footages showing the Hezbollah 
fighters firing rockets from villages and houses rather than military fronts. 
As for constant improvement and creativity, the Hezbollah chief explains that it is the 
responsibility of all fighters to figure out how to improve operations and such a task is not 
limited to a single group (Noe, 2007, p. 202).  
Nasrallah talks about the factors that have contributed to his party’s military successes, but 
he offers so much little information, if any, on the size of its arsenal. This is an old policy 
adopted by Nasrallah who often refrains from giving any direct answers to what kinds of 
equipment, or weapons, or rockets his party possesses. He does not comment as well on 
Israeli statements and reports about his party’s acquisition of certain missiles.  
After the withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005, Nasrallah said in a speech 
commemorating the fifth anniversary of the liberation of the south that Hezbollah has more 
than 12,000 rockets (Noe, 2007, p. 348). In the same speech he warned that any hand that 
tries to touch his party’s weapons will be considered an Israeli hand (Noe, 2007, p. 349). 
Then in an interview following the 2006 July War, he was asked if 50 percent of his party’s 
military capacity was destroyed. Nasrallah replied that he had never specified how much 
more than 12,000 rockets he had and so they could be any number above this figure , be it 
30,000 or 50,000 or whatever (Noe, 2007, p. 399). He said it would not be “sound” to 
reveal the true number and Hezbollah’s capabilities (Noe, 2007, p. 399). At the same time, 
and paradoxically, he wanted to confirm his honesty advocating that he was not practicing 
any psychological warfare (Noe, 2009, p. 399). “We do not lie in psychological war; I do 
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wage psychological war, but I do not lie,” he said (Noe, 2007, p. 399). Nasrallah also 
assures that all of Hezbollah’s combat locations are “self-sufficient” (Noe, 2007, p. 397). 
He validates his statement by saying that despite all the Israeli shelling of all roads, and 
bridges during the July War the party still managed to launch rockets into Israel (Noe, 
2007, p. 397). 
Nasrallah’s ability to display such war tactics could be matched with what Machiavelli talks 
about in Chapter 14 whereby he insists that the prince should be a master of the “art of 
war.” “A prince, then, who is not master of the art of war, besides other misfortunes, cannot 
be respected by his soldiers, nor can he depend upon them,” says Machiavelli (Griffith ed., 
1997, p.56-57). Nasrallah has revealed himself as someone who masters the art of war not 
only through hiding his military capabilities but through surprising the enemy during the 
war. During the 2006 July War, Nasrallah spoke over the phone on Al-Manar and warned 
that the surprises he has promised were just about to begin.   
“Look into the middle of the sea, facing Beirut, the Israeli warship that has pounded the 
infrastructure, people's homes and civilians - look at it burning. It will sink and with it will 
sink scores of Israeli Zionist soldiers. This is just the beginning," he added (The Daily Star, 
2006.) 
Nasrallah was honest and the television’s live broadcasts showed it to the whole world. The 
vessel went burning and Nasrallah created the “show” out of it. In his speech that followed 
this incident, Nasrallah denied media reports that Iranian soldiers hit the vessel saying that 
Iranian soldiers were not present in any military operation (Nass an-nida’ al-thani al-lathi 
wajahahou al-amin al-aam li-Hizbullah as-Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah il al-umma, 2008). 
“Those who have the expertise and are currently operating Hezbollah’s capabilities are 
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Lebanese, [they are] sons of Lebanese, and [they] belong to Lebanese families” (Nass an-
nida’ al-thani al-lathi wajahahou al-amin al-aam li-Hizbullah as-Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah il 
al-umma, 2006). He added that the Israelis issue such rumors to downplay the significance 
of the Lebanese capabilities (Nass an-nida’ al-thani al-lathi wajahahou al-amin al-aam li-
Hizbullah as-Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah il al-umma, 2006).  
Under the title of Nasrallah’s mastering of the art of war we could also put the example of 
Nasrallah’s continuous setting of new military formulas with Israel. Nonetheless, all of 
these anounced formulas still fall within the spectrum of issuing threats to Israel, and 
reassuring the party’s supporter of its rising capabilities. The last of those formulas was set 
by Nasrallah in February 2010, amidst media reports of a possible new war with Israel. He 
threatened that his party will carry out tit-for-tat attacks against Israel including 
infrastructure, airports and factories (The Daily Star, 17 February 2010, para.1). He said 
that if Israel strikes Beirut’s Rafik Hariri international airport, Hezbollah will strike Tel 
Aviv’s Ben Gurion International Airport (The Daily Star, 17 February 2010, para.2).  
Within the same context, Machiavelli emphasizes that the prince should never be “idle” in 
times of peace “but should industriously lay up stores of which to avail to himself in times 
of adversity; so that when fortune abandons him, he may be prepared to resist her blows” 
(Griffith ed., 1997, p. 58).  
Hezbollah is surely laying up stores of rockets and other weapons coming from Iran 
through Syria. However, the quantities and kinds of those weapons remain apt for 
speculations since none of the involved parties reveals anything about them. Nasrallah 
announced in 2009 that his party has the right to possess any kind of weapons to use against 
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Israel including Air Defense; however, he continues that whether the party has it or not is 
another issue (Annahar, 17 February, 2009).  
Another example of Hezbollah’s compiling of weapons at times of peace is an incident in 
February 2007 when the Lebanese army confiscated a truck that was secretly transporting 
weapons for Hezbollah.  
In fact, this example will move us to the second section of this chapter where we will 
discuss Hezbollah’s relation to the Lebanese state and the impact of its possession of 
weapons on Lebanon’s sovereignty.  
Nasrallah’s comments on the confiscation of weapons came shortly after the incident and 
he perceived it as an act against him by the Siniora led-government which he was opposing 
at the time. It is not the national Lebanese army that confiscated the weapons but the 
current cabinet which has already seized weapons during the July War and had not returned 
them yet, he said (Sabbagh, 2007). He sarcastically added, “It is the resistant cabinet that 
seizes the Resistance’s weapons in the toughest days of war and confrontation,” (Sabbagh, 
2007). He warned against inciting any conflict between the resistance and the army adding 
that such attempts shall fail. “Our weapons are theirs, and their weapons are ours in the 
battlefield, that was the case and will always be,” he said (Sabbagh, 2007). 
Looking into Nasrallah’s words reveals some controversies. According to Nasrallah’s logic, 
the army must act as if it did not see a truck loaded with weapons taking a trip inside its 
territory, and then handing over those weapons to one group. Nasrallah moves from the 
premises that these weapons will only be used against Israel and as such the army should 
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not take any step to halt their arrival into Hezbollah’s safe havens. What about any 
consideration to the law? What about the security of a country that was at the time 
witnessing increasing political turmoil? How can the army and an armed group coexist and 
support each other at the same time? 
Hezbollah has sometimes, accidentally or not, crossed the limits in dealing with the 
Lebanese Army. Take the August 2008 incident when Hezbollah fighters fired at the 
Lebanese Army helicopter flying over the southern village of Tilal Soujoud and shot dead 
Lieutenant Samer Hanna. Nasrallah described the incident as a “painful and regrettable 
mistake”, noting the Hezbollah fighter who shot the captain was only 19 years old 
(Annahar, 5 September 2008, p.6). Nasrallah said the assailant turned himself in to the 
military court noting that the party carried out its investigation to probe into what happened 
(Annahar, 5 September 2008, p.6). The Hezbollah chief said the “accident” had no political 
implications and called for avoiding the exploitation of the incident to create conflict 
between the army and the Resistance (Annahar, 5 September 2008, p.6). 
Away from all the justifications given by Nasrallah, shooting at the army constitutes a 
severe violation of the law and has serious repercussions on the state’s sovereignty. The 
Hezbollah suspect was released from jail only eight months later, which makes one ask to 
what extent is Hezbollah really under the rule of the Lebanese law.  
Even when the Lebanese army was conducting a battle in 2007 against the Fatah al-Islam 
fundamentalists in the northern Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared, Nasrallah put 
restrictions on the army’s operations. He believed that the matter should be resolved 
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politically in a manner that would protect both the army and the Palestinians. “The Nahr el-
Bared camp and Palestinian civilians are a red line. We will not accept or provide cover or 
be partners in this,” said Nasrallah (Sayyed Nasrallah: “Problem in North can be solved 
politically in a way that protects Lebanese Army, Palestinian brothers, 2008). Such a stance 
reflects an unwillingness to support the Lebanese army in conducting any battle inside 
Lebanon and perhaps achieving victories. One should take into account here that Nasrallah 
was in a quite difficult position. On one hand, he had to deal with the possible rise of a 
Sunni fundamentalist-Salafist movement, and on the other hand, he was wary of the army’s 
possible success which might be used by his opponents as a strong argument to have 
Hezbollah disarm and rely exclusively on the state’s military institution.  
Hezbollah has attributed to itself many victories such as the liberation of the south and the 
Israeli withdrawal in 2000, the 2006 “Divine Victory”, the various prisoner swaps with 
Israel. Some of these successes are debatable among the Lebanese and increase political 
tensions among the various parties. Whether they were true victories or not varies according 
to the receptors’ beliefs, background, perception of the reality, and evaluation of the 
political developments. However, one thing remains invariable: all of those “victories” or 
“non-victories” have happened at a certain expense at the social, humane, economic, and 
political levels.  
Once asked in February 2000 if Hezbollah takes into account the people’s suffering when 
Israel attacks civilians and economic installations, Nasrallah simply responds: “We have no 
other choice” (Noe, 2007, p. 220). He adds that the only alternative is that Israel remains 
occupying the territories and imposing its conditions (Noe, 2007, p. 220). “It is the fate of 
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the Lebanese people to resist and endure the burden of this resistance,” says Nasrallah, 
highlighting that despite the imbalance of power this war is too costly for Israel and they 
will not last for long (Noe, 2007, p. 220).  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
Limitations to Nasrallah’s leadership 
Hassan Nasrallah has evolved in his rhetoric from someone who stated in 1992 that he does 
not believe in a nation whose borders are 10,452 square kilometers in Lebanon (Noe, 2007, 
p. 32) to someone who in June 2005 surprisingly called for reviving late President Bachir 
Gemayel’s famous slogan of 10,452 square kilometers. Amidst his cheering crowds 
gathering prior to the parliamentary elections, Nasrallah called for “defending Lebanon’s 
sovereignty over its entire territory of 10,452 square kilometers” (Nasrallah: The U.S. will 
only ever see Hezbullah as ‘terrorist’ even if it wins all seats in parliament, 2008). He 
moved from someone who believed in a single Islamic world governed by a central 
government (Noe, 2007, p. 32) to someone who admits that nobody in Lebanon can 
“impose his own preferences on the others neither by words nor even weapons” (Noe, 2007, 
p. 325). 
Such changes in the Sayyed’s rhetoric convey that he matches with Machiavelli’s concept 
that a prince should always have a versatile mind and should “conform his conduct to the 
spirit of the times” (Machiavelli, 1997, p. 95). 
This thesis has set a very detailed comparison between the person of Nasrallah and the 
fictitious Prince in Machiavelli’s book. One can conclude that Nasrallah attained 
Machiavelli’s end result of achieving “the double glory of having established a new 
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principality and of having strengthened and adorned it with good laws, good armies, good 
allies and good examples” (Machiavelli, 1997, p. 92). 
The discipline and order among Nasrallah’s audience reflects his established good laws, 
whereas the loyalty and increasing arsenal of his fighters shows his possession of a good 
army. His strategic alliances with Iran and Syria have so far been to his advantage at the 
regional level, and his domestic alliances with the FPM, Amal, and PSP lately have finally 
shifted the ruling majority in Lebanon from the hands of the March 14 camp to those of the 
March 8, despite the results of the last parliamentary elections. Nasrallah never ceases to 
represent himself as a role model among his people and always sets his party as a leading 
example and superior model.  
Based on the above, Nasrallah appears to be as a very powerful leader in Lebanon, whom 
everybody should want to keep pleased and avoid his anger. Nonetheless, when one looks 
at Lebanon’s structure and history, he will find that many limitations hinder Nasrallah’s 
leadership and he will not be able to solely determine Lebanon’s fate, even if at many 
instances he seems to have done so. These limitations are present at the level of his 
community and at the level of his country. 
To start with, one should always keep in mind that no matter how powerful Nasrallah seems 
to be, he is neither the only decision maker at the level of his party nor at the level of the 
whole country. After all, Nasrallah belongs to a party which cannot operate independently 
of the Guardianship of the Jurist-Theologian, an ideology to which it has announced its 
commitment. We have seen that whenever Hezbollah wishes to take a major political 
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decision, it will always need the blessings of the Iranian clerics, particularly that of Imam 
Khamenei today as was the case with Imam Khomeini in the past.   
This adherence to Wilayat al-Faqih, imposes an important limitation to Nasrallah’s 
leadership within the Shiite community. Not all the Shiites believe in this concept including 
leading late figures such as Imam Moussa Sader, Ayatollah Mohammad Mahdi 
Shamseddine, Ayatollah Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah. The latter is undoubtedly 
the “most eloquent speaker and defender of the Islamic cause in Lebanon” and he has many 
times openly identified with Hezbollah but he also opposed their position (Jaber, 1997, p. 
67). Fadlallah and Hezbollah have always denied that the former is the “sole spiritual 
leader” of the Party of God (Jaber, 1997, p. 67). At the intellectual level, Fadlallah relates 
little to Iran or Khomeini although he shares a similar doctrine of establishing an Islamic 
state in Lebanon and has preached for that in the 1960s upon his return to Lebanon from 
Najaf (Jaber, 1997, p. 67). 
Fadlallah had always been regarded as an important religious authority among the Shiites 
and has a strong following among them independent of Hezbollah. In this sense, 
Nasrallah’s religious authority is strictly limited to those Shiites who believe in Hezbollah. 
After the death of Fadlallah, some bargained that his followers will create a line of their 
own which might create divisions within the Shiite community. So far, this has not become 
a reality but no one can guarantee that it will never happen.  
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Amal does not share Hezbollah’s religious and ideological commitment to Wilayat al-Faqih 
and we have seen that both parties clashed repeatedly but were then compelled to seem 
united so as to render the Shiites more powerful vis-à-vis the other sects.  
Another practical limitation to Nasrallah’s leadership at the level of his party is the strict 
security measures surrounding him. He cannot freely move among his subjects which will 
always keep him distant from them. Nasrallah is always well protected and has his own 
fortresses. At the same time he threatens to defeat the enemy in any possible war. Despite 
all attempts to convince the people that Nasrallah hides because he is under constant 
danger, it is worth asking: why would his life be more precious than that of those people 
who have all lives and properties under his mercy if in any case he decides to engage in a 
war with Israel? 
Among his sect, Hezbollah is also subject to certain social and economic limitations in the 
sense that some Shiites are discontent with Hezbollah’s bestowment of graces upon its 
supporters only. Some deprived Shiites, who are not taken care of by Hezbollah, feel the 
discrimination in the party’s financial aid and services. Meanwhile, can they resort to the 
state in areas that have become fully controlled by the Party of God? 
At the level of the country, no matter how superior Hezbollah might seem compared to the 
other parties in terms of its military and financial capabilities, any dream of unilaterally 
ruling Lebanon might be too costly, and the example of the 1975-1990 Civil War stands as 
a live example in the Lebanese minds. Even if some sects seem divided and weak, 
experiences in Lebanon suggest that the moment a sect feels that its existence is threatened 
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it would unite and fight back to preserve its continuity and well being. Here we are talking 
about the fear of the other that would always compel any sect to unite if it knows that its 
existence is at stake.  
In addition to this domestic balance of power, one should keep in mind that Hezbollah is 
not the only party backed by foreign powers; all the other Lebanese sects share this 
privilege. One cannot easily drop the regional and international balances of power when 
studying to what extent Nasrallah can shape Lebanese politics.  
Talking about foreign powers, it is also important to reflect on how much Nasrallah really 
understands the West. Since the 9/11 attacks Nasrallah has repeatedly stated that labeling 
his party as a terrorist organization is an honor. Had he really been indifferent to such a 
label, then why did he put so much effort to clarify that Hezbollah is a Resistance 
Movement with a totally different ideology than that of Al-Qaeda? Nasrallah continues to 
adopt a dehumanizing language when attacking the West and calls for the death of the 
biggest Satan, USA. Is Nasrallah aware that such rhetoric practically leads nowhere and the 
US remains the world’s superpower? Is he really capable of understanding the moves of 
Western countries and altering his policies accordingly so as to preserve his party’s best 
interest? So far, Nasrallah has only been skilled in showing his enmity, which has only 
increased the hostility of the West towards him, especially amidst the Israeli excellence in 
self-victimization.  
It is also good to ask how much do Nasrallah’s resistance speeches still sell at the level of 
the country, aside from his ideologically committed believers? These slogans are mere 
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sources of deception for some Lebanese, who no longer tolerate calls for violence and 
repetitive wars that have only led to losses of life, material damage and economic set-backs. 
Such speeches are also frustrating for some Lebanese who aspire for a peaceful living in a 
country that has for so long invested in wars.  
On the other hand, what about those Lebanese who wish to fight Israel and Hezbollah is 
depriving them from forming their own resistance. Even when Nasrallah launched in 1997 
the Lebanese Brigades for Resisting Occupation, this was never a serious initiative to 
include other Lebanese in the fight against the enemy. Hezbollah’s seizure of the 
exclusivity of resistance has increased the feelings of despite of the Amal Movement and of 
all leftist parties in Lebanon who felt that they were forcefully marginalized and deprived of 
practicing their beliefs. We have seen that becoming a Hezbollah fighter is complicated and 
every Mouhajid should be committed to the party’s ideological and religious beliefs.  
Now that we have mentioned wars, it is also important to shed the light on the limitations to 
Hezbollah’s capacity to maintain the same level of arms supply and freedom of movement 
in the south following the deployment of UNIFIL and Lebanese Army as stipulated by 
UNSCR 1701. Is Hezbollah as free as it used to be before that deployment? Had Hezbollah 
not known that the army’s presence in the south would limit its capabilities, it would have 
willingly accepted its deployment long time ago rather than through a de facto UN 
resolution. 
Since the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, voices were heard asking for the 
disarmament of Hezbollah and for putting the decisions of war and peace in the state’s 
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hands. Despite Nasrallah’s vigorous lash back at those who raise such a demand, this does 
deny the fact that the party has been under increasing pressure, especially since 2005, to 
disarm. 
Nasrallah once said that Resistance is not the end but the means; and resistance gains its 
sanctity through belonging to the sacred goal of liberating the land, something that 
everybody agrees on (Lahham, 2007, vol. 13, p. 84). Nasrallah cannot really assume that all 
Lebanese believe in sanctities the way he suggests them. What about setting the Lebanese 
army as the means to reach that end? 
If Resistance were only a means, then why does Nasrallah go on the offense and adopt fiery 
speeches when anyone suggests putting the resistance under the state’s control? Even more 
controversially, the Party of God tries to come up with the new formulas and imposes them 
in the governments’ Ministerial Statements such as stating that Lebanon’s strength “through 
its people, Resistance and army could protect the country against Israeli threats and 
preserve its sovereignty.”  
Lebanon still awaits the STL’s indictment, amid several media reports and statements by 
Nasrallah and other party officials that Hezbollah will be accused of murdering Hariri. 
Nasrallah views this indictment as a sword over Hezbollah’s neck and a final alternative to 
disarm and dismantle the party. 
How will Hezbollah practically deal with such an indictment and whether its speculations 
are in place shall only be revealed when the indictment is issued. Will this happen anytime 
soon and what about the impact of all the rising revolutions in the Arab world on Lebanon? 
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Will the silenced unrest in Iran and the growing protests in Syria put at stake Hezbollah’s 
well-being? 
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 XIDNEPPA
 ٦٠٠٢-٧-٨٢رﺳﺎﻟﺔ ﻣﺠﺎهﺪى اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻣﺔ اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻴﺔ اﻟﻰ اﻷﻣﻴﻨﺎﻟﻌﺎم اﻟﺴﻴﺪ ﺣﺴﻦ ﻧﺼﺮ اﷲ 
 
 ﺑﺴﻢ اﷲ اﻟﺮﺣﻤﻦ اﻟﺮﺣﻴﻢ
 " ﻣﺤﻤﺪ رﺳﻮل اﷲ واﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﻣﻌﻪ أﺷﺪاء ﻋﻠىﺎﻟﻜﻔﺎر رﺣﻤﺎء ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻢ "
 اﷲ اﻟﻌﻠﻲ اﻟﻌﻈﻴﻢﺻﺪق 
 ﺳﻼم ﻣﻦ اﷲ ﻋﻠﻴﻚ ورﺣﻤﺔ ﻣﻨﻪ وﺑﺮآﺎﺗﻪ ..ﺳﻤﺎﺣﺔ اﻷﻣﻴﻦ اﻟﻌﺎم اﻟﻤﻔﺪى
 ..اﻟﺴﻼم ﻋﻠﻴﻚ ﻳﺎ ﺣﺒﻴﺒﻨﺎ، اﻟﺴﻼم ﻋﻠﻴﻚ ﻳﺎﻋﺰﻳﺰﻧﺎ، اﻟﺴﻼم ﻋﻠﻴﻚ ﻳﺎ ﻧﻮر اﻟﺠﻬﺎد واﻟﻤﺠﺎهﺪﻳﻦ
ﺎ ﻟﺘﺤﻘﻴﻖ اﻟﻨﺼﺮ،ﻓﻜﻠﻤﺎﺗﻚ ﻋﺬرًا ﻳﺎ ﺳﻴﺪﻧﺎ اﻧﺖ ﺗﻌﺮﻓﻨﺎﺟﻴﺪًا وﻧﺤﻦ آﺬﻟﻚ ﻧﻌﺮﻓﻚ وﻟﻴﺲ ﺑﺠﺪﻳﺪ ﻋﻠﻴﻨﺎ ﻣﺎ ﺳﻤﻌﻨﺎﻩ ﻣﻨﻚ ﺑﺎﻟﺮهﺎن ﻋﻠﻴﻨ
اﻟﻮﺟﺪاﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺳﻤﻌﻨﺎهﺎ ﻣﻨﻚ ﺳﻮاء ﻋﺒﺮ وﺳﺎﺋﻞ اﻻﻋﻼم أو ﻋﺒﺮ وﺳﺎﺋﻞ اﺗﺼﺎﻻﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻣﺔ أو ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل اﻟﻨﺸﺮات اﻟﺪورﻳﺔ 
اﻟﺼﺎدرة ﻋﻦ ﻏﺮف ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻣﺔ اﻟﻰ آﻼﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻣﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺮاﺑﻄﻴﻦ، ﺳﻤﻌﻨﺎ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﻜﻠﻤﺎت وﻣﺎ ﺳﻨﻘﻮﻟﻪ ﻟﻴﺲ ﺑﺠﺪﻳﺪ ﻋﻠﻴﻚ وﻟﻜﻦ 
  ..ﻣﺔ واﻟﻌﺎﻟﻢ ﺻﻮﺗﻚ وآﻠﻤﺎﺗﻚ ﺗﻠﻚ ﻧﺮﻳﺪ أن ﻧﺴﻤﻌﻬﻢ ﺻﻮﺗﻨﺎ وآﻠﻤﺎﺗﻨﺎ هﺬﻩآﻤﺎ ﺳﻤﻌﺎﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﻴﻮن واﻻ
  ..ﻧﺤﻦ ﻳﺎ ﺳﻴﺪﻧﺎ ﺛﺎﺑﺘﻮن هﻨﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻣﺘﺪاد ﺣﺪود ﻓﻠﺴﻄﻴﻦ وﻓﻲ آﻞ ﺑﻘﻌﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻨﻮب اﻟﻌﺰةواﻟﻜﺮاﻣﺔ واﻹﺑﺎء
اﻟﺸﻌﺐ ﻣﺎ زﻟﻨﺎ اﻟﻮﻋﺪ اﻟﺬي ﻗﻄﻌﺖ آﺎﻟﺮﻋﺪ ﻓﻮق رؤوس اﻟﺼﻬﺎﻳﻨﺔ ﻓﺒﻌﻀﻨﺎﻏِﻨﻢ واﻟﺘﺤﻢ ﻣﻊ اﻟﻨﺨﺒﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻨﻮد اﻟﻌﺪو ﻓﻲ ﻋﻴﺘﺎ 
وﻋﻴﺘﺮون وﻣﺎرون اﻟﺮاس اﻟﺘﻴﺄوﻗﻔﺖ ﺷﻌﺮ رأس ﻗﺎدة اﻟﻌﺪو ﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ اﻵف ﻣﻦ رﺟﺎﻟﻚ اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻣﻴﻦ ﻳﻨﺘﻈﺮون ﺑﻠﻬﻔﺔ وﺷﻮق 
 ..ﻋﻈﻴﻤﻴﻨﻔﺮﺻﺔ اﻻﻟﺘﺤﺎم ﻣﻊ ﻣﻦ ﻳﺠﺮؤ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻨﻮد اﻟﻌﺪو ﻟﻨﻠﺤﻘﻪ ﺑﺮﻓﺎﻗﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﺨﺒﺔ وﻟﻨﺴﻘﻂ ﻣﺎ ﺗﺒﻘﻰ ﻣﻨﺸﻌﺮ ﻋﻠﻰ رؤوس ﻗﺎدﺗﻪ
 
 ﻧﺤﻦ ﻳﺎﺳﻴﺪﻧﺎ ﺳﻼح اﻟﺸﻴﺦ راﻏﺐ
 ﺔ اﻟﺴﻴﺪﻋﺒﺎسﻧﺤﻦ ﻳﺎﺳﻴﺪﻧﺎ وﺻﻴ
 ... ﻧﺤﻦ ﻳﺎ ﻗﺎﺋﺪﻧﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﻬﺪﻧﺎ وﻗﺴﻤﻨﺎ ﻟﻚ وﻟﻠﺸﻬﺪاء
  ..ﻧﺤﻦ وﻋﺪك اﻟﺼﺎدق
  ..ﻧﺤﻦ ﺣﺮﻳﺔ ﺳﻤﻴﺮ اﻟﻘﻨﻄﺎر
 ...ﻧﺤﻦ ﺣﺮﻳﺔ ﻧﺴﻴﻢ ﻧﺴﺮ وﻳﺤﻲ ﺳﻜﺎف وﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﻓﺮان وآﻼﻻﺳﺮى
 ...ﻧﺤﻦ اﻟﺘﺤﺮﻳﺮ ﻟﻤﺰارع ﺷﺒﻌﺎ وﺗﻼل آﻔﺮ ﺷﻮﺑﺎ وآﻞ ﺷﺒﺮ ﻣﻦ ارض ﻟﺒﻨﺎﻧﻨﺎاﻟﻌﺰﻳﺰ
 ... ﻟﻌﻈﻴﻢﻧﺤﻦ اﻟﻔﺪاء ﻟﺸﻌﺐ ﻟﺒﻨﺎن اﻷﺑﻲ وا
 ... ﻧﺤﻦ اﻟﺪم اﻟﺬي ﻳﺤﻤﻴﻮﻳﺪاﻓﻊ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻮﻃﻦ
 ...ﻧﺤﻦ اﻟﻤﻔﺂﺟﺄت... ﻧﺤﻦ ﻋﺸﺎق اﻟﺤﺴﻴﻦ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ اﻟﺴﻼم 
 ﺻﺪق اﷲ اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺎﻟﻌﻈﻴﻢ" إن ﻳﻨﺼﺮآﻢ اﷲ ﻓﻼ ﻏﺎﻟﺐ ﻟﻜﻢ.. "ﻧﺤﻨﺎﻟﻨﺼﺮ اﻵﺗﻲ ﺑﺈذن اﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﻟﻰ 
 واﻟﺴﻼم ﻋﻠﻴﻜﻢ ورﺣﻤﺔ اﷲ وﺑﺮآﺎﺗﻪ
 
 
 رد اﻟﺴﻴﺪ ﺣﺴﻦ ﻧﺼﺮ اﷲ ﻋﻠﻰ رﺳﺎﻟﺔاﻟﻤﺠﺎهﺪﻳﻦ
أﻣﺎ ﻟﻠﻤﺠﺎهﺪﻳﻦ ﻓﺄﻗﻮل ﻟﻬﻢ، وﺻﻠﺘﻨﻲ رﺳﺎﻟﺘﻜﻢ وﺳﻤﻌﺖ ﻣﻘﺎﻟﺘﻜﻢ، وأﻧﺘﻢ واﷲ آﻤﺎ ﻗﻠﺘﻢ، ﻧﻌﻤﺄﻧﺘﻢ اﻟﻮﻋﺪ اﻟﺼﺎدق، وأﻧﺘﻢ اﻟﻨﺼﺮ 
  ..اﻵﺗﻲ ﺑﺈذن اﷲ، أﻧﺘﻢ اﻟﺤﺮﻳﺔ ﻟﻸﺳﺮى واﻟﺘﺤﺮﻳﺮﻟﻸرض، واﻟﺤﻤﻰ ﻟﻠﻮﻃﻦ وﻟﻠﻌﺮض واﻟﺸﺮف
رﺗﻬﺎ وﺛﻘﺎﻓﺘﻬﺎ وﻗﻴﻤﻬﺎ وﻋﺸﻘﻬﺎ وﻋﺮﻓﺎﻧﻬﺎ، أﻧﺘﻢ ﻳﺎ أﺧﻮاﻧﻲ أﻧﺘﻢ أﺻﺎﻟﺔ ﺗﺎرﻳﺦ هﺬﻩ اﻷﻣﺔوأﻧﺘﻢ ﺧﻼﺻﺔ روﺣﻬﺎ، أﻧﺘﻢ ﺣﻀﺎ
ﻋﻨﻮاﻧﺮﺟﻮﻟﺘﻬﺎ، أﻧﺘﻢ ﺧﻠﻮد اﻷرز ﻓﻲ ﻗﻤﻤﻨﺎ وﺗﻮاﺿﻊ ﺳﻨﺎﺑﻞ اﻟﻘﻤﺢ ﻓﻲ دﻳﺎرﻧﺎ، أﻧﺘﻢ اﻟﺸﻤﻮﺧﻜﺠﺒﺎل ﻟﺒﻨﺎن اﻟﺸﺎﻣﺨﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﺗﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ 
أﻗّﺒﻞ رؤوﺳﻜﻢ اﻟﻌﺎﺗﻲ واﻟﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻌﻠﻲ، أﻧﺘﻢ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﻠﻬﺘﻌﺎﻟﻰ اﻷﻣﻞ واﻟﺮهﺎن، آﻨﺘﻢ وﻣﺎ زﻟﺘﻢ وﺳﺘﺒﻘﻮن اﻷﻣﻞ واﻟﺮهﺎن، 
اﻟﺘﻲ أﻋﻠﺘﻜﻞ رأس، واﻗّﺒﻞ أﻳﺎدﻳﻜﻢ اﻟﻘﺎﺑﻀﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺰﻧﺎد، ﻳﺮﻣﻲ ﺑﻬﺎ اﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﻟﻰ ﻗﺘﻠﺔ أﻧﺒﻴﺎﺋﻬﻮﻋﺒﺎدﻩ واﻟﻤﻔﺴﺪﻳﻦ ﻓﻲ اﻷرض، 
 ..وأﻗﺒﻞ أﻗﺪاﻣﻜﻢ اﻟﻤﻨﻐﺮﺳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻷرض، ﻓﻼ ﺗﺮﺗﺠﻔﻮا وﻻﺗﺰوﻟﻮا ﻣﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﻣﻬﺎ وﻟﻮ زاﻟﺖ اﻟﺠﺒﺎل
ﺼﻰ اﻟﻘﻮم، ﺟﻮاﺑﻲ ﻟﻜﻢ هﻮ ﺷﻜﺮ ﻟﻜﻢ إذ ﻗﺒﻠﺘﻤﻮﻧﻲ واﺣﺪًا ﻣﻨﻜﻢ، وأﺧًﺎ ﻳﺎ أﺧﻮاﻧﻲ، ﻳﺎ ﻣﻦ أﻋﺮﺗﻢ اﷲ ﺟﻤﺎﺟﻤﻜﻢ،وﻧﻈﺮﺗﻢ إﻟﻰ أﻗ
 ."ﻟﻜﻢ،ﻷﻧﻜﻢ أﻧﺘﻢ اﻟﻘﺎدة وأﻧﺘﻢ اﻟﺴﺎدة وأﻧﺘﻢ ﺗﺎج رؤوس وﻣﻔﺨﺮة اﻷﻣﺔ، ورﺟﺎل اﷲ اﻟﺬي ﺑﻬﻤﻨﻨﺘﺼﺮ
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